


THE
RECENT FOREIGN POLICY
OF THE
UNITED STATES

GEORGE H. BLAKESLEE

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The Recent Foreign Policy of the United States

Problems in American Cooperation
With Other Powers

By
George H. Blakeslee

Professor of History and International
Relations, Clark University




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


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INTRODUCTION

GEORGE SLOCUM BENNETT, a graduate of Wesleyan University in the class of 1864, showed his lifelong interest in the training of youth for the privileges and duties of citizenship by extended periods of service as a member of the Board of Education of his home city, and as member of the Boards of Trustees of Wyoming Seminary and Wesleyan University.

It was fitting, therefore, that, when the gifts made by himself and his family to Wesleyan University were combined to form a fund whose income should be used "in defraying the expenses of providing for visiting lecturers, preachers, and other speakers supplemental to the college faculty," it should have been decided that the primary purpose should be to provide each year a course of lectures, by a distinguished speaker, "for the promotion of a better understanding of national problems and of a more perfect realization of the responsibilities of citizenship." It was also decided to provide for the publication of these lectures so that they might reach a

larger public than the audience to which they were in the first instance addressed.

To give the sixth course of lectures on this Foundation the committee for its administration selected, for the first time, an alumnus of the University, George Hubbard Blakeslee, of the class of 1893.

As Professor of History and International Relations in Clark University, member of the Commission of Inquiry to prepare data for the American delegation to the Paris Peace conference, technical adviser to the American delegation to the Conference on the Limitation of Armament and Pacific and Far Eastern Questions in 1921, organizer and director of conferences on international relations held at Clark University, editor of numerous publications bearing upon the foreign relations of the United States, especially with China, Japan, and Latin America, and member of the editorial staff of *Foreign Affairs*, Professor Blakeslee has won distinction for himself and honor for his Alma Mater. His whole academic career has prepared him to speak with authority on the topic selected for this series of lectures. By extending to other citizens through the publication of these lectures the opportunity enjoyed by the students of Wesleyan we feel that a very real contribu-

tion is being made to the "promotion of a better understanding" of a national problem of primary significance.


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FOREWORD

THESE addresses were delivered at Wesleyan University, on the George Slocum Bennett Foundation, in March, 1924; but they have been revised and expanded so that they now include the entire period during which Secretary Hughes has directed the foreign affairs of the United States. The volume is not a survey of American foreign policy from its beginning; the field is limited to the last few years, but with enough background to make the issues of this period intelligible. Neither is it a detailed history; many diplomatic controversies are not mentioned. The aim of the work is to present, to compare, and to discuss the recent distinctive foreign policies of the United States—particularly as these policies affect the problem of cooperation with other countries.

In writing upon this subject, a period of some few months as a member of the Department of State, preceding and during the Conference for the Limitation of Armament, has been of great service in gaining not only much information of value, but also a better appre-

ciation of the spirit, as well as of the methods, of those who guide our foreign relations. One cannot but be impressed by the ability, loyalty, and hard work which in general characterize the officers in the Department. Among the many remembered with pleasure, and from whom much assistance was obtained, particularly in the Division of Far Eastern Affairs and in the Conference Section of the Division, especial mention should be made of the gifted Assistant Secretary of State, formerly Chief of the Division, Mr. J. V. A. MacMurray.

A word of personal appreciation for the Secretary of State, under whom I served for a time, may be pardoned. Whatever views may be held regarding various items in recent American foreign policy, one who had the privilege of working under Mr. Hughes upon the problems of our foreign affairs will always retain an affectionate regard for the man and an admiration for the outstanding characteristics of the Secretary—intellectual leadership, keen insight into the heart of issues, idealism in purpose, and the rare combination of great force and abiding kindness.

Second only in value to an experience in Washington is association with the leaders in the field of foreign policy who come together

each summer at the Institute of Politics at Williamstown. There, under the guidance of President Garfield and Professor W. W. McLaren, an intimate insight is given into international affairs, from both the American and the foreign point of view, which can scarcely be gained in any other way. Particularly helpful material bearing upon our Latin-American relations was obtained from the Round Table led by Dr. Leo S. Rowe, the Director-General of the Pan-American Union.

To a number of friends, there is an especial obligation for the helpful task of criticizing parts of the manuscript. Among those who have read some or all of these chapters are: Professor Henry M. Wriston, of Wesleyan University; Mr. C. C. Batchelder, of New York University, formerly Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs in the Department of Commerce; Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck, of Harvard University, formerly an official of the Department of State; Professor I. J. Cox, of Northwestern University; Mr. Denys P. Myers, of the World Peace Foundation; and my ever helpful colleagues Professor A. L. P. Dennis and Professor Samuel J. Brandenburg.

The time necessary for the preparation of this volume was gained from a semester's

leave of absence, which was due to the kindness of the president of Clark University, Dr. W. W. Atwood, and of the Board of Trustees. The librarian of the University, Dr. Louis N. Wilson, has been always ready to order any volume, pamphlet or newspaper desired.

To deliver these addresses at my Alma Mater was a particular pleasure, where every spot is endeared by associations of old college days. For many courtesies from former instructors and professors, still members of the faculty of Wesleyan University, and for unfailing assistance from the professors in the Department of History, George M. Dutcher and Henry M. Wriston, there is grateful appreciation.

GEORGE H. BLAKESLEE.

Clark University, March 5, 1925.

WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY

GEORGE SLOCUM BENNETT FOUNDATION

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I

AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD EUROPE

A SURVEY of American foreign relations shows that the United States does not have a set of policies which it applies uniformly in all parts of the world, but that its most distinctive policies are essentially regional in character. In addition to certain general principles which it supports, such as the limitation of armaments and the judicial settlement of international disputes, it has a separate policy for Europe, another for the Americas, and still a third for the Pacific and the Far East. As for Europe, the United States now seeks to keep out of European politics. For this hemisphere it aims to keep Europe and the Far East out of American politics, and to group the American republics into a Pan-American Union under its own friendly leadership. For the Far East, it desires to cooperate politically with both the Far Eastern and the European nations whose homelands or possessions lie in the Pacific area.

In these chapters the purpose will be to study these policies from the viewpoint of

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international cooperation, to estimate the popular support or opposition given to each and the measure of its success, and to consider the problems resulting in each geographic region and the apparent trend for the future.

THE OLD POLICY OF POLITICAL ISOLATION

After the United States had won its independence from Great Britain it was only natural that it should desire, so far as possible, to cut the remaining political cords which bound it to the continent of Europe. Jefferson expressed this sentiment in a somewhat extreme way when he wrote: "We have a perfect horror at everything like connecting ourselves with the politics of Europe." This statement fairly typifies the attitude of an appreciable part of the American people from the earliest days to the present time. Only a few months ago ex-Senator Beveridge, in speaking upon the query, "How far, if at all, and in what way should the United States enter into the European situation?" answered, succinctly, "Not an inch and in no way."

The statements from the founders of our republic most frequently quoted in support of a policy of political isolation from Europe are from Washington's Farewell Address and

Jefferson's first inaugural. Washington said: "Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities." Jefferson, in summarizing the essential principles of our government, included among them, "Peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none." This same general point of view was held by John Adams, as is well shown by the following entry in his diary in 1782: "'You are afraid,' says Mr. Oswald to-day, 'of being made the tools of the powers of Europe.' 'Indeed I am,' says I. 'What powers?' said he. 'All of them,' said I. 'It is obvious that all the powers of Europe will be continually maneuvering with us to work us into their real or imaginary balances of power.'" Similar views were expressed by most of the political leaders of the nation throughout the nineteenth century. The Senate, too, has specifically indorsed the policy upon two or three occasions; in 1906,

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for example, it reaffirmed "the traditional foreign policy which forbids participation by the United States in the settlement of political questions which are entirely European in their scope." This clause may be taken as a correct definition of the so-called policy of isolation. The United States has never been genuinely isolated from Europe, nor did it ever wish to be so. There always have been trade relations with the countries across the Atlantic. Isolation means merely nonparticipation in the settlement of strictly European political issues.

The governmental action of the United States, in its relations to Europe, has for the most part, especially during the first century of its history, consciously followed the policy of avoiding any possible entanglement in European politics.

This policy of isolation, as thus defined, was based by the Fathers of the republic upon their belief that Europe was organized in a political system different from and opposed to that in the Americas; that the European states were monarchical, militaristic, and either constantly fighting, or else intriguing in a contest over the balance of power; and that they were so far away that distance alone was an important factor in making their

quarrels of slight importance to the United States. The statesmen of that period therefore concluded that trade, commerce, and peace should mark the normal relations of the United States with each country of Europe, but that, as a rule of general national conduct, there should be as little participation as possible in the strictly political issues of Europe, and, especially, no taking sides by the United States permanently with any European state or group of states against another state or group.

But the Fathers were not doctrinaire; if circumstances appeared to warrant it, they were ready to join with European states whenever and to whatever extent it should be to the genuine advantage of the country to do so. In fact, Washington definitely recognized "temporary alliances" with European states as proper for "extraordinary emergencies." During the War for Independence the Government not only made the military alliance with France, but was ready and willing to enter into every other European connection which would aid it in the struggle against England. And Washington, at least, regarded the policy of isolation as partially a temporary one; he looked forward to the time when the United States would meet with

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other nations to consider world affairs. He spoke of the future "when, our institutions being firmly consolidated and working with complete success, we might safely and perhaps beneficially take part in the consultations held by foreign states for the advantage of the nations."

As the United States became a genuine world power, especially from the time of the Spanish War, it began to participate—much as Washington had prophesied—with increasing frequency with the states of Europe in settling matters of international interest, some of them political in nature. During the three decades before the World War the United States took part in twenty-eight official international conferences, meeting in Europe, which drew up treaties which our Government ratified; but in the hundred years before that time, from 1784 to 1884, it took part officially in only two such international gatherings. These many conferences shortly before the World War showed that it was necessary, as international intercourse grew more intimate, for the United States to join with other states in discussing matters which were of general interest to various countries of the world.

This increased participation with Europe

in many matters was especially noticeable beginning with the administration of President Roosevelt. He was in frequent communication, either direct or through his Secretaries of State, with the powers of Europe over international political problems. The most striking evidence of this was in connection with the Algeciras Conference held in Spain in 1906. While technically the issue there related to Morocco, a part of Africa, actually it was the major political problem of the time in the European balance of power and threatened not only hostilities between Germany and France, but a general European struggle, with the major alignment the same as that in the World War. In this critical and, in essence, strictly European political issue, the United States took the most influential part. It was President Roosevelt who virtually decided that the Conference should meet; the official agenda he drew up in the White House; and when the Conference appeared deadlocked, it was the President of the United States who decided by cable the terms of settlement and induced the reluctant Kaiser to accept them. This was not only participation, but leadership, in European political affairs; yet it was not an alignment of the United States with either one side or

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the other, but was merely cooperation in the effort to preserve the peace of Europe; and the peace of Europe concerned the United States, even if viewed from its merely material interests.

Notwithstanding this increased cooperation—much of it not being known to the public at large—when the World War broke out, the old spirit of isolation asserted itself, and the general feeling in America was that the struggle was a strictly European affair, which should be left entirely alone. President Wilson appealed to the American people to “be neutral in fact as well as in name,” and added, “We must be impartial in thought as well as in action.” He later stated that we had been neutral in part “because it was the fixed traditional policy of the United States to stand aloof from the politics of Europe.” In those early days of the World War the attitude of Americans, in their feeling of political isolation from Europe, was well illustrated by the program at a college dinner in one of our New England institutions: two debating teams were chosen to present the arguments of the Entente and Central Powers respectively; the student body joined in singing alternately as best they could the “Marseillaise” and “Die Wacht am

Rhein," closing with "The Star-Spangled Banner" as a doxology; and the university president gave an address upon America as the land of true neutrality where prejudice dies.

THE NEW POLICY OF POLITICAL COOPERATION

But this isolation phase of thought passed away. After a time the same political leaders who had preached the doctrine of separation from Europe were proclaiming the opposite creed—that American interests and ideals were involved in this European struggle. When Congress declared war on Germany, American public opinion gave its support. It favored the most intimate cooperation with the Entente in measures of all kinds aimed at winning the war—although, due possibly to a survival of the old isolationist attitude, the United States took the position of an associated, not an allied power. When the fighting was over, American opinion looked forward with approval to the full participation by the United States—either by the President in person or by his delegates—in the conference which was to meet in Europe to settle the most complicated tangle of political issues ever presented to an international gathering in that old war-racked continent.

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When the American delegation was taking part in Paris in making world peace, American sentiment on foreign policy was apparently greatly changed from what it had been in the pre-war days. Long-held beliefs had become molten in the crucible of war. Fighting not merely for national interests but for American ideals, it was common in those war days to hear from the platform and to read in the press: "This has been our war from the beginning; only we entered it late." With two million soldiers fighting side by side with Englishmen and Frenchmen against the troops of Germany, the old slogans of the policy of isolation sounded like hollow mockery—"The broils of Europe," "No entangling alliances," "Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none, or a very remote relation." But the "broils of Europe" had entangled us. The "primary interests of Europe" had not a "very remote relation" to us but a very close relation. Were we not up to our necks in Europe? Had not a European political issue involved us in war, and was some other political issue not likely to involve us in a future war? It was this situation and this feeling which inclined the American people to favor another policy—that of creating a league or association of na-

tions to maintain peace—a policy which at least raised the issue whether it could be reconciled with the old doctrine of isolation.

The first American of note to announce this new policy was none other than Theodore Roosevelt. In his Christiania address, in 1910, upon receiving the Nobel Peace Prize for bringing to an end the Russo-Japanese War, he said: "Finally, it would be a master stroke if those great powers honestly bent on peace would form a league of peace, not only to keep the peace among themselves, but to prevent by force if necessary, its being broken by others."¹ The outbreak of the World War intensified Mr. Roosevelt's conviction. In *The Outlook*, *The Independent*, the *New York Times*, and in his volume, *America and the World War*, which appeared early in 1915, he preached the need, emphasized by the war, of a great "world League for the Peace of Righteousness," of which the United States should be a leading member. "The effective power of civilization," he said, "must be put back of civilization's collective purpose to secure reasonable justice between nation and nation." This belief in a league or association of nations to enforce just peace Mr. Roosevelt always maintained.

¹ *The Outlook*, Vol. 95, p. 19.

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At the same time that Mr. Roosevelt was writing his articles in favor of a great world league, others were working out the plan for the League to Enforce Peace. A society organized in 1915, of which ex-President Taft and President Lowell of Harvard were the most distinguished leaders, aimed to create a league of nations pledged to use their united economic and military forces against any state which should resort to war before submitting an issue either to a world court or to a council of conciliation. The League to Enforce Peace received widespread support; eighteen State Legislatures indorsed the plan by resolution. At the Annual Assemblage of the League, in Washington, May, 1916, among the speakers was Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, who said: "We have carried the principle of voluntary arbitration to its limit. . . . I think the next step is that which this League proposes, and that is to put force behind international peace."

Following Senator Lodge, introduced by ex-President Taft, spoke President Woodrow Wilson. He sounded the first official note of a new foreign policy when he said: "We are participants, whether we would or not, in the life of the world. The interests of all nations are our own also. We are partners with the

rest. What affects mankind is inevitably our affair as well as the affair of the natives of Europe and of Asia." From that time the Government of the United States was the official leader of what had come to be a world movement in favor of an effective league of nations.

Although it is always hazardous to speak positively upon the state of public opinion at any particular time, yet there were so many straw votes, so much public discussion, and so many resolutions by so many different kinds of organizations, that upon the basis of these it appears reasonably certain that when the treaty of peace was being negotiated at Paris, a substantial majority of the American people favored in principle the formation of a league of nations, of which the United States should be a member, for the general purpose of maintaining the peace of the world.

It was one thing to accept the ideal of a world league; it was quite another thing to accept a detailed constitution creating such a league. In the Senate it was not the principle of a league, but, in combination with party politics, a difference of opinion on certain of the provisions of the Covenant of the League which caused its defeat. In the following Presidential campaign, in 1920, the

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Democratic Party declared for the League. The Republican Party, divided between those who were thoroughgoing isolationists and those who supported the League, though generally with reservations, declared for some association of nations "to preserve the peace of the world." A few days after the election was over, the Vice-President-elect, Mr. Calvin Coolidge, said: "I doubt if any particular mandate was given at the last election on the question of the League of Nations. . . . You can't say that there was a preponderance of votes against the League of Nations."

CLASH BETWEEN POLICIES OF POLITICAL ISOLATION AND COOPERATION

But very clearly there had begun a perceptible cooling of the war-time enthusiasm for full cooperation with our European associates. This change of attitude was due not merely to the influence of political leaders who were isolationists, but also to the altered situation both in the United States and in Europe.

In the United States the new policy of close cooperation with Europe in political matters had been brought about in part by the generous idealism of the war, by the spirit of service for the welfare of humanity as a whole. But with the emotional reaction which came after the

peace, and which follows every great war, the American people came to think less of making the world safe for democracy and more of their own domestic problems.

In Europe since the war there has also been a reaction, toward prewar diplomacy, which has affected American sentiment unfavorably. A struggle has been going on between conflicting principles of international organization: between a general league and exclusive alliances. The League is functioning; it has accomplished some notable achievements, such as the settlement of the Silesian boundary question, the creation of a World Court, and the economic rehabilitation of Austria and Hungary. It has done much good; it has done no harm; it is growing constantly stronger; but it has not yet realized the expectations of those who planned it. The very idea of a league of nations, as Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson conceived it, excluded rival alliances within its membership. Yet to-day in Europe, side by side with the League, there exist rival groupings of the nations, alliances in a new balance of power, and apparent dependence upon military strength. Furthermore, in the idealism of 1917 and 1918, when America thought of a covenant of free peoples, it was believed that with the overthrow of

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autocracies, all responsible governments would be unselfish, conciliatory, and peaceful. The discovery that the free peoples of Europe since the war have been, in considerable part, selfish, unconciliatory, and intensely and aggressively nationalistic, has at least chilled the earlier enthusiasm for unlimited participation with them in settling their international disputes.

This recent change in American sentiment has thrown into a clearer light the problem of determining what shall be the foreign policy of the United States toward Europe. The problem, which is the most important in the entire field of American international relations, has grown out of the fact that the American people have recently had two apparently conflicting policies toward Europe—the old policy of political isolation and the new policy of complete political cooperation. Each policy rests upon contentions in which there is at least a large measure of truth. The isolationists say, "A Balkan squabble does not concern the United States." But the cooperationists reply, "It was a Balkan squabble which started the World War."

When the new policy was being advocated, its apparent departure from the old was justified on two grounds: first, the policy of isola-

tion was no longer suited to the twentieth century; second, the new policy did not violate the essential principles of the old. President Wilson well expressed both points of view. He said: "The United States was once in enjoyment of what we used to call splendid isolation. The three thousand miles of the Atlantic seemed to hold all European affairs at arms' length from us. . . . It does not suffice . . . to suggest that we do again what we did when we were provincial and isolated and unconnected with the great forces of the world, for now we are in the great drift of humanity which is to determine the politics of every country in the world." But he also endeavored to reconcile the new with the old when he said: "I am proposing that all nations henceforth avoid entangling alliances which would draw them into competition of power. . . . There is no entangling alliance in a concert of power." Strange as it seems to-day, Senator Lodge expressed the same view in 1916, when he said: "But I do not believe that when Washington warned us against entangling alliances he meant for one moment that we should not join with the other civilized nations of the world if a method could be found to diminish war and encourage peace."

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Perhaps more than any other of our leading statesmen Mr. Roosevelt believed in both the new and the old policies, at least in each in part, and felt that they must be reconciled. Although he had advocated a strong league of nations in 1910, and again in the opening weeks of the World War, he yet felt that some limit should be placed upon the extent of American participation in the ordinary disputes of Europe. In his last article, January, 1919, written before the adoption of the provisions of the Covenant at Paris, he said: "Mr. Taft has recently defined the purposes of the League and the limitations under which it would act, in a way that enables most of us to say we very heartily agree in principle with his theory and can, without doubt, come to an agreement on specific details." He continued: "Finally make it perfectly clear that we do not intend to take a position of an international 'Meddlesome Matty.' The American people do not wish to go into an overseas war unless for a very great cause and where the issue is absolutely plain. Therefore, we don't wish to undertake responsibility of sending our gallant young men to die in obscure fights in the Balkans or in Central Europe, or in a war we do not approve of. . . . Let civilized Europe and Asia introduce some kind of

police system in the weak and disorderly countries at their thresholds.”² In other words, Mr. Roosevelt advocated the new policy of a world league, but he still held to the old policy to the extent of wishing the “ordinary vicissitudes” of Europe’s politics to be left to Europe. It is indeed a genuine problem, to adopt a system of cooperation with Europe by which important matters of general interest and issues involving world peace shall be discussed by an organized association of nations, of which the United States shall be a member, but ordinary local European problems be decided by European states alone.

Political theories have concrete applications. And the theories as to America’s relations with Europe have found practical expression in the various proposals regarding its relations to the League of Nations. The adherents of the old policy, the political isolationists, insist that the United States must have no connection with the League. The adherents of the new policy insist that the United States must become a regular member of the League. Those who would harmonize the two policies wish the United States either to join the League after adequate reservations

²Kansas City Star, January 13, 1919.

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have been made, or else to cooperate with it as an associate member or with such limitations that our Government would not be bound to take sides in the political disputes between members of the European state system.

Bearing upon this problem, there is a fundamental difference of view in the present League of Nations itself, the existence of which is not generally recognized nor its importance realized. The usually accepted view is that all the nations of the world which are members of the League should jointly settle international disputes which cannot be solved by diplomacy. All such disputes, it is held, whether between Chile and Argentina, China and Japan, or England and France should normally be considered by the League, either in the Court or the Council. So far as the controversies of Europe are concerned, it is maintained that it is almost essential that these be subject to world judgment and opinion, and that it is particularly important that the United States should give to the discussion the great weight which would come from its detached political position, its relative freedom from national prejudice, and its geographical distance from Europe.

But there is a newer view which has gained a foothold in the League. It is believed by

some that the League should recognize and encourage, either within or without its own organization, associations of nations composing the different geographic regions of the world, which normally, at least in the first instance, would deal with issues which are local to the region in question. The League as a whole would then have jurisdiction of matters which are essentially world-wide in character or which the regional associations could not settle. This view has already been carried out in a considerable measure in actual practice. American disputes, between American republics members of the League, have not come before the League for decision; but the officers of the League, in each instance, have acquiesced in the settlement being made in this hemisphere. Matters of common interest to American states are considered not by the League but by the Pan-American Union and Pan-American Conferences. Similarly, the disputes and the common interests of the Pacific and the Far East have recently been passed upon by the states of that region in the Washington Conference. The League recognized the desirability of some regional grouping of the nations by recommending, in 1923, in connection with the proposed general reduction of armament,

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that the nations of each geographic area should make a separate agreement of their own, and should, at least at first, jointly care for their mutual safety. The same idea was presented by Lord Robert Cecil to the Council of the League of Nations, in 1922, when he suggested that there should be continental associations of nations to deal with strictly continental questions. Although in 1924 the proposed Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes drawn up by forty-eight of the states of the League did not rest upon a regional basis, it was widely criticized on the ground that it was essentially European, and was not adequately adapted to conditions in the Americas and the Far East. After Great Britain, in March, 1925, declined to sign the Protocol, influenced in some measure by the opposition of its overseas Dominions, the British, French, and German statesmen turned to the idea of a security pact to be signed by at least the leading powers of Europe. The plan now under discussion for the establishment of political stability across the Atlantic is clearly based upon the conception of a regional association of European states.

Many Europeans not officials of the League believe in a European league of nations.

A well-known German critic of international affairs, Count von Bernstorff, recently prophesied, "As the United States did not join the League it seems probable that the League will gradually turn more and more into a European institution." The first of the Filene peace prizes, awarded in September, 1924, by a group of distinguished Frenchmen, for the best plan for the restoration of security and prosperity to France and to Europe, was given to a proposal which advocated the formation of a European league of states. The same suggestion was advanced in one of the two plans which divided the first Filene prize in Italy. A similar proposal was urged in a volume entitled *Pan-Europa*, by Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, published in Vienna, in 1924. Should the trend in this direction be carried further, until the European members of the League would normally deal with strictly European political questions, leaving the League as a whole to pass upon world problems, it would satisfy many Americans who are now classed as isolationists. But it would not satisfy those who believe that every international dispute is a world issue.

Were there no League of Nations, the present fundamental issue in American foreign affairs would remain: to reconcile the new

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and the old policies. During the war, before the League was born, it was the need of complete cooperation with our European associates of which we thought. Since the peace it has been the danger of European entanglement. In the struggle to reconcile these two different policies, as one of our American writers has expressed it, "America is divided in her own soul." This fact is partially recognized abroad. In a recent Swiss publication Professor Rossier says that while better-informed Americans feel that the United States should take timely precautions to prevent another European war, "The trouble is, they do not know how to intervene usefully in our affairs without entangling themselves in a maze of complications and controversies of which they want to hear nothing. . . . The United States does not want to take part in meetings where we debate the partition of Silesia, the government of the Saar, or the question of Dantzig."

This division of opinion among the American people has largely determined the recent action of our Government in regard to European affairs. The intimate cooperation with Europe during and for some months after the war, was followed by a complete withdrawal, politically, from all participation

in European matters. The United States was no longer represented in the Conferences of Ambassadors held to straighten out the tangles left by the Treaty, nor in the many commissions which the Treaty established in order to carry out its provisions. Its moderating influence was withheld from the key commission, that on reparations. When some settlement had to be made with Germany and Austria, the American Government negotiated separate treaties, the only course possible under the circumstances. As for international conferences, not only did it avoid those which were political in character, but it even, for a time, took practically no part in the many international gatherings to discuss general humanitarian projects. It was soon found, however, that complete isolation, even political, was impossible, however desirable it might be regarded. American interests in many ways were so closely bound up with those of Europe, that even from the viewpoint of America's own national advantage a certain measure of participation with European states was essential.

POLICY OF THE MIDDLE COURSE

Under these circumstances, the Harding-Coolidge administration adopted a middle

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course toward Europe, steering between the political isolation of the Fathers and the complete cooperation of the War and the Peace Conference. It developed a new foreign policy, which in its main outlines was forced upon it by this division among the American people as to their proper relations to Europe. The genuine desire of the administration to cooperate in some measure with our war associates in bringing real peace to Europe was thwarted by the fact that the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate was controlled by political isolationists, whose opposition to any possible European connection was made more intense by the bitterness of the preceding Presidential campaign. The resulting policy of taking part in European affairs which affect American interests, but strictly avoiding the political issues of Europe, has been very difficult to carry out, since the financial and economic recovery of Europe, which does vitally concern the United States, is inextricably bound up with the international politics of Europe. In fact, it has been impossible to draw a sharp line between European problems which are financial or economic and those which are political.

Not only a new policy toward Europe, but a new method of diplomacy, has been developed.

The Department of State has been limited in its action, in general, by the strong popular sentiment in the United States against participation in European political questions, and, in particular, by definite legislative restrictions. When the Senate ratified the separate treaties with Germany and Austria it added a reservation which forbids the President to appoint a representative for the United States on any body or committee created by the Versailles Treaty, unless Congress shall give permission to do so. This reservation, says George W. Wickersham, attorney-general of the United States under President Taft, "was an unconstitutional invasion of the Executive power by the Senate. Its adoption was one of the significant steps recently taken by the Senate in assuming an extraconstitutional control of our international relations."³ Nevertheless, the reservation has been respected by the Executive. The stream of our normal diplomatic relations with Europe, dammed by these barriers from its normal channel, has had to cut new channels in which to flow. The Department of State, when it deems it advisable to have the United States represented in some conference in Europe, either dependent upon the Treaty of Ver-

³Foreign Affairs, Vol. ii, No. 2, p. 180.

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sailles, or which is in large measure political in character, has usually sent its delegate under some such designation as "unofficial observer." This method has come to be almost the normal procedure. Yet in some degree at least these unofficial observers are doing much the same work they would do were they official delegates. Further, the Department has been forced to act indirectly, through private American citizens, whose selection for important positions in Europe it approves, but whom it could not directly appoint. Finally, many Americans of prominence have brought American methods and the best American ideals to help solve problems of Europe, especially those under the supervision of the League of Nations, although these individuals have had no connection, direct or indirect, with the United States Government.

The most important subjects involving co-operation with the states of Europe the past four years have been the negotiations with Turkey, America's relations to the League of Nations, and the settlement of reparations. At Lausanne, where the Turks, after defeating the Greeks, met our former war-time associates to make a general peace, it was evident that the United States had important inter-

ests—economic, religious, and political—which would be affected by the negotiations. Therefore the American Government, unwilling to participate fully, especially since the United States had not been at war with Turkey, sent representatives, who presented the views of the United States, influenced the joint negotiations, but had no vote and did not sign the treaty. After a general convention between Turkey and the leading European states had thus been made, the American Government negotiated a separate treaty, along the same general lines. This procedure was consistent with the older policy of political isolation and it was the only course possible under the circumstances; but the American attitude in this matter, as well as the insistence in the separate treaties with Germany and Austria that the United States should have “all the rights, privileges, indemnities, reparations, or advantages” which it would have possessed, had it signed and participated in carrying out the treaty of Peace, has created an unfortunate impression in some circles in Europe, a feeling that Americans are claiming all the advantages without assuming any of the obligations of participation in European affairs. The London Daily Chronicle said that there was a

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“fundamental contradiction inherent in a policy which simultaneously claims a decisive voice in the settlement of affairs all over the world and obstinately declines all responsibilities.”

With the League of Nations, regarded by its critics as a European political organization, both the United States Government and the American people have come to cooperate in an increasing measure. In the early days of the Harding-Coolidge administration it had no relations with the League, but it soon appeared that as the League developed in prestige practically all of the international associations and agencies dealing with humanitarian and other non-political subjects of world interest were placed under the League's supervision. The United States therefore had to choose between taking no part in these activities, in many of which it had a very great interest, or of discovering some method of cooperation with committees and conferences which were under the jurisdiction of the League. The case of the international movement to restrict the opium traffic is typical. In this effort our Government has for years been the recognized leader, and by its initiative the Hague Opium Convention was adopted in 1912, which placed

certain administrative duties in collecting information and conducting correspondence upon the Netherlands Government at The Hague. But all of the signatories of the Convention, with the single exception of the United States, acceded to the request of the Netherlands that its functions should be transferred to the League. The result has been that while the other Governments have corresponded directly with the Secretariat of the League in matters relating to the opium traffic, the United States has received questionnaires and sent its replies through the Dutch Government, which acted, in the case of the United States, merely as a forwarding agency. When the League organized a Permanent Advisory Committee on Opium, our Government, in 1921, declined an invitation to appoint a member of the Committee, but in 1923 it designated a representative to act with another League committee on opium in an "unofficial and consultative capacity," and later in the year sent a strong delegation, in an "advisory capacity," headed by Mr. Stephen G. Porter, chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives. In the spring of 1924, the Department of State instructed Mr. Neville, one of its Consular officers, "to attend" the

Preliminary Committee which was arranging the program for the two Opium Conferences to be held under the auspices of the League in the following November. In a somewhat similar way, the United States Government has now taken part through its delegates with League committees or conferences dealing with anthrax, public health, anti-toxic serums, relief work, traffic in women and children, control of the traffic in arms, transit and communications, and customs formalities.

The American delegates are not technically members of these Committees, since the United States is not a member of the League. As has been pointed out, they are usually designated as "unofficial observers." However, as Secretary Hughes stated: "They are unofficial simply in the sense that they are not and cannot properly become members of the League organization or Committees. But, so far as our Government is concerned, they represent it just as completely as those designated by the President always have represented our Government in the conferences and negotiations which he properly authorizes in the conduct of our foreign relations." The American delegates, also, may take part with League Committees in drawing up draft

treaties or proposals for identic legislation by various states, which may then be submitted to our Government for approval by appropriate legislative action.

A further step in cooperation with the League was taken when the United States accepted the invitation to be officially represented in the International Conference on Opium, held under the auspices of the League of Nations at Geneva, November 17, 1924. Congress expressed its approval by appropriating \$40,000 for necessary expenses. The American delegation, headed by Congressman Porter, and including Mr. Neville of the Department of State, led the movement in the Conference for a drastic restriction of opium and other habit-forming narcotic drugs to strictly medical and scientific purposes. Although the delegates secured the adoption in part of certain of the American proposals, they felt compelled to withdraw from the Conference February 6, 1925, since it had then become evident that no treaty could be agreed upon which would meet the conditions laid down in the joint resolution of Congress authorizing the participation of the United States. But this withdrawal does not affect the principle that our Government is now willing to enter, upon terms of

complete equality with other states, international conferences which appear to it to be desirable, although these may be convened upon invitation of the League of Nations. The readiness to cooperate with the League in this respect was illustrated further by the acceptance by Secretary Hughes, December 9, 1924, of the invitation to the United States from the Council of the League to take part in an international conference to meet at Geneva May 4, 1925, for the consideration of the restriction of the traffic in arms, munitions, and implements of war.

Unofficial America has taken an even larger part in League activities than has our Government. Various American societies and organizations have cooperated with the League, including the International Health Board of the Rockefeller Foundation, the American Society of International Law, the Bureau of Social Hygiene, the United States Chamber of Commerce, the American Social Hygiene Association, and the World Peace Foundation. A large number of Americans with no governmental connection have held, or are now holding, important offices under the League. Mr. Norman Davis, formerly Under-Secretary of State, headed the League Committee which settled the perplexing inter-

national problem of Memel; Mr. Henry Morgenthau, former American Ambassador to Turkey, was chairman of the Committee appointed by the League to care for refugees in Greece, and has been succeeded by Mr. Charles P. Howland of New York; Mr. Jeremiah Smith, Jr., of Boston, is High Commissioner in Hungary, with broad powers in supervising the League's program for financial rehabilitation; Professor John Bassett Moore is one of the judges of the Permanent Court of International Justice; and George W. Wickersham is a member of the International Committee appointed by the Council of the League to study the codification of international law.

American bankers and investors subscribed \$25,000,000 to the loan needed to carry out the League's plan for the financial restoration of Austria, and \$7,500,000 to the similar Hungarian loan. To aid in making these financial plans of the League a success, Congress authorized long-time extensions of the date of payment of the Austrian and Hungarian debts due the United States.

In these various ways, officially and unofficially, the American people have been participating in certain of the League's activities almost as much as they would do were this

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country a member of the League of Nations. In the activities of the League which may be regarded as political, our Government has taken no part, such as the supervision of the administration of Dantzig, the Saar, and the Mandates; the settlement of the Silesian boundary line, and the discussion of the Corfu incident.

THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPEAN REPARATIONS

The clearest view of the new American policy toward Europe, the "middle course" between complete isolation and complete co-operation—its success, limitations, and extreme difficulty—is to be seen in the history of our Government's relations to the issue of reparations and the associated problems of Europe. In the economic and financial recovery of Europe the United States is genuinely concerned, yet the Government has felt it necessary to avoid taking part in European political affairs. As a result, at the Brussels Financial Congress, held in 1920 under the auspices of the League, an unofficial observer represented the United States. Two years later, our Government was formally invited by Italy to take part in the economic and financial Conference held at

Genoa in April, 1922; but the Secretary of State declined, on the ground that the Conference would deal in part with political issues, and referred to "the clear conviction of the American people . . . that they should not unnecessarily become involved in European political questions." The Government did, however, send to Genoa an unofficial observer.

But the administration recognized that the prosperity of the United States was involved in the recovery of Europe; Secretary Hughes, in his New Haven address, in December, 1922, said: "The economic conditions in Europe give us the greatest concern. . . . We cannot dispose of these problems by calling them European, for they are world problems, and we cannot escape the injurious consequences of a failure to settle them." He then suggested that the Governments affected should appoint experts who, as private individuals, should make an investigation into the amount Germany could pay in reparations and recommend a plan for making the payments. This suggestion finally led to an understanding between the leading states that the Reparations Commission, created by the Versailles Treaty, should appoint committees of experts to study certain limited

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phases of the reparations question. Three Americans were appointed, among others, General Charles G. Dawes, Owen D. Young, and Henry M. Robinson; and General Dawes was made chairman of the leading committee. In order to agree upon the provisions necessary to put into effect the Dawes plan, which the experts presented, a Conference of the Premiers of the allied countries was held in London, July and August, 1924. The United States was invited to be represented; and the President instructed Ambassador Kellogg, at London, to attend the Conference "for the purpose of dealing with such matters as affect the interests of the United States, and otherwise for purposes of information"—instructions adequately broad, since the adoption of the Dawes report was officially regarded as affecting the interests of the United States. Secretary Hughes was in London during much of the Conference, attending the sessions of the American Bar Association, of which he was president, and naturally took an important part in discussing the problems of the Conference, although he acted informally and in a technical sense unofficially. The Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Mellon, was also in London and consulted with the British and French officials and delegates. Since an

essential part of the Dawes plan was a large loan to Germany, a considerable proportion of which would have to be floated in the United States, Thomas W. Lamont and other representatives of the leading American banking groups were also on hand to advise upon the terms which would be acceptable to American investors.

In these efforts to aid in the economic restoration of Europe, the Government systematically used the methods of its new diplomacy. It acted strongly, but unofficially. The initial public suggestion, which led to the Dawes plan, was made in an address by the Secretary of State before the American Historical Association. General Dawes and his American colleagues were proposed for their posts—it is understood—by the Department of State, but their actual appointment was made by the Reparation Commission. After the report of the experts was published, the White House gave out the statement: "It is the desire of the Administration that the Dawes plan should be put into effect as speedily as possible. This is the first essential step to economic recovery abroad, in which this country is vitally interested." At the London Conference America was represented by an unusually large and able delegation: the Sec-

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retary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the American Ambassador to the Court of Saint James's, the American observer on the Reparations Commission (Colonel James A. Logan), one of the Americans of the Dawes Committee (Owen D. Young), leading American financiers and bankers, and various assistants. Yet the only official delegate of the United States was Ambassador Kellogg, who was assisted by Colonel Logan. And his technical powers were so limited that he did not sign the Protocol finally drawn up by the Conference. During the Conference it was officially stated that the United States Government would consent that Americans, acting as private citizens, might be appointed to positions created by the London Protocol. After the Conference was over, the American Government encouraged public subscription to the large private loan to be floated in this country as an essential part of the Dawes plan. When the plan was put into operation, after September 1, American citizens were appointed to the key positions. The most important post of all, that of Agent-General of Reparations, was given temporarily to Owen D. Young, and later to S. Parker Gilbert, Jr., former Under Secretary of the United States Treasury. American citizens, it was agreed, were to hold

the presidency of the Arbitral Commission, and the chairmanship of the Arbitral Tribunal, provided for by the London Protocol; and an American, Thomas N. Perkins of Boston, has been appointed to take part in the discussions of the Reparations Commission and have a vote, whenever the Commission considers any question arising out of the Dawes Report. In fact, Premier Herriot stated to the French Chamber of Deputies, "We put in an American everywhere we could in the committees operating under the Dawes plan." As a consequence, America has come to play a decisive rôle in the economic restoration of Europe.

A policy is naturally judged by its results. Certainly, this method of unofficial cooperation with Europe in regard to reparations has thus far been strikingly successful. Just as America finally gave the essential aid to the Allies to win the war, so America, from present indications, has finally given the essential aid to Europe to win the peace; for the settlement of the reparation issue lays the foundation for the financial and economic restoration of Europe, as well as for a solution of its most acute political problems. The plan which accomplished this was in actual fact the plan of the United States Government; it

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developed step by step under its constant supervision and by its strong support. The method adopted, the unofficial and indirect diplomacy, was forced upon the Government by the legal and political situation: the restriction upon official action contained in the Senate reservation to the German and Austrian treaties, already mentioned, and the practical necessity of avoiding any course which would require the consent of the Senate, for this would probably mean delay and acrimonious discussion and possible failure.

But notwithstanding the scrupulous care of the Administration, it could not entirely avoid all participation in European political issues. It is apparent that the financial and political aspects of the reparation problem are so closely intertwined that it was impossible to separate them completely. The Dawes report was distinctly based upon the restoration by France to Germany of the economic control of the Ruhr and other occupied parts of the country; yet the French seizure of the Ruhr and the conditions upon which it might be restored had been for two years the very center of entangling European international politics. At the London Conference the strictly financial issues made rela-

tively little difficulty. The real problem was political, the insistence by France upon its alleged right to take political action alone against Germany should there be failure to comply with the stipulations of the Dawes plan, an insistence which rested upon the natural demand of the French for political security. It was the same political issue which was acute in the discussion by the American bankers of the conditions of the necessary loan to Germany. In fact, the central problem with which the Americans in attendance upon the London Conference had to deal was the chief political issue in Europe.

The difficulty of steering a middle course in our relations with Europe has been illustrated by the recent Paris Financial Conference and its results. Since the London Conference stipulated that the payments from Germany provided for by the Dawes plan should cover all her obligations to the Allied and Associated Powers, thus including those to the United States, it was manifestly to our national advantage to reach an agreement with the other powers that some portion of the German payments should come to the United States. When it was arranged that the Finance Ministers of the Allied Powers should meet in Paris, January 7, 1925, to agree upon a divi-

sion of the amounts expected from Germany, the President therefore appointed Ambassador Kellogg, Ambassador Herrick, and Colonel Logan to attend and to represent the United States. The American delegation was successful in inducing the other representatives to consent that a percentage of the annual German payments should be allocated to the United States until all American claims should be satisfied. After the Agreement had been signed by all of the delegations, certain of the European statesmen and journals expressed great satisfaction that the United States had become financially interested in the success of the Dawes plan; they felt that the American Government could not be indifferent should Germany default in her payments and some even stated that the United States would probably take part in putting pressure upon Germany should such a measure be necessary. As a result, vigorous criticism of the Agreement was made by the political isolationists in the United States, and the Senate passed a resolution asking the Secretary of State for a copy of the Agreement and for information regarding its negotiation. In reply Secretary Hughes stated that "the Agreement makes no provision for sanctions and does not commit the United

States in any way to any action in case the contemplated payments are not made"; that the Paris conference was not a body provided for by either our Treaty with Germany or the Treaty of Versailles, and consequently participation in the Conference was no violation of the reservation attached by the Senate to the Treaty of Berlin; and that the Agreement "was negotiated under the long recognized authority of the President to arrange for the payment of claims in favor of the United States and its nationals."

Participation in the Paris Financial Conference was a natural and almost inevitable step, since failure to provide for American claims by the Dawes payments would have brought severe criticism upon the Administration; the efforts of the American delegation were highly successful; and the Agreement signed included no political commitments. Yet unavoidably the United States has now a stake of some \$600,000,000 in the Dawes plan, and a corresponding inducement, although no obligation, to join in any action which may be necessary at any time in the future to continue its success.

INCREASING COOPERATION WITH EUROPE

Viewing the international relations of the

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United States with Europe as a whole, the outstanding fact is that there has been an increasing amount of international cooperation during the past four years, and of sentiment in favor of it. Instead of complete isolation from the League of Nations the United States is now openly cooperating with the League's humanitarian agencies, and participating fully and officially in certain of the International conferences called by the League; and this cooperation apparently is to be carried still further by the Coolidge Administration. In connection with the reparation issue, it is notable that the London Conference on the Dawes plan was the first meeting in Europe, during the last four years, of the political leaders of the Great Powers which an American attended, not as an observer but, within limits, as a regular participant; and that the Financial Conference at Paris was the first at which an American delegation was present on an equal footing with those from European governments. The adherence of the United States to the Permanent Court of International Justice has been advocated by Secretary Hughes, by Presidents Harding and Coolidge, by both the Republican and Democratic Parties in their National Conventions, and by the House of

Representatives, March 3, 1925, by a vote of 301 to 28; and a reluctant Senate will doubtless eventually give its necessary consent. In fact, the extreme isolationist attitude of the Senate has been very largely responsible for the marked condemnation of that body the past two years by American public opinion. Although the Administration has felt compelled by the force of the world situation to give up the idea of an association of nations, other than the League, which was advocated in the Republican platform of 1920, it has substituted the ideal of frequent international conferences to deal with specific topics. For a conference on further limitation of armament, there has come to be an almost universal demand, which has been voiced by the President, Congress, and both political parties; and the Administration has promised to call such an international gathering in the future if conditions in Europe should be promising of success. In the recent public statements of the officers of the Coolidge Administration, it is not the need of political isolation which has been stressed but the necessity for adequate international cooperation. It would appear to be the Administration's policy to join with the states of Europe in settling problems of common in-

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terest as often and as far as this can be done with the handicap of an isolationist Senate and with the accepted restrictions against membership in the League or participation in the discussion of purely political problems.

COMPLEXITY OF AMERICAN SENTIMENT

Any foreign policy will have its critics, especially one which steers a middle course between two other policies each of which has intensely earnest, nation-wide support. The recent strictly limited cooperation with European states has been condemned by certain isolationist elements; speeches have been made in Congress advocating proposals for compelling the President to recall from Europe even the unofficial observers, while the favorable Agreement signed at the Paris Financial Conference has been severely attacked. There are certainly limits to the cooperation with Europe which present American opinion would sanction. It is very doubtful whether public sentiment would support the Government should it join other states in administering Dantzig, in determining the boundary of Albania, or in discussing the Italian occupation of Corfu. The feeling in favor of avoiding the supposed entanglements of European politics is still strong.

The isolation sentiment in the United States is sometimes and with some reason regarded as due largely to politics and prejudice, but it cannot be dismissed so lightly. A similar attitude developed in England, in Parliament and among the people, after the Napoleonic wars. A recent British writer says: "Nor have we the right to criticize America's refusal to be drawn into the resultant mess. Her aloofness from Europe is, *mutatis mutandis*, precisely the attitude adopted by England after the Napoleonic wars. England, a hundred years ago, . . . isolated herself behind the barrier of the Channel and only reached out again into Continental affairs when it became her practical interest to do so. Until then she merely preached and criticized when illiberal things were done in Europe, refusing to sit in at the conferences which then, as now, were held at frequent intervals, sending to them, on one occasion at least, an unconsidered functionary whom she called 'an unofficial observer.'"⁴ Even to-day there is a certain amount of this isolation sentiment in England. A recent issue of the Round Table, a quarterly which reflects the opinion of a large, thoughtful element in Great Britain, contends that at all

⁴Foreign Affairs, Vol. i, No. 2, p. 64.

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hazards Great Britain must avoid going further into "the vortex of European militarism"; must, in fact, revert to her former policy of aloofness from Continental entanglements and alliances. Yet the British Channel is much narrower than the Atlantic Ocean; Great Britain is nearer to the continent of Europe than is the United States.

America's desire to avoid participation in Europe's state system is sometimes charged to selfishness; but the charge is not convincing in view of the magnificent generosity of American relief to Europe since the war. The tons of supplies sent to Russia alone, filling some two hundred and fifty steamships crossing the Atlantic, and seventy-two thousand freight cars after landing, a gift from both the Congress and the people of the United States for the starving millions of a government whose acts had robbed our citizens of millions of dollars, whose overthrow Americans ardently desired, and whose political system they hated—is a fair example of American idealism, even in times of moral reaction.

America will feed Europe but will not help her politically; it will lend unofficial experts to restore Europe's shattered economic and financial structure, but will not aid in main-

taining the structure of the great Peace settlement which Americans helped to erect. America wishes to be intimate with Europe in business and commerce, but a stranger to Europe in politics. The United States will not enter the League, yet both the Government and the people of the United States are cooperating constantly more closely with the associations which are the creations of the League. The American people, in their present frame of mind, apparently desire to be in Europe for some purposes but out of Europe for other purposes.

This present policy, which doubtless provides as great a measure of cooperation with Europe as is possible under existing political conditions in this country, does not satisfy all elements in our population. There is a sentiment strongly held by certain groups in favor of a greater measure of joint action with the states of Europe. Those who hold this view are all opposed to the isolationist attitude of the Senate, while many wish a much closer cooperation with Europe than is advocated by the Coolidge Administration.

The belief in the desirability of establishing close relations with Europe is due both to economic factors and to idealistic considerations—to Wall Street, on the one hand, and,

on the other, to the University and the Church. On the financial and business side, the attitude of the American people on such questions as the economic restoration of Europe passed from indifference to painful solicitude. It came to be felt that it would be a disastrous policy to let Europe go to a ruin that would also affect the United States when adequate and timely assistance could prevent it. The same point of view was officially expressed by the American Bankers at their Convention, in October, 1922, attended by eleven thousand members; they passed a resolution that the time had come for the Government of the United States to formulate the principles on which it would be able to cooperate with the other nations to bring about the needed rehabilitation of European countries and peace in the world. It is also significant that the United States Chamber of Commerce officially declared in favor of the adherence by the United States to the Permanent Court of International Justice, on the terms suggested by Secretary Hughes.

Idealists, in greater part, feel that the United States has not been true to its former standards of helpfulness and effort for the common good, and that the present policy of political isolation toward Europe should not

continue. The distinguished President Emeritus of Harvard University, Charles W. Eliot, is an excellent representative of this class. There are certainly strong forces, on the side of idealism, which favor close cooperation with Europe: the organized church, whenever it has expressed its views through conferences and declarations of boards of bishops; the strongest women's associations; and, in general, the college and university world. A significant vote was taken, the early part of 1924, in the convention of the International Student Volunteers at Indianapolis. The delegates represented discussion groups which had been studying problems of war and peace, and voiced the opinions of a wide circle of young men and women. Although many resolutions on foreign policy were voted upon, the majority of the delegates, some six thousand of the seven thousand four hundred, declared themselves against pacifism but in favor of the United States entering both the World Court and the League of Nations. These delegates doubtless well represented the protest of young religious idealists, yet a vote probably more in the direction of general American sentiment was that taken shortly afterward at Dartmouth, where a majority disapproved of the United States becoming a regular mem-

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ber of the League, but favored, by over two to one, organized and official association with the League, and by a still larger majority declared against the policy of political isolation.

The increased interest of the church in our foreign policy and the recent declarations of the leading denominations are of great significance. There is a growing belief that if religion is to be vital, it must abolish war as an institution; and that this result can be obtained only through adequate international cooperation and organization. The Methodist Episcopal Church, the largest of the Protestant denominations, at its quadrennial General Conference, in May, 1924, adopted the following resolution: "We set ourselves to create organization for peace. Grateful to our Government for leadership in the movement toward reduction of armaments and the promotion of tribunals for international arbitration, we insist upon a more decided and aggressive policy in these directions." While many of the recent resolutions passed by various religious bodies express only in general terms their insistence upon closer international organization, some of them declare specifically for a League of Nations. The Methodist Episcopal declaration

stated, "The participation of the United States in a League of Nations will receive our active aid." The Congregational Church declared, at the last regular meeting of the National Council, "We believe that the United States should either enter into the existing League of Nations, or find some more effective way to take our part in bearing the burdens of the world." A similar resolution was voted by the House of Bishops of the Episcopal Church, in November, 1923; while the Reformed Presbyterian Church, at its National Synod, June, 1924, declared unqualifiedly for membership in the League.

Not one of the three political parties, however, in the Presidential campaign of 1924 advocated the entrance of the United States into the League. The Democratic platform deemed it more expedient to propose a nationwide referendum upon the issue.

Any attempt by the American people either at the present time or in the near future to determine our national policy toward the League will involve the difficulty of either choosing between, or else harmonizing, two policies relating to Europe, each of which has been at different times maintained by both the Government and the people of the United States: the policy of political isolation and

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the policy of political cooperation in an adequate international organization. It will reveal more clearly two schools of thought. One says: "The world is a whole; the economic, financial and political interests of any part of it affect the United States; Europe in bankruptcy is a menace to the United States; Europe in war is a menace to the United States; therefore for our own interests, we should join in a world organization together with the states of Europe to preserve peace and solve acute international differences." But the other school says: "The world is not a unit; it is a collection of regional political areas; Europe is essentially different from America, and we should scrupulously avoid any cooperation in European political issues."

II

THE MONROE DOCTRINE AND
RELATED POLICIES

ONE reason for refusing to participate in the international politics of Europe is to keep Europe from participating in the international politics of the Americas. If the United States declines to become a member of the state system of Europe, it will have a much firmer moral ground for insisting that Europe must not enter the state system of this hemisphere.

It is the Monroe Doctrine which is supposed to express our determination that America shall be preserved for the Americans. But what is the Monroe Doctrine? In a leading metropolitan daily there was recently a prominent insertion: "I believe strictly in the Monroe Doctrine, in our Constitution, and in the laws of God." Can it be that a keen British essayist was correct when he said: "To the Americans the Monroe Doctrine is like God or religion to a small child—something fearful, something to inspire awe, something, if necessary, to fight for"? Cer-

tainly, the American people as a whole do believe, as an article of faith, in the Monroe Doctrine, and never more firmly than at the present time; they will fight for it—probably it is the only one of our foreign policies they will fight for—but their ideas as to what it means have been, and doubtless still are, vague and conflicting.

While the Monroe Doctrine is essentially negative, providing that Europe—or any non-American power—shall not do certain things on this hemisphere, the United States has a leading positive policy, Pan-Americanism. These together provide that while a non-American state may not seize the territory or the control of the government of any country on these two continents, the United States will take the lead in cooperating with other American republics to further common interests and settle economic and political difficulties. These great sister policies, the Monroe Doctrine and Pan-Americanism, the American people thoroughly approve.

The meaning of the Monroe Doctrine has been a subject of frequent discussion and dispute especially during the past three decades. It has been variously understood by our own people as well as by our political leaders and has been so unfortunately interpreted by

many in Latin America that this fact seriously endangers the success of our Pan-American policy. What the Monroe Doctrine meant at the time it was declared is quite clear. The United States did not propose to have the militaristic monarchies of Europe seize or colonize American territory or overthrow the young American republics. But as the decades passed, the United States became constantly more powerful, extending its sovereignty and protective influence ever further south; its relations in trade and finance with Latin America became more intimate; and the Panama Canal was begun, completed, and fortified. As our Government was forced to meet a constantly increasing number of issues in its relations with Latin America, its various actions were generally regarded as applications of the Monroe Doctrine.

In recent years there have thus come to be two different views of the Monroe Doctrine. The more popular one has held that the original or simple Monroe Doctrine, a policy merely of defense, has gradually been transformed into a broader, vaguer, more inclusive policy. This view is presented in such a standard volume as Albert Bushnell Hart's *The Monroe Doctrine: An Interpretation*.

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Another school of political thought has maintained that the original Doctrine has never been seriously modified, that it has remained simple, but that the United States has developed additional policies to meet new situations as they have arisen.

Whichever view of the Monroe Doctrine is held, it is evident that there is something which Latin America now resents—either the newer interpretation of the Doctrine, which seems to make it a policy of overlordship and tutelage, or, if the Doctrine be regarded as unchanged, certain of the new policies which the United States has developed in regard to its weaker sister republics. Partly as a consequence of this regrettable attitude of Latin America, there was earnest discussion in this country, during the two years before the World War, regarding the status of the famous Doctrine. At that time, while Europe had not yet absorbed our attention, the Panama Canal, the visit of Roosevelt to South America, our rapidly increasing trade and financial connections with the countries to the south of us, the pressing problems of Mexico and the Caribbean, all caused us to look toward the Latin-American world, and to give increased consideration to the Monroe Doctrine.

Monroe
Doctrine?

THE MONROE DOCTRINE IN 1913-14

Those who were acquainted with Latin-American opinion, possibly through visiting the leading South American countries during this period, as the writer did, had no doubt as to the general sentiment on the Monroe Doctrine. "We don't want any papa," was the reply of a prominent Chilean, when asked for the attitude of South America toward this policy. This reply well expressed the feeling of the continent as a whole. The people believed that it made Uncle Sam a stepfather over their republics, who not only guarded them from Europe, but watched their important acts and often told them what they might or might not do; and this interference was universally resented. But still more unfortunate was the conviction of many that the Monroe Doctrine threatened political control of their continent by the United States. That this view was widely held was stated again and again, in frank, confidential conversations, by representative men of the several republics. A number of them added that the expression, "America for the Americans," which is supposed to paraphrase the Monroe Doctrine, was believed by a large proportion of the people of South America to mean

"America for the United States." In García Calderon's widely read work, *Latin America*, which appeared about that time, he said: "The Monroe Doctrine has undergone an essential transformation; it has passed successively from the defensive to intervention and thence to the offensive. . . . The United States seeks to conquer new territories for their imperialist race."

This fear that the Monroe Doctrine endangered their independence was held by a considerable proportion of the common people in several of the countries, and by some individuals, although far from a majority, of the educated and governing group. Resentment against its spirit of patronage was general in all classes, in every one of the South American republics. President Roosevelt, in his Annual Message to Congress, in 1906, said: "In many parts of South America . . . an idea has become prevalent that our assertion of the Monroe Doctrine implied, or carried with it, an assumption of superiority, and of a right to exercise some kind of protectorate over the countries to whose territory that Doctrine applies." To the same effect was the testimony of Viscount Bryce, who visited South America in 1912; he added that nothing could more offend Latin Americans than

a claim of a sort of tutelage over their republics.

The question naturally arises, Why did not the South Americans express some degree of gratitude for the protection which the Monroe Doctrine was giving them against the military powers of Europe? The answer is that they no longer feared Europe. But for the part played by the original Monroe Doctrine, as they regarded it, in saving their continent in the past from European conquest, as it probably did, the candid, thoughtful people were reasonably grateful. This attitude was manifested by the Latin-American delegations at the Pan-American Congress at Buenos Aires in 1910; they were all willing to unite in a resolution expressing their appreciation of the protection which the Monroe Doctrine had afforded them, which should be sent to the United States Government as a mark of good will at the time of the centennial of the independence of the South American republics. It turned out, however, that no resolution was sent, since it seemed impossible so to phrase this resolution that it would indorse the original meaning of the Doctrine, and yet exclude the recent interpretation by which, as it appeared, the United States assumed the hegemony over the hemisphere.

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However much mistaken the South Americans may have been in their interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine, they certainly had some reason for regarding it as they did. Our newspapers and periodicals were constantly referring to the Doctrine as if it placed Latin America under the tutelage of the United States. This view was occasionally presented in our standard, serious books. The calm assertion of guardianship was seen in statements by our leading officials. Secretary of State Olney wrote, in 1895: "To-day the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition." Mr. Taft, when a member of President Roosevelt's Cabinet, in 1906, said: "The frontiers of the United States virtually extend to Tierra del Fuego." These and similar statements have been broadcast through the Latin-American press, and repeated again and again.

It was in part at least the knowledge of the unfortunate attitude in Latin America which started the widespread discussion of the Monroe Doctrine in the United States in 1913 and 1914. It was at this time that Senator Hiram Bingham, then a professor at Yale, wrote his well-known book, *The Monroe Doctrine an*

Obsolete Shibboleth. The volume made a deep impression, since it voiced, though in a somewhat extreme way, a dissatisfaction regarding the status of the Monroe Doctrine which existed widely at that time.

To ascertain the opinions of those interested in our Latin-American relations, the writer sent out in 1914 a questionnaire on the status of the Monroe Doctrine to all the professors and instructors in American colleges and universities who were lecturing upon international law or diplomacy, and who therefore necessarily had given the subject professional study. One hundred and forty-six replied, including representatives of nearly all of our foremost colleges and universities, as well as most of the men recognized as leaders in this field.

The replies showed that certain general conclusions were agreed upon by a large majority. The then-existing status of the Monroe Doctrine, they felt, was unsatisfactory. The Doctrine should not, however, be abandoned, but it should be more clearly defined and explained, and it should be decidedly modified in certain respects. There were two principal modifications favored. One was a differentiation in some way between the neighboring Caribbean region, where the states

were weak and unstable and where the United States had special interests and a genuine need of retaining and enforcing the Doctrine, and, on the other hand, the distant republics of South America, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, which were relatively strong and stable, and in no real danger of territorial aggressions from Europe. The other modification favored was to place the Monroe Doctrine upon a Pan-American basis; a large majority believed that the stable Latin-American republics should be invited to cooperate with the United States in both interpreting and enforcing the Monroe Doctrine wherever it might apply on this hemisphere.

This evaluation of the Monroe Doctrine was doubtless a correct expression of the opinion of university professors who had studied the subject. An attempt was also made to ascertain the attitude of a wider circle of Americans by finding the opinions of the public press. As a result, the views of forty-seven leading dailies and weeklies were obtained on at least some of the phases of the Monroe Doctrine. These views, in major part, were in general agreement with the convictions held by the college and university lecturers upon international law and diplomacy. A few quotations will illustrate the wide-

spread dissatisfaction with the Monroe Doctrine as shown in the press at that time: "The Monroe Doctrine is as elastic as India rubber and as comprehensive as all out-doors" (New York Sun); "That vague thing known as the Monroe Doctrine" (New York Evening Post); "The whole world would be grateful for some dependable definition" (Detroit Free Press); "The time has clearly come for re-valuing the Monroe Doctrine" (Boston Herald); "The Monroe Doctrine, President-made in the first place, has been made over and over again until its own father wouldn't know his child" (New York Press); "As it is now interpreted here and elsewhere, the Monroe Doctrine becomes not only a menace to our peace and safety but fails utterly in its benevolent purpose as regards the southern republics" (New York World).

A large majority of these newspapers and periodicals maintained that the Monroe Doctrine needed clearer definition, and that it should be modified by being placed upon a Pan-American basis.

This same general attitude was held by the two former Presidents of the United States then living, Roosevelt and Taft. Mr. Roosevelt had visited South America in 1913, sensed the feeling of the people of Brazil, Argentina,

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and Chile in regard to the Monroe Doctrine, and declared definitely that it should be made a cooperative policy. At Rio de Janeiro he said: "All the nations which are sufficiently advanced, such as Brazil and the United States, should participate on an absolute equality in the responsibilities and development of this doctrine so far as the interests of the western hemisphere as a whole are concerned. It must be made a continental and not a unilateral doctrine." At Buenos Aires he said, in his address to the Argentine people: "I wish there to be no doubt of my meaning. As far as you are concerned, we have no more concern with the Monroe Doctrine about you than you have about us. . . . The Monroe Doctrine in the sense of special guardianship thereof by the United States of the north no longer applies." In regard to cooperation he expressed the hope that "all of the Latin-American peoples will finally reach such a level of orderly self-government, of material prosperity, of potential strength, and of political and social conduct as to make the Monroe Doctrine, in the sense of being merely a unilateral doctrine, a thing of the past and to substitute for it a common agreement among all the free republics of the New World." Ex-President Taft, a few months

later, stated in a public address that he agreed with Mr. Roosevelt. The possibility, he said, of Europe's attempting to seize territory in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile was "so remote that it practically removes them from the operation of the Monroe Doctrine." As to complete cooperation with these stable republics in regard to the Doctrine, as Mr. Roosevelt had proposed, he said: "If we could do this, I would be glad to have it done, because it would relieve us of part of a burden and would give greater weight to the declaration of this policy."

Of the two former Secretaries of State, at that time, who had had the largest part in interpreting the Monroe Doctrine, Richard Olney and Elihu Root, the former, notwithstanding his authorship of the famous declaration regarding the sovereignty of the United States on this continent, believed in 1914, that the United States should proceed, in its Monroe policy, "not by making itself an international 'boss' but . . . by initiating, cultivating, and working through an American concert."¹ Mr. Root, on the contrary, stated in an address the same year, that the Monroe Doctrine could not be "transmuted into a

¹American Journal of International Law, Vol. i, No. 2, p. 425.

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joint or common declaration by American states or any number of them.”²

Looking back a decade to the two years immediately before the rush of Germany's armies through Belgium riveted our attention upon Europe, we find a widespread discussion of the Monroe Doctrine, and a rather general agreement on a few fundamental facts and convictions. In Latin America the Monroe Doctrine, regarded by many as a policy of tutelage and overlordship, was widely resented. In the United States, a majority apparently of professional students of diplomacy, of leading newspapers and periodicals, and of former Presidents and Secretaries of State believed that the Monroe Doctrine was not properly understood; that it should be more clearly defined or explained; and that it should no longer be a unilateral policy of the United States, interpreted and enforced by this country alone, but should become a common American policy, in the responsibilities of which at least the stable American republics should share.

THE MONROE DOCTRINE SINCE THE WAR

Then came the World War. After the

²American Journal of International Law, Vol. viii, No. 3, p. 440.

World War was over, there was another discussion of the Monroe Doctrine, but under different conditions and with a greatly altered attitude on the part of the American people. It was the League of Nations which presented the problem of the real meaning of the Doctrine. In the first draft of the Covenant of the League there was no mention of the Monroe Doctrine. The Covenant did, however, contain the famous Article X: "The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all States members of the League." In the view of President Wilson this pledge included the Monroe Doctrine and extended it to the whole world. As he expressed it in his address to the Senate in January, 1917: "I am proposing, as it were, that the nations should with one accord adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the world: that no nation should seek to extend its polity over any other nation or people."

But when this first draft of the Covenant was published, a widespread sentiment in the United States demanded some specific reservation of the Monroe Doctrine, and in response to this sentiment, President Wilson

was able, against considerable opposition at Paris, to insert the following provision: "Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace." But this specific safeguarding of our national policy was not satisfactory to many, especially to the opposition Senators. The Monroe Doctrine was not a "regional understanding," it was claimed, and it should not be affected in any way by the League. The Senate voted that the Monroe Doctrine was to be interpreted by the United States alone, and was wholly outside of the jurisdiction of the League.

During this more recent discussion the dominant attitude in the United States has been noticeably different from what it was a decade ago. The ending of the war brought an intensification of American nationalism. The spirit which carried the motto "America first" could hardly entertain doubts as to the wisdom and beneficence of America's foremost foreign policy. The newspapers and periodicals have lately been largely free from such criticisms of the Doctrine as were common in 1913 and 1914. Little has recently

been said in this country in favor of making it a cooperative policy. Even Senator Hiram Bingham, shortly after the war, withdrew the views presented in his famous book. The general purpose at present in the United States is to guard the Monroe Doctrine carefully, and to apply it with strictness to exclude even more completely than before all European political influence from this hemisphere.

Latin America, however, has not changed its critical attitude toward the Doctrine. At the Peace Conference, at Paris, when it was proposed to insert the special article in the Covenant giving treaty recognition to the Monroe Doctrine, there was considerable opposition from Latin Americans. The republic of Salvador made a formal request of our Department of State for an explanation of the Doctrine, "which shall put an end to the divergence of views now prevailing on the subject." The Government of Mexico informed all the other governments at Paris that "Mexico has not recognized nor would recognize this Doctrine," stating that it "would set up and establish a tutelage over all the nations of America."

The divergence between the view of the Monroe Doctrine held by the United States and that held by the Latin-American leaders

was shown at the recent fifth Pan-American Conference, which met at Santiago, Chile, in March, 1923. Some of the Latin-American delegates proposed that this policy should be made Pan-American; others made vigorous statements concerning the need of defining the Doctrine. But the head of the American delegation, Mr. Fletcher, stated that the Monroe Doctrine was a unilateral, national policy of the United States, which the United States alone interpreted and applied. The impression which this difference of opinion made upon many careful observers of the Conference may be judged from quotations from leading European journals. The London Times said: "The shadow of the Monroe Doctrine lay over the Conference. It became more and more apparent as the weeks went by that this Doctrine must be considered as the special and sole possession of the United States, something in whose application no help is needed or desired. However right this may seem to the United States, it nevertheless presents the Doctrine to Latin Americans as the right of North America to interfere in their affairs." *L'Europe Nouvelle* stated: "The Congress was a struggle between the United States, which desires to monopolize the Monroe Doctrine for its own interest, and

Latin America, whose governments are seeking to put that doctrine in the keeping of the Pan-American League."

THE SECRETARY OF STATE DEFINES THE MONROE DOCTRINE

Shortly after the Santiago Conference adjourned, the Secretary of State, evidently desiring to clarify and explain the Monroe Doctrine and so far as possible to remove the apprehension and ill feeling of the Latin-American republics, gave two addresses upon this policy—most appropriately since it was the centennial year of the Doctrine. Mr. Hughes realized the unfortunate misunderstanding of this policy by many Latin Americans, for he said: "Great republics, whose independent sovereignty has been safeguarded by the historic doctrine, no longer fear the danger of encroachments and control by European powers, but look with apprehension at the expansion, vast resources, rapidly growing population, and formidable strength of the republic of the North. They do not feel the need of protection against European powers, and the Monroe Doctrine is apt to be conceived, and criticized, as a suggestion of a policy of interference in their internal affairs."

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The Monroe Doctrine, he said, has not changed in any essential respect since its first declaration. Modifications in only two particulars have been made: (1) "What was said with Europe exclusively in view must be deemed equally applicable to all non-American powers," and (2) the opposition to a non-American power securing territorial control in America has been extended to any method by which this attempt may be made. The Secretary then gave the following official definition of the Monroe Doctrine: "It is opposed (1) to any non-American action encroaching upon the political independence of American states under any guise, and (2) to the acquisition in any manner of the control of additional territory in this hemisphere by any non-American power." He emphasized the following points. "The Monroe Doctrine is not a policy of aggression; it is a policy of self-defense." As it "is distinctively the policy of the United States, the Government of the United States reserves to itself its definition, interpretation, and application." It "does not infringe upon the independence and sovereignty of other American States," and it "does not attempt to establish a protectorate" over them. But the Monroe Doctrine, definite and limited, is not the only na-

tional policy of the United States applicable to the Americas. Particularly in the region of the Caribbean, the Secretary of State said, the United States has policies beyond that of the Monroe Doctrine. That is, we have a Caribbean policy which is not the Monroe Doctrine, and is different from the Monroe Doctrine.

In giving these two addresses Secretary Hughes has made a notable contribution to the clarification of our foreign policies for this hemisphere. Although Presidents and Secretaries of State in the past, especially in the last two or three decades, have frequently made statements regarding the Monroe Doctrine, no authorized spokesman of the United States Government has ever given such a precise definition and full, lucid explanation of our famous national policy as has Mr. Hughes. Aside from the clarity of his exposition, his most important contribution is his distinction between the Monroe Doctrine, simple and unchanged, and the other American policies of the United States. In these two points he has fulfilled the urgent need, stressed in the discussions of 1913 and 1914, of making the Doctrine explicit, and of differentiating, in our national action, between the stable, distant republics, such as Argentina,

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Brazil, and Chile, and the near-by, weak countries of the Caribbean.

There is, however, one point in his explanation which will not meet the earnest wishes of Latin Americans—that regarding cooperation. In stating that the Monroe Doctrine must continue to be a unilateral policy of the United States, Secretary Hughes is in accord with the United States Senate, which voted in a proposed reservation to the Versailles Treaty, in November, 1919, that the Monroe Doctrine “is to be interpreted by the United States alone”; he is in accord with most of our Presidents and Secretaries of State, and, in particular, with Mr. Elihu Root as he expressed his views before the American Society of International Law in 1914, and with President Wilson when he said: “The Monroe Doctrine was proclaimed by the United States on her own authority. It always has been maintained and always will be maintained upon her own responsibility.” Historically, Secretary Hughes’ position is consistent; logically it is conclusive; and in actual practice it might be essential for the United States alone to interpret and enforce the Doctrine. Should the Monroe Doctrine be made a completely cooperative policy, as many have suggested, it might well be that the United States would

refuse to follow a decision regarding its interpretation or enforcement made by a majority of the concert of American states. To imagine a concrete case: if Germany, shortly before the World War, after making a treaty with Denmark for the purchase of the present Virgin Islands, had taken possession of them, and the United States, upon bringing the matter before the American concert, could not obtain a majority vote in favor of putting Germany out, there would clearly be a most embarrassing international situation.

But Secretary Hughes' position is not in accord with the views of President Roosevelt, President Taft, and Secretary of State Richard Olney, all of whom favored placing the Monroe Doctrine in some way upon a Pan-American basis. And President Wilson, by proposing that the United States and the Latin-American republics should join in a mutual guarantee of territoriality and independence, showed that his American policy as a whole was in a high degree cooperative. Most important of all, a Monroe Doctrine declared, interpreted, and enforced by the United States alone is highly distasteful to Latin America. After the Santiago Conference, *La Prensa*, of Buenos Aires, the foremost daily in all Latin America, and not at all unfriendly

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to the United States, asserted that the Latin-American republics would never be content to accept the Monroe Doctrine as an exclusive policy of the United States. Of similar import was the statement at the Institute of Politics at Williamstown, in the summer of 1923, by the late Doctor Zeballos, formerly Secretary of Foreign Affairs for Argentina. Referring to the Pan-American Conference at Santiago, he said: "One of the outstanding features of the Conference was . . . that the Monroe Doctrine is not popular in Southern states." And he repeated the assertion, which he first made in Buenos Aires in 1913, at the banquet in honor of Theodore Roosevelt: Argentina has "no fear of any aggression upon her territory by any European or American power. . . . In consequence, the Monroe Doctrine is not applicable to the Argentine Republic."

While there is some feeling of apprehension, especially in the weaker Latin-American countries, that the Monroe Doctrine may be used as a basis for aggression, the strong states of South America resent it when asserted as an exclusive policy of the United States primarily not from fear, but from injured national pride and dignity. Their opposition is due not to material but to senti-

mental reasons. If my rich, influential and powerful neighbor publicly announces that he insists upon continuing to protect me from robbers, my attitude, provided I have no fear of robbers, is one of resentment; I regard his repeated statement as public evidence of my inferiority. Much the same attitude is taken by the Latin-American republics.

What the United States really wants is a material right: the unrestricted liberty of interpreting and enforcing its century-old national policy. What Latin America wants, in this respect, is a sentimental right: a statement of this policy which will not imply the national inferiority of the Latin-American republics. Is it not possible to satisfy both the United States and Latin America? It would appear that this could be done. Secretary Hughes declared in 1923 that the United States would welcome a declaration of the Monroe principle by each of the other American republics. This statement he elaborated in an address upon our relations with Latin America, January 20, 1925: "While this doctrine was set forth and must be maintained as the policy of the United States, there is no reason whatsoever why every one of our sister republics should not have and formulate a similar principle as a

part of its own foreign policy. . . . In this way, without sacrifice by any American state of its particular interests, the Doctrine would have the support of all the American republics." If adequate sympathetic encouragement should be given them, it is probable that most if not all of the Latin-American states would follow Secretary Hughes' suggestion, and announce a policy, each in its own phraseology, which would be the equivalent of the Monroe Doctrine. Such a procedure would be consistent with the vote of the Senate of 1919, and apparently with the known views of past Presidents and Secretaries of State; and would mark a step toward the position advocated by Roosevelt, Taft, and Olney. It would be even better, if at the next Pan-American Conference, or earlier if possible by a special agreement, the twenty-one republics should issue a joint declaration, possibly using the words of Secretary Hughes' definition of the Monroe Doctrine, that each of them is opposed "(1) to any non-American action encroaching upon the political independence of American states under any guise, and (2) to the acquisition in any manner of the control of additional territory in this hemisphere by any non-American power." If either course of action should be carried out,

the Latin-American states should then be satisfied, since they would be sharers in declaring the policy—it would no longer be the exclusive possession of their great neighbor of the North; and the United States should be satisfied since it would, as every other American republic, retain its unrestrained liberty of decision as to the application and enforcement of the Doctrine.

A similar suggestion was made by our Government shortly after the original declaration of the Monroe Doctrine. Henry Clay, in his instructions to the American delegates to the Panama Congress, which he drew up and signed as Secretary of State, directed them to propose, if it should appear practicable, that all the American states should issue a joint declaration that each, acting for and binding only itself, would not allow a European colony to be established within its territory. Substantially the same proposal has often been made by Latin Americans. President Diaz of Mexico, in his address to the Mexican Congress, in 1896, recommended that each American republic, "by means of a declaration similar to that of President Monroe, should proclaim that an attack by any foreign power which aims to impair the territory or the independence or to alter the institutions

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of one of the American republics would be considered, by each nation making the declaration, as an offense against herself. . . . In this manner the Doctrine which is to-day designated as the Monroe Doctrine would become a truly American Doctrine in the most ample sense."

If in addition, then, to the notable service of Secretary Hughes in giving such a clear definition and detailed explanation of our foremost national policy, there could be added such a procedure as has been suggested, by which all American republics would declare, either severally or jointly, their support of the Monroe principle, there would seem to be reasonable hope that the unpleasantness and even bitterness caused by the Monroe Doctrine in Latin America the past few decades would be permanently removed.

THE CARIBBEAN POLICY

Should the misunderstanding of the Monroe Doctrine disappear, there would still remain the problem of its closely related policies—those concerning the Caribbean, and the maintenance of a separate American system for this hemisphere. The Caribbean policy of the United States has popularly been identified with the Monroe Doctrine, but is now to be

regarded as distinct from it; it is composed, as Secretary Hughes has pointed out, of the Monroe Doctrine plus certain other policies of the United States. It is in the Caribbean region that the Monroe Doctrine is particularly important, since this is the only part of the Americas in which there has been any real danger, the past three decades, of the extension of European political or territorial control. As Secretary Hughes recently stated: "So far as the region of the Caribbean Sea is concerned, it may be said that if we had no Monroe Doctrine, we should have to create one."

In addition to the Monroe Doctrine, certain factors are responsible for further American policies in the Caribbean. The republics of this area are such near neighbors that the United States is particularly affected by disturbed conditions in any of them, and is acutely sensitive to any situation which may involve the danger of European aggression. The Panama Canal is in this region; a great amount of American money has been invested in various enterprises; raw materials essential to our civilization, especially petroleum, exist in large quantities; and the countries of the Caribbean are politically weak, economically undeveloped, and racked by frequent

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revolutions. The United States aims to control the Panama Canal as well as any other canal which may connect the Atlantic with the Pacific; to hold the military approaches to them; to give reasonable protection to legitimate American investments; and to encourage and, in certain cases, to maintain peace and political and financial stability throughout the region. These aims, plus the Monroe Doctrine, are the chief elements in the Caribbean policy of the United States.

The continuance of political and financial stability in the republics of the Caribbean, and peace within them and between them, is not only desirable of itself, but gives assurance of the maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine. For revolutions and wars make European intervention more likely, especially from the repudiation of old debts to Europe or the default on the payment of interest, from the contracting of new debts which cannot be paid, and from injuries, both personal and financial, inflicted upon foreigners.

To gain these various aims, particularly peace and political and financial stability, which are fundamental for all else, the United States has resorted to certain measures which have come to be characteristic means of carrying out its Caribbean policy. These are:

counsel or friendly mediation, helpful cooperation, the nonrecognition of governments created by revolution; and—but only if deemed necessary—a degree of political supervision, temporary military occupation, financial oversight, and the control of exports from the United States of munitions of war.

Counsel or friendly mediation has frequently been offered to Caribbean Governments. Recent typical instances are General E. H. Crowder's mission to Cuba, in 1920, to give advice in the perplexing financial and political situation in the island at that time, and Mr. Sumner Welles' visit to Honduras in 1924 as the special representative of the President to bring about, if possible, a peaceful termination of the civil war.

The helpful cooperation of the United States has been shown most strikingly in connection with the two conferences of the Central American republics, in 1907 and 1922-23, which were called at the suggestion of the American Government. Both of them aimed to further the common interests of the republics attending, and especially to guard against war and revolution. The Conference of 1922-23, held at Washington, drew up a series of treaties, the most important of which provided for strict limitation of armament,

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international commissions of inquiry in cases of dispute not settled by the ordinary methods of diplomacy, the nonrecognition of governments established by revolution, and a new Central American court, more arbitral and less political in character than the one established in 1908. The United States took part in the Conference and signed the convention for the establishment of international commissions of inquiry, the only one to which it could appropriately become a party. Already four of the treaties, which have now been ratified by three or more of the Central American republics, have become effective as between the ratifying states. In still other instances the United States has promoted international cooperation in the region of the Caribbean. When Mexico had a stable government, President Roosevelt and President Diaz, in 1906 and 1907, jointly used their good offices to bring to an end two wars in Central America, between Salvador and Guatemala, and Salvador and Nicaragua respectively; and President Diaz united with President Roosevelt in issuing the invitation to the Central American Conference of 1907. Within the past year Secretary Hughes invited the Central American republics to join with the United States in mediating with the revolutionary factions

in Honduras. The invitation was accepted, and a conference was held, in April and May, 1924, at Amapala, the Pacific port of Honduras, where the delegates of all these republics cooperated cordially in the effort to bring about peace.

A further method of strengthening the Caribbean republics has been the systematic nonrecognition of governments which have come into power by violence. President Wilson's refusal to recognize Huerta as President of Mexico is the most striking example of this principle of constitutionalism, but it has been applied by the United States in many other cases. The Central American states have signed a treaty, as has been pointed out, pledging themselves to the same rule of action. In their Conference of 1922-23 their delegates drew up a convention obligating their Governments not to recognize any other Government that might come into power in any of the five republics in consequence of a *coup d'état*, or of a revolution, until such Government should receive the support of the people expressed in a new election; and, even then, not to grant recognition if one of the revolutionary leaders should have been elected President. This treaty, although signed by all the five Central American republics, has not yet

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been ratified by a sufficient number to become effective.

The right of limited political supervision was first obtained in the case of Cuba. The Platt Amendment, later embodied in a treaty, gave the United States "the right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence, and the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty"; and obligated the Cuban Government not to contract any excessive debt. The precedent in regard to Cuba has been followed in other instances. Haiti has been placed under a far more extended American supervision by a treaty made in 1915, which is to remain in force for twenty years. In the case of Cuba the United States may take no action so long as the Cuban Government fulfills its obligations and maintains a stable government; but in the case of Haiti Americans are given administrative control of the finances and the constabulary of the republic. A somewhat similar treaty, now in force with the Dominican Republic, made in 1907, limits American supervision to the collection of the customs. The treaty with Panama of 1903 gives the United States rights of oversight especially in matters of sanitation and public order in the cities of Panama

and Colon. Our Government has attempted to negotiate three additional agreements of this general type. With Nicaragua and Honduras treaties were signed in 1911, which provided for the appointment of American collectors of customs, as in the Dominican Treaty of 1907, but neither was ratified. The Dominican Government was urged in 1915 and 1916 to sign a treaty giving the United States substantially the same rights of control as in Haiti, but it refused.

As for military occupation, it took place in Cuba from 1906 to 1909; in Vera Cruz, Mexico, for some months in 1914; and in part of northern Mexico throughout the greater part of 1916. Haiti and the Dominican Republic were placed under military control in 1915 and 1916 respectively. In Nicaragua a small legion guard has been maintained at the capital from 1912 to the present time, which has been adequate to maintain public order and prevent revolution.

The United States has also sought, by a measure of financial assistance or supervision, to promote the economic and financial strength, and thus the political stability, of these republics. This is a legitimate phase of the much-criticized Dollar diplomacy. In explanation of this aim, President Taft said:

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"It should be the policy of this Government, especially with respect to countries in geographical proximity to the Canal Zone, to give to them when requested all proper assistance, within the scope of our limitations, in the promotion of peace, in the development of their resources, and in a sound reorganization of their fiscal systems, thus, by contributing to the removal of conditions of turbulence and instability, enabling them by better established governments to take their rightful places among the law-abiding and progressive countries of the world." Secretary Hughes indorsed this policy. The difficulties of these Caribbean republics, he stated, are due in considerable measure to the lack of the development of their resources; these resources cannot be developed, however, except by private foreign capital, which cannot be obtained, at least at reasonable rates, unless there is adequate security. In this situation, he explained, the United States Government "has at times, with the consent of the parties—indeed, at their instance—agreed to a measure of supervision in the maintenance of security for loans which otherwise would have been made only at oppressive rates." This supervision is often exercised through Americans nominated or approved by the Gov-

ernment, who act as collectors of customs or as financial advisers. In some cases, however, our Government has had nothing whatever to do with the selection of such officials, their appointment being made by a Latin-American republic in accordance with the terms of a loan contract with some American banking corporation. Including both those who have some official connection with the United States Government and those who act entirely unofficially, there are Americans at present in one or more of these financial positions in the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Panama. In regard to Nicaragua it is provided by the treaty of 1914 that the \$3,000,000 to be paid by the United States for the Canal option can be spent only upon authorization of some designated American official. The recent loan contract with the republic of Salvador stipulates that in case of default a collector of customs is to be appointed upon the approval of the Secretary of State, and that in case of disputes regarding the loan, these are to be referred to the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court or to such other Federal judge as may be selected by the Secretary of State.

Still another means of stabilizing constitutional governments has been the control of

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exports of arms from the United States. By the act of 1912 the President may forbid all shipments of military supplies from this country to any republic of the American hemisphere, except under such conditions as he may prescribe. President Wilson used this authority effectively. The Harding-Coolidge Administration regulated the export of munitions in three cases. To the established Governments of Mexico and Cuba it sold a quantity of government war material, and at the same time forbade the export of arms to the Mexican and Cuban rebels. It also made illegal all shipments of military supplies to Honduras during continuance of the civil war of 1924.

These, then, are the usual means taken to carry out the Caribbean policy of the United States, a policy which the Secretary of State has recently described as "in the interest of the unimpaired integrity and sovereignty of these Republics." To the delegates of the Central American Conference, in 1922, he said: "The Government of the United States has no ambition to gratify at your expense, no policy which runs counter to your national aspirations, and no purpose save to promote the interests of peace and to assist you, in such manner as you may welcome, to solve your

problems to your own proper advantage. The interest of the United States is found in the peace of this hemisphere and in the conservation of your interests."

This Caribbean policy, however, including the measures adopted to carry it out, is full of perplexities; it is criticized by many in our own country; it is widely resented in Latin America, and it is endangering the success of our Pan-American aims. To many people in the United States, as well as elsewhere, the efforts of our Government to aid these weak republics economically and financially appear as the evidence of an economic imperialism, pursued in the interests of our great moneyed corporations, and with the purpose of exploiting these tropical lands. By the people of these Caribbean republics the limited supervision of the United States, which in certain cases seems to our Government essential and helpful, is widely resented. Naturally so, since it is a general historical law that no people, however great a failure they may be making in managing their own affairs, wish a foreign power to impose upon them a better government than their own. By the Latin Americans as a whole, the Caribbean policy of the United States, in many of its manifestations, is regarded as a violation of the sov-

ereignty of independent states and of the generally accepted principle of nonintervention.

The Latin-American view regarding military occupation and political supervision was expressed in the summer of 1923 with surprising frankness by Doctor Zeballos, when he made the following recommendation to the United States regarding the Caribbean: "Not to interfere in the internal life of the other republics, whatever may be their political instability. Let them fry themselves in their own gravy." Here is a fundamental difference of opinion between Latin America and the United States. It is safe to say that the people of the United States neither now accept, nor in the near future are likely to accept, the principle of the rights of unrestricted sovereignty as thus interpreted. The United States, to be sure, believes in the policy of nonintervention; in fact, it is one of our most firmly held general principles. But the United States maintains that, as with other general principles, it has its exceptions. President Roosevelt said in 1905: "Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the

adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power." Secretary Hughes, in the summer of 1923, indorsed this principle. Referring to the American military occupation of the Dominican Republic in 1916, he said: "This occupation was due to the demonstration, to use the phrase of President Roosevelt, of an impotence resulting in the loosening of ties of civilized society and thus requiring intervention."

Due to this genuine difference in principle regarding this phase of the American Caribbean policy, there is almost certain to be at times some measure of opposition and misunderstanding in connection with it, even if it were carried out in the most considerate and benevolent manner possible. But, by almost general agreement, it has not always been so carried out. The resentment of Latin America is due probably more to the method of executing the policy than to the policy itself. In connection with the military administration of Haiti and the Dominican Republic it has been the stories—exaggerated and sometimes baseless though they were—of brutalities of American marines, the censor-

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ship of the press, the conviction by military courts of innocent natives, and the coercion of governments by withholding the salaries of officials and members of Congress, which have filled the Latin-American press. It is not inherently essential, however, that this cause of resentment should exist, for the methods of carrying out the American Caribbean policy may be altered, as Secretary Hughes has recently altered them, without abrogating the policy itself.

Public sentiment in the United States will not permit the Caribbean area, or any considerable part of it, to lapse into political, economic, or financial anarchy. The policies of the United States for maintaining a reasonable degree of stability will doubtless, in the main, be continued for some years to come. But the means of executing these policies can well be improved. As few interventions as possible, and terminated as soon as possible; more civil and less military government during an intervention; and administrators who are more sympathetic with the peoples of these republics, would render these policies not less effective, yet far more acceptable to Latin America.

Alleged American imperialism, however, as viewed by Latin America as a whole, is in part

military and political and in part financial. It is certainly true that the influence of American financial interests in the neighboring republics has greatly increased the past few years. But this fact is not a convincing argument against loans by American banks to Caribbean countries, nor against helpful influence by the Department of State in obtaining these loans. The various Governments of these backward states often beg and plead with the Department of State to give its aid by nominating or approving an American financial adviser or a customs collector in order to induce the financial groups to make a loan at all, or on reasonable rates of interest. Yet when the Department of State has acceded to the request, there is increased criticism of the financial imperialism of the United States. The critics of the American Caribbean policy often urge that our Government should refuse to have any connection with the loans or investments of its citizens abroad. But should this be done, it would not remedy the situation complained of—the extension of the influence and power of American finance—for some of the financial transactions in the Caribbean which have been commented upon most unfavorably in some quarters have had no connection with

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the Department of State, such as the recent acquisition of the Guatemala railroads by interests associated with the United Fruit Company. An immediate result of the refusal of the Department of State to give its aid in the case of the Caribbean states which are financially weak would be their inability to obtain necessary loans at current rates of interest, and consequent possible financial embarrassment. As to the general policy of the United States, Judge Otto Schoenrich, one of the best-informed and most discriminating authorities on conditions in the Caribbean, has recently said: "I have during the past twenty-five years been closely associated with the Caribbean countries, and have over and over again had occasion to observe that when the influence of the United States was exerted in any country, the result was as if that country had been touched by a magic wand. The country thrived visibly, commerce began to boom, public works multiplied, the inhabitants gained security in their persons and property, while the condition of everyone, especially of the humblest citizens, was enormously improved. . . . I am defending our general policy of lending a helping hand to our neighbors, but I am not excusing the means we have sometimes used in carrying out that policy.

The inefficient and oppressive military régime in Haiti and Santo Domingo was a disgrace to our country.”³ As Judge Schoenrich suggests, there would appear to be no reason to reverse the general policy of helpfulness, financial and otherwise, which the Department of State has adopted; but the utmost care is needed that the aid of the Government be in the best interests of the Latin republics, and that not even an occasion be given for the charges frequently heard a few years ago that the Government was forcing loans upon reluctant Caribbean republics in the interest of American financial groups.

As to Pan-American cooperation in solving Caribbean problems—there is none. The United States has cooperated with the Central-American republics and occasionally has taken joint action with Mexico, but otherwise it supervises the area of the Caribbean, so far as it needs supervision, by itself alone. An inherent weakness of this unilateral character of the Caribbean policy is that it causes the United States to be regarded as an imperialistic power, and subjects our Government to whatever imperialistic impulses may exist among our own people. Any measure of cooperation, in such instances as those of Haiti

³Foreign Policy Association, Pamphlet 21, 1923-24.

and the Dominican Republic, with some or all of the Latin-American states; any consultation with them, within or without the Pan-American Union; any measure of participation by them in advice or action, would, if it could properly be brought about, be of very great advantage to us and to the betterment of Pan-American relations. One step in this direction the United States might surely take: whenever it feels it necessary to institute any action which would be a departure from ordinary diplomatic relations, as in the Dominican Republic, Haiti and Nicaragua, it would do well to lay its reasons for such action fully and frankly before all of the Latin-American republics, either by an identic note addressed to their several governments or by an explanation at a meeting of the Pan-American Union. Such a course would go far to prevent misunderstanding and to maintain good will.

However much the methods may be criticized which were at times used in the past to carry out the Caribbean policy, the United States is entitled to just praise for its sincerity of purpose. According to Old-World precedents, it should already have extended its sovereignty or full political control over most of this region. During the Spanish War Continental Europe expected the United

States to annex Cuba, the greatest prize of the Caribbean Sea, but our Government organized it, and withdrew. When intervention was again necessary in 1906, it again withdrew. In the Dominican Republic and Haiti, it could easily have extended its military occupation into full sovereignty, but it has made no effort to do so. Instead of increasing the political control of the United States in the Caribbean the past three or four years, as would be natural were this country really an imperialistic state, this control has been definitely lessened. To such an extent has the withdrawal of American supervision been carried out that the course of action taken by Secretary Hughes has often been spoken of as constituting a reversal of the former American Caribbean policy. In the Dominican Republic the American military administration has been terminated; an independent native Government was established July 12, 1924; and the last of the American marines were withdrawn during the following August. From Nicaragua the marines were ordered to withdraw in January, 1925, in accordance with a notification given to the Nicaraguan Government fourteen months earlier, November 14, 1923; but upon the urgent request of the newly elected President of Nicaragua that

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the marines should be permitted to remain until a native police force could be organized, the withdrawal has been postponed to some date not later than September 1, 1925. In Haiti the marines have already been withdrawn from the interior and concentrated in two posts, a greater degree of administrative control has been allowed to the native Government, and Secretary Hughes has stated, January 20, 1925, that the United States is only waiting to see a reasonable promise of internal peace and stability to effect its complete withdrawal. These measures are certainly indicative of a modification of the methods formerly adopted to realize American aims in the Caribbean, and should be of considerable help in meeting the objections of the Latin Americans and developing a better feeling toward the United States.

Additional evidence that this country has no purpose to seize territory in the Caribbean was seen in the fact that the Administration strongly supported, and the Senate, March 13, 1925, ratified, a treaty with Cuba, signed in 1904, by which the United States relinquishes all claim to the Isle of Pines, although considerable pressure was exerted by Americans who lived in the island or owned property there to have the United States assert a right of sov-

ereignty which they believed existed by virtue of provisions in the treaties with Spain of 1898 and with Cuba of 1903. A further indication of the desire of the American Government to limit its political supervision in the Caribbean as strictly as possible was the action of the Secretary of State, during the summer of 1924, in declining to accede to the request of political leaders of Nicaragua that the United States should inform them whether certain candidates for the Presidency would be acceptable to the American Government. Secretary Hughes replied that the United States would express no preference as to candidates, and that it desired only that a free and fair election should be held.

The perplexity of the Caribbean situation is well illustrated, however, by the recent events in Honduras. Hardly a year after the delegates of this republic, and the four others in Central America, had left the Washington Conference of 1922-3, where they drew up regulations for discountenancing revolutions, a typical old-fashioned, political civil war broke out in Honduras, and the American Consul sent word to Washington that his work of writing his official dispatches had been interrupted by the rain of revolutionary bullets which had poured into the Consulate.

And after the United States, by tactful co-operation with the Central-American republics, had brought this revolution to an end, and the special representative of President Coolidge had withdrawn, still another revolution broke out.

But no shot fired in a Caribbean republic will precipitate a war between the great powers, as the shot at Serajevo precipitated the World War. It is a cause for no small degree of thankfulness that the Monroe Doctrine and the Caribbean policy have saved this American Balkan area from becoming a cockpit for the military powers of the world.

With all non-American nations prevented from gaining political or territorial control, and with the great power which the United States and its citizens possess through treaty rights, financial supervision, economic penetration, and naval bases, this whole region is now, and for years to come will be, within the hollow of the hand of the United States. This fact brings a serious and a dangerous responsibility, and a continuing challenge to our sincerity of purpose.

EXCLUSION OF EUROPE FROM AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Another policy closely allied to the Monroe

Doctrine is that which aims to prevent Europe from participating in American political issues. This policy has never been carefully defined, its interpretation has varied from time to time, and there has been no consistency in the action of our Government in attempting to enforce it. While it has generally been considered a part of the Monroe Doctrine, it may be regarded as the India rubber element of the Doctrine which Secretary Hughes has attempted to remove. One perplexity in the situation is that there has been no agreement as to what constitutes participation in American political questions.

The attitude of our political leaders as to this policy may be judged by typical quotations from their writings or speeches. Jefferson said: "Our first and fundamental maxim should be, never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe; the second, never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with cisatlantic affairs." The United States Senate defined its attitude on this issue in the reservation to the Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, in 1899: "Nor shall anything contained in the said convention be construed to imply a relinquishment by the United States of its traditional attitude toward purely American questions." Elihu

Root emphasized "the need to separate the influences determining the development and relation of states in the New World from the influences operating in Europe."⁴ John Bassett Moore, pointing out the distinction between the American system and the European, wrote: "To the extent to which Europe should become implicated in American politics, or to which American countries should become implicated in European politics, this distinction would necessarily be broken down, and the foundations of the American system would be impaired; and to the extent to which the foundations of the American system were impaired, Pan-Americanism would lose its vitality and the Monroe Doctrine its accustomed and tangible meaning."⁵ Senator Lodge, in 1919, in discussing the first draft of the Covenant of the League of Nations, said: "Under this draft of the constitution of the League of Nations American questions and European questions and Asian and African questions are all alike put within the control and jurisdiction of the League. Europe will have the right to take part in the settlement of all American questions, and we,

⁴American Journal of International Law, Vol. viii, No. 3, p. 441.

⁵Moore, J. B., *Principles of American Diplomacy*, p. x. Harper & Brothers, publishers.

of course, shall have the right to share in the settlement of all questions in Europe and Asia and Africa." To permit Europe to participate in settling American questions would be, in the judgment of Mr. Lodge, "to abandon the Washington policy and the Monroe Doctrine."

It is clear from such typical quotations that these American leaders were not discussing the seizure by European states of American territory, nor the extension of European political control over any American republic. They were therefore not discussing the Monroe Doctrine, as officially defined, but something different from it. They were objecting to European participation in American political questions, even though this participation would not endanger the independence or the territory of any American republic.

But what constitutes participation in American international politics? Would Europe be intermeddling in American affairs, if Europeans should join in settling by arbitration or judicial decision disputes between American republics? This would not seem to be the case, since the United States for years has been referring its disputes with other American countries to courts in which the majority of the judges were Europeans; and

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no one has claimed that the Monroe Doctrine was violated or endangered. The United States has had four cases before the Hague Court over American issues, and in each instance European judges have been in control of the Court. It was President Roosevelt, the great exponent of Americanism, who persuaded Mexico, in 1902, to refer to the Hague Court the first dispute ever submitted to it. In this Pious Fund case, as it was called, President Roosevelt, or his Secretary of State, selected two Europeans as our two judges; Mexico selected two other Europeans; and these four chose a fifth European. Every single member of this famous court was a European, and the American Government and the American people were entirely satisfied with the proceedings and with the results. The following year, President Roosevelt persuaded the nations which had differences with Venezuela to submit their case to The Hague. The three judges selected were all Europeans. In the extremely important North Atlantic Fisheries Case, in 1910, between the United States and Great Britain, the majority of the three controlling judges (aside from the British and American representatives) were also Europeans. Finally, the same year, in the case between the United States and

Venezuela over the claims of the Orinoco Steamship Company, two of the three judges were Europeans.

Important issues with other American countries the United States has not hesitated, in the past, to refer to the decision of European sovereigns. The Northeastern boundary dispute was submitted, in 1827, to the arbitration of the King of the Netherlands; and the controversy over the boundary in the San Juan channel was settled, in 1872, by the German Emperor.

As for the disputes between the Latin-American republics, one of the most important in the last two or three decades, that between Argentina and Chile over the boundary along the Southern Andes, was referred to the decision of the sovereign of Great Britain, and the proceedings, 1901-2, were held in London. Other similar disputes in this hemisphere have also been settled by Europeans: the Swiss president arbitrated the boundary line between Brazil and French Guiana in 1900; President Loubet, of France, in 1900, the boundary between Costa Rica and Colombia; Victor Emmanuel III, the boundary between Brazil and British Guiana, in 1904; and the King of Spain, the territorial dispute between Venezuela and Colombia, in 1891.

Neither has our Government hesitated to agree to submit issues to a council of investigation in which Europeans may be in the majority. By the Bryan treaties, the United States stands bound to-day with twenty states, many of them Latin-American republics, not to go to war before submitting to an international Commission of Inquiry every dispute, of whatever character it may be, provided it cannot be settled by diplomacy. The method of selecting the commissioners makes it possible, just as in the Hague Court, that the larger number on the commission may be Europeans.

While the United States, before the war, had little, if any, objection to European participation in the arbitral or judicial settlement of American international questions, the American Government has generally been opposed to joint political action with European powers in regard to American issues. There has, however, been no consistency in this matter. In 1851 an American agent cooperated with the consuls of France and Great Britain in intervention in Santo Domingo, and in 1875 Secretary Fish proposed joint mediation with several European powers to restore peace in Cuba. But these are outstanding exceptions to the general rule that

the United States Government has declined to take part with European Governments in joint political action in this hemisphere.

Europe, on the other hand, has not felt excluded from all joint political relations with the Americas. In 1904, for example, certain European powers threatened in effect to associate themselves with the United States in establishing a joint fiscal control of the Dominican Republic. Shortly before the World War Sir Edward Grey inquired whether President Wilson would not consult the European powers in regard to a successor to General Huerta in Mexico; and Germany and France asked to have a share with the United States in the control of Haitian customs. But in all of these cases the United States took sole charge of the situation.

The existence of the League of Nations, and the fact that all but two of the Latin-American republics are members of it, while the United States is not, have caused American opinion to view with a disapproval not shown before the war any suggestions that American questions should be settled elsewhere than in this hemisphere. The opposition is not so much to a possible judicial determination of an American dispute by the Permanent Court of International Justice as it is to a decision

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by the Council or Assembly of the League, which are regarded as political bodies largely European in character. But should the issues of all kinds arising between American states be settled regularly at Geneva, that would not imperil either the territory or the political independence of any American republic. It would not violate the Monroe Doctrine, as defined by Secretary Hughes, but it would gravely endanger the continuance of a distinct American state system for this hemisphere and undermine the sister policy of the Monroe Doctrine—Pan-Americanism.

III

PAN-AMERICANISM: WASHINGTON
AND GENEVA

THE Monroe Doctrine and Pan-Americanism are the two outstanding policies of the United States for this hemisphere. The Monroe Doctrine aims to protect the Americas from overseas aggression; Pan-Americanism aims to bind the Americas together. These two might be called twin policies, were they of the same age. But while the former has just celebrated its hundredth birthday, the latter is hardly thirty-five years old. Pan-Americanism, which implies mutually beneficial cooperation by the twenty-two republics, rests upon the assumption that they comprise a state system distinct from that of Europe, and that they possess common ideals, principles, and interests.

The meaning of Pan-Americanism, its possibilities, limitations and problems, may be seen in part from a survey of the history of international cooperation in the Americas during the past century.

From the early days of the revolt against

Spain, nearly all of the prominent Latin-American political leaders have favored international conferences, leagues, and unions; but the first conference of any importance was that held in Panama, in 1826. Of special significance was the fact that there was doubt whether the United States should be asked to send delegates. Bolivar, who called the Conference, did not include the United States with the Latin-American republics, and it was only later that an invitation was extended to our Government. The Panama Congress accomplished nothing; but during the following half century and over, a number of other Latin American conferences were called, to which the United States was not invited. A feeling existed among the Latin-American republics that they formed a family of nations of which the United States was not really a member. They realized, too, that the United States was opposed to alliances; and they were somewhat disturbed at the prospect, as one of their political leaders admitted that the natural preponderance of a first-class power might embarrass the action of the Conference.

There was no organized international co-operation by all of the American republics until the first Pan-American Conference at

Washington, in 1889. In fact, the very name "Pan-America" was not used until that year. The vision of Pan-Americanism, however, was seen from afar in the early days by Henry Clay. In 1820 he said: "It is in our power to create a system of which we shall be the center, and in which all South America will act with us. In respect to commerce we should be most benefited. . . . We should become the center of a system which would constitute the rallying point of human wisdom against all the despotism of the Old World." It is interesting to note the outstanding points in Clay's plan: an American state system, the leadership of the United States, the development of commerce, and republican idealism.

The mantle of Henry Clay fell upon James G. Blaine, who originated the present Pan-American policy. Blaine's aims were to promote peace throughout the hemisphere and to further the trade of the United States—as with Clay, a combination of idealism and commerce. In issuing invitations, in 1881, to a conference of all the American republics, Secretary Blaine stated that the United States, although the initiator of the gathering, would be "on the same footing as other powers represented, . . . as a single mem-

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ber among many coordinate and equal states." The Conference did not meet, however, until 1889, when Mr. Blaine was again Secretary of State. All the American states, except the Dominican Republic, sent delegates, although Señor Romero, the Mexican Minister at Washington, said that there was a general fear among the Latin Americans that the object of the Conference was "to secure the political and commercial ascendancy of the United States on the continent." On the other hand, an appreciative and sympathetic attitude was shown by several of the republics, the Government of Venezuela stating, "The future of South America may be considered as secure under the guardianship of the great republic which is both our teacher and our model."

Other Pan-American conferences have been held from time to time. The second met at the City of Mexico in 1901, the third at Rio de Janeiro in 1906, and the fourth at Buenos Aires in 1910. The fifth conference was to have been held at Santiago, Chile, in 1914, but on account of the war was finally postponed until 1923. In addition to these general conferences there have been many special or limited Pan-American gatherings of an official character, such as the Pan-American

Financial Conferences and the Pan-American Scientific Congresses.

These Pan-American gatherings as a whole have achieved fortunate results. They have formulated agreements to improve trade and commerce and to better sanitation; they have expressed common ideals as to international peace, and have drawn up treaties providing for international arbitration, while the leaders of the various American republics, by working together for common objects, have come to know and appreciate each other better. The most important concrete achievement of the conferences has been the development of the Pan-American Union. In its home at Washington, it gives tangible evidence of the common interests and activities of the American republics. At the laying of the cornerstone in 1908, the Ambassador of Brazil, Senhor Nabuco, well said, "There has never been a parallel for the sight which this ceremony presents—that of twenty-one nations of different languages building together a house for their common deliberations."

PAN-AMERICAN SENTIMENT IN LATIN AMERICA

Pan-American sentiment, which, it must be remembered, has always been stronger in the United States than in the Latin-American

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republics, reached its height in the latter countries during the years from 1914 to 1919. When the United States, in 1914, occupied Vera Cruz by its military forces, the action was at once resented throughout the Latin-American world. But this attitude changed when our Government, a few days later, accepted the mediation of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. When the delegates of these three republics, with those of the United States and Mexico, sat around a common table in conference at Niagara, and discussed together the best means of settling the outstanding critical problem of America, it made a very deep impression. It was felt that this was genuine co-operation. *La Prensa*, of Buenos Aires, exclaimed, "Blessed be Pan-Americanism!" Other papers made similar statements. Pan-Americanism was felt by many to have become an accomplished fact. From Chile an American acquaintance wrote, "Chilean opinion regarding the United States has made a complete revolution since the acceptance of the A. B. C. mediation, and now we are held in very high esteem." Doctor Naon, the brilliant Argentine Ambassador at Washington, remarked to the writer in 1913, "There is no Pan-Americanism in South America; it exists only in Washington." But the following

year he said, "The Niagara Conference has largely created a real Pan-Americanism; it has made it actual; before this it was merely an ideal."

The impression made by the Niagara Conference was deepened by a similar international gathering, in 1915, when at President Wilson's request the delegates of the United States, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, and those of three representative smaller American republics—Bolivia, Uruguay, and Guatemala—met together to discuss anew the perplexing Mexican situation.

President Wilson's speeches also exerted a favorable influence. Since a marked trait of Latin Americans is their idealism, they were naturally greatly moved by this dominant characteristic of the President's public addresses and writings. As he realized the apprehensions of the republics to the south of us, he tried to remove them by stating frankly the policies of the United States and by proposing to place the United States under treaty obligations not to seize Latin-American territory. A striking paragraph from his address to a group of Mexican editors greatly pleased Latin America: "We said, 'We are going to be your big brother whether you want us to be or not.' We did not ask whether it was agree-

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able to you that we should be your big brother. We said we were going to be. Now that was all very well so far as protecting you from aggression from the other side of the water was concerned, but there was nothing in it that protected you from aggression from us. . . . So I said, 'Very well, let us make some arrangement by which we will give bond. Let us have a common guarantee, that all of us will sign, of political independence and territorial integrity. Let us agree that if any one of us, the United States included, violates the political independence or the territorial integrity of any of the others, all the others will jump on her.' " This informal speech expressed colloquially the official proposal which the President made in his address at the Second Pan-American Scientific Congress, which met at Washington in December, 1915. He suggested that all American states should unite "in guaranteeing to each other absolute political independence and territorial integrity." Had this plan been accepted, it would have been a guarantee against aggressions by the United States as well as by any other power.

It was the World War, however, which brought Pan-American sentiment in Latin America to its greatest height. The Latin-

American republics soon realized that as neutrals they had a new bond with the United States, for they were deeply interested in preserving their rights by international law from the aggressions of any of the belligerents. There was a strong movement in favor of some joint declaration by the United States and the Latin-American republics. At a meeting of the Pan-American Union, December 8, 1914, the delegates from eight states, most of them acting under definite instructions, urged united action by all American republics in defense of their common neutral rights. In the discussion some of the delegates stated that the events of the war had demonstrated the increasing need of close Pan-American cooperation.

When the United States declared war against Germany, Latin Americans in general felt that our nation, which they had too generally regarded as essentially materialistic, was clearly acting in accordance with high principles and idealistic motives. The invitation of our Government to all neutral states to follow its course of action brought a notable response from Latin America. Of their twenty republics, sixteen placed themselves by some official action on the side of the United States in the World War. Thirteen of

them broke off all diplomatic relations with Germany, and of these, eight declared war against her. The attitude of the Latin-American Governments at this time may be seen from their official statements. The Government of Uruguay, in its support of the United States, announced a new Pan-American doctrine: "The Government of Uruguay has proclaimed the principle of American solidarity as the criterion of its policy, understanding that the grievance against the rights of one country of the continent would be considered as a grievance by all." Brazil replied that it "could no longer stand unconcerned when the struggle involved the United States," since it "recognized the fact that one of the belligerents is a constituent portion of the American continent and that we are bound to that belligerent by traditional friendship." Bolivia "decided to make its attitude in the present diplomatic crisis conform wholly with that of the United States Government." "Salvador as an American nation could not fail to recognize, in the conflict between the United States and Germany, the solidarity which binds it to the great republic of the North, in view of the spirit of Pan-Americanism which should prevail among the countries of the continent." Peru wrote that its international

policy "must be inspired by the principle of the solidarity of the nations of the American continent with the United States." Honduras recognized "that continental solidarity imposes upon the states of America the duty to contribute according to the measure of their abilities toward the triumph of the cause of civilization and the right which, with the allied nations, the United States of America defends." Even more striking than these statements was the action of Ambassador Naon, of Argentina. So keenly did he feel that his Government should declare war against Germany that he staked upon the issue his diplomatic career; and when Argentina, due to the insistence of its President, would not follow his advice, he resigned his post at Washington and returned home. His correspondence with his Government, secret at the time, was later published. In writing as an Argentine official confidentially to a fellow Argentine, he said: there should be "a policy of harmony and cooperation between the countries of this continent, and above all, between the Argentine Republic and the United States. . . . A divergence between these two republics is incompatible with this Pan-American idea. . . . Whatever danger, directly or indirectly, may threaten the one,

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must be a danger to the other. . . . Hence it is impossible for me to conceive, without being uneasy for the fate of my country, the slightest political misunderstanding between these nations at a time when they are confronted by so grave a crisis."

After the war a reaction in Pan-Americanism set in for a time. The end of the fighting relaxed the bond which had united most of the American republics, first as neutrals and later as associates or partisans in the bitter world struggle. When our Senate refused to ratify the Treaty of Versailles, especially the Covenant of the League of Nations, and our Government was forced to withdraw from Europe, Latin Americans rather generally felt that, whatever the strictly legal aspect of the case might be, the United States had failed morally to live up to its obligations. Further, when attention was no longer focused upon affairs in Europe, they could give more thought to the policy of the United States in the Caribbean, which they strongly disapproved. The economic situation also exerted an unfortunate influence. The world-wide economic collapse in prices in 1920 affected Latin Americans severely. Their importers were extremely unwilling, in many cases entirely unable, to accept the great quantity of freight

from the United States which was heaped up on the docks of the ports of Latin America. Although their merchants were technically liable for these goods, they felt that they had been unfairly treated by American exporters, who were charged with undue haste in shipping at once all standing orders as soon as they realized that a fall in prices had begun, with the result that the Latin Americans were asked to pay greatly in excess of the value of the goods at the time they reached the southern ports. It was also more difficult for them to make the payments, due to a sharp decline in exchange, which made the Latin-American currency of less purchasing power than before. There was a widespread belief that American banks and financiers had artificially lowered the exchange. One of the writer's former students, for some time manager of one of the Latin-American branches of the National City Bank of New York, has stated that he spent most of the banking hours, for many days, trying to convince his patrons that Wall Street had nothing to do with this financial movement, but that it had been brought about by normal economic causes.

THE SANTIAGO CONFERENCE

The status of Pan-American sentiment in

Latin America in the spring and summer of 1923 was shown by the fifth Pan-American Conference, held at Santiago, Chile, in March of that year. Much good was accomplished by the Conference. Director-General Rowe, of the Pan-American Union, said, "The record of positive, practical achievement in bringing about concerted action amongst the republics of the American continent in the solution of their common problems is both larger in volume and more important in its immediate and ultimate consequences than that of any of the four preceding conferences." A number of helpful practical treaties were agreed upon, such as those for the registration of trade marks and the publicity of customs documents. The functions of the Pan-American Union were extended and arrangements were made for holding a number of special Pan-American conferences on limited but important topics. A peace treaty, signed by sixteen of the American republics, provided that all controversies between American states which cannot be settled diplomatically shall be submitted to an American commission of inquiry for investigation and report, and that during the period of investigation there shall be no mobilization of military forces. This general convention is, in substance, an exten-

sion to practically the whole continent of the Bryan treaties negotiated in 1913 and 1914. Señor Edwards, President of the Conference, regarded this Pan-American treaty as probably the most important ever signed on the American continent for the promotion of peace.

As to the general results of the Conference there has been no unanimity of judgment. Some of the delegates from the United States, in interviews published in the press, stated that the Conference was highly successful. Senator Frank B. Kellogg, now Secretary of State, was reported as saying: "The Conference at Santiago has been a great success. It had the effect of increasing good feeling and bringing closer the relationship of all Pan-American countries. The relations between the United States and Pan-American countries are better than ever." Señor Augustin Edwards, the Chilean President of the Conference, spoke highly of the Conference, its definite achievements and the spirit of international democracy which characterized it, and in an address before the Assembly of the League of Nations, September 12, 1923, he said, "The Pan-American Santiago Conference was a very great success." But in an address in New York he remarked, "Let me say,

first of all, that this Conference has had what we sometimes call a 'bad press.'” This statement was quite correct. The press comments were generally unfriendly, both in Latin America and in Europe. *La Prensa* said: “What did happen at Santiago . . . should be plainly and truly told in the interest of the future success of Pan-American policies, which at this moment are passing through a serious crisis. . . . The other delegates manifested a strong bias” against the United States and its proposals, “a sullen suspicion of Pan-Americanism, and a hostile attitude not shown at any previous Congress.” This spirit of antagonism, it pointed out, was not due to the strong Latin-American states, such as Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, but to the smaller republics, immediately affected by the policies of the United States. *La Prensa* referred to “the open discontent exhibited by at least fifteen of the Spanish-American countries, precisely the countries where the political, military, and commercial influence of the United States is strongest.”

There were some outstanding incidents which manifested, and in part intensified, this feeling of discontent. When the Chairman of the United States delegation declared that the Monroe Doctrine was a unilateral policy

of the United States, to be interpreted and enforced by our country alone, it made an unfavorable impression not only upon the other delegates, but also, judging from press accounts, upon public sentiment throughout Latin America. The strong movement for the reorganization of the Pan-American Union was generally interpreted as in the main an effort to limit the control or leadership of the United States.

The discussions regarding the proposed limitation of armament also revealed a measure of anti-American sentiment. It is not surprising that it was impossible to reduce the number of capital ships in Latin America, since of the only three countries which possessed them, Chile had but one and Argentina and Brazil two each. But it has been charged by some that the failure to come to any agreement as to limitation of any kind was due to the influence of the United States' naval mission to Brazil. The sending of this mission well illustrates the difficulties which our Government often encounters in dealing with Latin-American situations. Some three years ago the Government of Brazil requested the United States to send a naval mission to help reorganize the Brazilian navy, which by general repute was in sad need of rehabilitation.

The United States Government was reluctant to part with the services of the Admiral suggested as the head of the delegation, and so informed the Brazilian authorities. The reply was that, if the United States should be unwilling to send a mission, Great Britain would doubtless do so. Naturally, if a naval mission was to be sent in any case to an American republic, the United States preferred to send it, and somewhat reluctantly acceded to the request of Brazil. But there was nothing unusual in what was done, for naval and military missions have been common in the recent past in Latin America. The Chilean navy was organized by a British mission, and even to-day there are one or two British naval officers in an advisory capacity in Chile. The Chilean army was reorganized by a German military mission. Shortly before the war the writer had the pleasure of visiting the Chilean "West Point" and observing the exhibition drills of the cadets. The whole system was German throughout, even to the distinctive German goose-step. In Bolivia, at the same time, there was a German military mission reorganizing the forces of that country. Brazil and Peru had previously employed French military missions. But when the United States, with much reluctance, sent a naval

mission to Brazil, it created considerable antagonism in some of the other nations, and led to the charge that the United States was abandoning its policy of working for international peace and was developing militarism on the American hemisphere.

Whatever evaluation one may make of the results of the Santiago Conference as a whole, especially in its general influence—and there is much difference of opinion upon this subject—it is reasonably clear that Pan-American sentiment throughout Latin America in 1923 was not all that could be desired. Along with much evidence showing support of the policy there should be placed the candid statement of Doctor Zeballos, of Argentina, who said in his carefully prepared Williamstown addresses in 1923: "It is a well-known fact that in the New World there exists a serious opposition to the influence of the United States and a movement of resistance against Pan-American activity. It is grounded on the belief that the United States are not acting sincerely in their relations with the other republics, concealing a deep purpose of political domination and commercial absorption. The resistance up to now is only a popular one, as no government has shown its public sympathy with it, but I am convinced that

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the personal feeling of many functionaries of the American republics is mistrust and fear toward the United States. One of the outstanding features of the [Santiago] Conference was the revelation of an unexpected anti-American spirit."

PRESENT ATTITUDE OF LATIN AMERICA

Distrust of the United States, as Doctor Zeballos stated, still exists in some measure throughout Latin America. The feeling is natural, for the Monroe Doctrine has eliminated the fear which the Latin Americans would normally have of the military and expansionist powers of Europe and has left the United States the heir of any suspicion which may remain in the Southern countries. It is almost inevitable that this attitude should be found in some degree, in view of the great strength of the United States and the relative weakness of our sister republics. Some of the thoughtful Latin Americans explain the philosophical basis for their apprehension by referring to the general law, "The big fishes eat the little fishes." The most direct cause of distrust has been the southern expansion of the sovereignty and control of the United States, especially the development of American power in the Caribbean since 1898, and

more particularly the military occupation of the Dominican Republic and of Haiti. It has appeared to some that these actions were but further steps toward the complete domination of the Caribbean region by the United States.

Along with this distrust of the United States felt by a certain proportion of the Latin Americans, there also exists among others a considerable measure of confidence in the sincerity and justice of our Government. And this confidence has been considerably increased in the recent past, especially on account of the policy of withdrawal in the Caribbean, which has been announced and in large part carried out during the past two or three years. The termination of the military occupation of the Dominican Republic and the complete restoration of the native government, the restriction of military control in Haiti, and the orders given to the marines to withdraw from Nicaragua have produced a most favorable impression throughout Latin America. In addition to these measures, which have already been described, the United States has settled the outstanding issues with Mexico, granted recognition to the existing government, and given it strong support during the insurrection in the early part of 1924. It has ratified the long-pending treaty with

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Colombia, thus atoning in some part at least, in the minds of the Latin Americans, for the intervention in Panama in 1903. It has joined the Central American States in signing a treaty, at the Washington Conference of 1922-23, binding itself to submit to a commission of inquiry any one of a large class of disputes which might arise with any of them. In these various ways the United States, instead of continuously extending its power in the Caribbean, has effected a partial withdrawal and a restriction of its normal freedom of action. The two most important of these events, those relating to the Dominican Republic and to Mexico, have taken place since the Santiago Conference. When the Conference was in session committees from the Dominican Republic and Haiti appeared in Santiago and were looked upon as the representatives of oppressed peoples. At the same time the Mexican Minister to Chile pointed out in the press that Mexico was unable to be represented at the Pan-American gathering because of the refusal of the United States to grant recognition to its Government. At the present time, however, not only have these causes of misunderstanding been removed, but all others between our Government and Latin America, except that relating to Haiti; and

the Haitian problem is apparently on the road to settlement.

The formal governmental relations between the United States and the Latin-American republics have not for many years been so free from specific causes of international friction as at present. The increasing confidence throughout official circles in Latin America in the trustworthiness of the Government of the United States has been shown by the willingness of the Latin-American republics to submit their most important international differences to the arbitration of the United States. The bitterest feud in South America, that between Peru and Chile over the possession of Tacna-Arica, was referred by these two states to the arbitration of the President of the United States. Colombia and Panama accepted the good offices of the Government at Washington, and on May 8, 1924, ended their strife of over two decades' standing and later established regular diplomatic relations. Honduras and Guatemala both agreed, at the Central American Conference of 1922-23, to submit to our Government their controversy over the ownership of a considerable territory claimed by both—though no Protocol has as yet been drawn up. The Governments of Ecuador and Peru signed an agreement, June

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21, 1924, to refer their long-standing boundary issue to arbitration in Washington. Brazil, Colombia, and Peru sought the good office of the Secretary of State in their boundary controversy, and, March 4, 1925, their diplomatic representatives at Washington signed a procès-verbal accepting the solution proposed by Mr. Hughes. On the other hand, it is rare indeed for Latin-American republics to submit a dispute to the arbitration of a Latin-American Government. It is evident that, however much they may fear their powerful sister republic of the north, they trust her more than they trust each other.

In considering the attitude of Latin America toward the United States it should be remembered that public sentiment is not uniform throughout the twenty republics, and that only very general statements can properly be made regarding it. The typical Mexican point of view is not the same as that of the A. B. C. countries as a whole, while in each of these three republics the sentiment toward the United States is somewhat different from that in the others. Further, in every country, the various groups, social or political, are apt to view foreign issues each in its own characteristic way.

As to the general status of Pan-American-

ism throughout Latin America as a whole, making allowance for differences between various countries, and between groups within each of them, it appears that Pan-Americanism at present is a less active force and stirs less enthusiasm than during the World War, yet that it has a certain measure of support, varying in degree, of course, in all the Latin-American countries. There are those, however, who have no interest in the policy, and others who energetically oppose it.

THE MEANING AND THE BASIS OF PAN-AMERICANISM

After this survey of the history of this sister policy of the Monroe Doctrine, the query naturally arises, What is the exact meaning of Pan-Americanism? Also, Does it rest upon such a firm foundation that it has a reasonable certainty of permanence? We may judge what Pan-Americanism means in part from the statements of some of our political leaders. Even before the present policy came into existence Jefferson spoke of "the advantages of a cordial fraternalization among all the American nations," and pointed out "the importance of their coalescing in an American system of policy." John Bassett Moore has explained the basis of the doctrine: "The idea

of Pan-Americanism is obviously derived from the conception that there is such a thing as an American system, that this system is based upon distinctive interests which the American countries have in common, and that it is independent of and different from the European system."¹ Robert Lansing said in an address when Secretary of State: "Pan-Americanism is an international policy of the Americas. Pan-Americanism is an expression of the idea of internationalism. . . . It has been made possible because of our geographic isolation, of our similar political institutions, and of our common conception of human rights." President Wilson held that Pan-Americanism presents the republics of America "as in a very deep and true sense a unit in world affairs, spiritual partners, standing together because thinking together, quick with common sympathies and common ideals." And Secretary Hughes has recently stated, "This system is not hostile to Europe; it simply conserves the opportunity for the cultivation of the interests which are distinctively American."

But what is the American system of policy, and what interests and ideals have the

¹ Moore, J. B., *Principles of American Diplomacy*, p. x. Harper & Brothers, publishers.

Americas in common? Certainly, the republics to the south of us are not duplicates of our own United States. The Latin Americans, in the languages they speak, the books they read, the form of religion they profess, the schools and universities they attend, the social customs they follow, the styles they adopt, the topics they introduce in conversation, are very much nearer to Continental Europe than to the United States. And when they save a little money and take an overseas vacation, they do not visit New York, but Paris. Their whole intellectual, social, and emotional life binds them to Europe rather than to North America. On our side, if we are frank and honest with ourselves, we must admit that we instinctively recognize more common ties with an Englishman than with a Mexican, with a Frenchman than with a Paraguayan.

Yet there are adequate bases for Pan-Americanism. The first comes from similar geographic and historic factors. Every one of the American republics was settled by Europeans, who came from an old continent to a new world and built up a new civilization. This fundamental fact has brought about many similar conditions and problems. In Argentina, for example, in the Congres-

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sional reading room the writer noticed many government publications of the United States. An Argentine Congressman remarked, "We make greater use of your documents than of those from any other country, since general conditions in the United States are strikingly like our own." Dr. Montes de Oca, recently Argentine Secretary of Foreign Affairs, said, "We Argentines look to the United States for a solution of the great problems upon which our country is just entering; we read your laws and decisions; and we often find that your Supreme Court has already decided constitutional questions which we are only beginning to study."

In the ideals of international relations there is an important common basis. All American republics are organized primarily on the basis of peace rather than of war. They are all adherents of the doctrine of the legal equality of states, and strong advocates of international arbitration and the limitation of armaments. The leadership taken by our own country in the attempt to substitute law and conciliation in place of war is well known, but the attitude of Latin America is not so generally understood. In the First Pan-American Conference, held at Washington in 1889-1890, every American republic but

one voted for the declaration, "The principle of conquest is eliminated from American public law." In the present national Constitution of Brazil, adopted in 1891 and modeled closely upon that of the United States, there is the clause, "The United States of Brazil shall in no case engage in a war of conquest, directly or indirectly, by itself or in alliance with another nation." Latin-American publicists in writing of the devotion of their states to the principle of peaceful international settlement sometimes boast that in recent years Latin-America has had recourse to arbitration, and direct negotiation partaking often of the nature of arbitration, more frequently than all the rest of the world. The striking difference between the peace basis of the Americas and the war basis of Europe was pointed out a few months ago by Secretary Hughes: "Whether we have regard to the total active armies in the world, or to the total organized forces in the world, we find that in this hemisphere, including the United States and Canada, we have not six per cent of the whole. Europe has fifty-seven per cent of the total active armies and seventy-four per cent of the total organized forces."

An additional basis for Pan-Americanism exists in common economic and financial

interests. The World War deprived Latin America of its accustomed financial assistance from Europe, and forced it to turn to the United States. Relatively undeveloped, much like our own country during the nineteenth century, the Latin-American republics require large loans for railroads, harbor construction, waterworks, irrigation, and factories, and for many years must depend in considerable measure upon North American funds for these necessary advances. It is also to the economic advantage of the United States to invest abroad some of its great cash reserves which have been accumulating since the war. Many hundreds of millions of dollars have been loaned the past few years to Latin-American Governments, municipal, state, or national, or invested in private enterprises in the various southern republics. The mutual interests arising from this situation will be apparent to anyone who will turn the pages of the *Proceedings of the Pan-American Financial Conference* of 1915 and of 1920. Further, the trade of the two regions is largely reciprocal. Latin America needs our markets for its raw materials and agricultural products; it is almost dependent upon American purchasers of its coffee, sugar, bananas, and to a less degree its nitrate, hides,

and wool, while our business men need to sell in Latin America their surplus manufactured products.

This hemisphere also is free from the conditions which have most frequently brought war to the Old World. The rivalry for colonies and for control of foreign markets does not exist among us. Latin America neither possesses nor covets colonies, nor exports manufactured products. Neither do the Americas have the deep-seated national and race antagonisms and hatreds which exist in Europe.

It is only natural, with these various bonds uniting them, and no essential causes of antagonism, that a sentiment in favor of Pan-Americanism has developed both in the United States and in Latin America. Many prominent Latin Americans are genuine supporters of this political ideal. Among them may be mentioned Augustin Edwards, the President of the Santiago Conference; Manoel de Oliveira Lima, the distinguished Brazilian scholar and statesman; Federico A. Pezet, recent Peruvian Ambassador at Washington; Alejandro Alvarez, the Chilean authority on international law; and Romulo S. Naon, former Argentine Ambassador at Washington. Some of the Latin-American newspapers

also are strong adherents of Pan-Americanism. A recent issue of the Buenos Aires Nación says: "The Pan-American idea is no more the creation of the United States than of any other single nation. It is a national frame of mind, whose continuance and development afford us countless benefits without entangling us in European imbroglios."

LATIN-AMERICANISM

Pan-Americanism, nevertheless, is to-day challenged by another political ideal, Latin-Americanism, which would group together all the twenty Latin-American republics, but exclude the United States. In the history of the past century, especially in connection with the earlier international conferences, there are many instances of this attitude. The basis of Latin-Americanism, as presented by its advocates, is the idea that their twenty republics are united by ties which do not include the United States: a common tradition, race, church, and general culture; similar languages; and, in large measure, like feelings and sentiments. Latin-Americans are, it is claimed, bound together by their common apprehension of the United States and its alleged imperialism. They point with disapproval or fear to the conquest of northern

Mexico in 1846-48 and, more recently, the acquisition of Porto Rico and the protectorate over Cuba in 1898; the seizure of Panama in 1903, the military occupation of Haiti and Santo Domingo in 1915 and 1916, and the dominant influence in Nicaragua of American marines. While they beg for American financial assistance, they dread American financial control. An evidence of governmental indorsement of Latin-Americanism may be seen in the seal of the National University of Mexico, which has a miniature map of all the American republics south of the Rio Grande, with an accompanying motto which stresses the fact that all these peoples belong to one common race.

Latin-Americanism is particularly strong in the literary circles throughout the republics to the south of us. Many of the recognized Latin-American authors support this new ideal and are unfriendly to the United States, a tendency particularly marked the last twenty-five years. Dr. J. Fred Rippy, of the University of Chicago, in his valuable study, *Literary Yankeephobia in Hispanic America*, 1922, says: "North American students of the modern literature of Hispanic America have noted a decided element of opposition to the United States. . . . It is

of considerable importance to know that this bitterness and suspicion exists." Professor J. D. M. Ford, of Harvard, in his *Main Currents in Spanish Literature*, 1919, states, "In the writings of more recent Spanish-American authors antipathy toward the United States presents itself in unmistakable terms, and is directed chiefly at what the authors are pleased to term our imperialism."² Early in 1924 the Colombian Minister at Montevideo published a book describing the Santiago Conference in which he advocated united diplomatic action by the Latin-American republics in defense of their common interests. Recently a leading journal in Buenos Aires, *La Epoca*, carried an article, stating, "We must reject Pan-Americanism, which is but a hollow mockery for us South Americans." The attitude of this extreme school may be shown by a few quotations from Latin-American authors, all of them of recognized standing, and some of them of the first rank. Blanco-Fombona, of Venezuela, exclaims, "The Yankees, the Yankees, these are the enemies of our soul, of our civilization, of our character, of our independence." Manuel Ugarte, of Argentina, writes in his *El Porvenir de la America Latina*: "From the ethni-

²P. 273. Henry Holt & Company, publishers.

cal, the political, and the social point of view, two Americas flourish. Few demarcations are found so neatly established, so brutally traced, as that which divides the inhabitants of the New World into portions numerically equivalent and morally inharmonious. . . . The Mexican frontier, therefore, is the boundary between two civilizations." Pan-Americanism he considers a "very dangerous fraud, a very lamentable and grave error." He does not fear military conquest, but that of another kind: "A constant moral preeminence, a progressive infiltration, a needless protection of our independence, the diffusion of language, and a sort of paternalism held up before Europe—may these not perchance be the agencies of a spiritual, commercial, and political invasion?" Salvador R. Merlos, of Nicaragua, says: "There is for the people of Latin America a grave danger which no one ignores and which all the world witnesses with marked indignation—Yankee Imperialism." F. Garcia Calderon, of Peru, wrote, in 1911, in his well-known work, *Latin America*, "To save themselves from Yankee imperialism the Latin-American democracies would almost accept a German alliance, or the aid of Japanese arms; everywhere the Americans of the north are feared." A Chilean poet exclaims,

"Two things unite all Spanish America: a common language and a common hatred of the United States."

Such views as these, intemperate and unjust as they may seem to us, are widely read and have great influence in Latin America. Although there is good reason to believe that they represent the opinions and the sentiment of a minority of the people of the various republics south of the Rio Grande, yet they give some idea of the seriousness of the challenge of Latin-Americanism.

A close examination of this ideal, however, shows that the Latin-American republics are not so closely bound together as might be imagined from these quotations. In fact, Dr. Ernesto Nelson, of Argentina, has stated that the terms "Latin America" and "Latin Americans" have no reality back of them, save to the extent of giving a name to a geographical accident. In racial stock, although the European elements in the population have come largely from Spain, Portugal, and Italy, marked differences exist. Argentina, for example, is thoroughly European—probably more purely European in its population than is the United States—but Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, and Paraguay—not to mention Mexico and the Central-American republics—are three

fourths Indian or part Indian. In geographical situation, the A. B. C. countries are in the temperate zone, with all the national strength which is usually found in temperate lands, while the majority of Latin-American republics are in the tropics, with the national weakness characteristic of tropical regions. The various republics are also in considerable measure isolated from each other. The southern countries of South America, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay, have practically no communication of any kind with those in the north, Colombia and Venezuela. Finally, there are outstanding divisions and jealousies among them. Call an educated, cultured Argentine a "South American" and watch him wince. He will state with considerable force and dignity that he is not a "South American," but an "Argentine," and that his country is a great republic, which has far more in common with such nations as the British Empire and the United States than with the small backward Latin-American neighbors, such as Ecuador or Paraguay. It was noticeable at Santiago that there was considerable difference in general attitude and point of view between the strong A. B. C. countries and the weak Caribbean republics; and that between Argentina and Brazil considerable

friction developed due to the rivalry over naval armament.

Should Latin-Americanism develop in strength, it will naturally become an increasing danger to its rival political ideal, Pan-Americanism. Its extreme advocates are already urging that the Latin-American republics should abandon their association with the United States, form political alliances among themselves, develop closer relations with Europe in order to free themselves from dependence upon the United States—cultural bonds with Spain, Portugal, France, and Italy, with which they have racial ties, and commercial and financial connections with Great Britain and Germany—and use every means to strengthen their intellectual and cultural unity. A movement to establish a Latin-American League has recently been started in Buenos Aires by a number of leading men, including among others influential university professors.

There is no likelihood, however, either from the history of the past century or from the present situation, that the Latin-American republics will decline to participate with the United States in the Pan-American organization, or that they will form a rival international union of their own. The practical

movements which Latin-Americanism may further are those for a reorganization of the Pan-American Union and for closer relations, political and economic, between their republics and Europe.

PROPOSED REORGANIZATION OF THE PAN-AMERICAN UNION

There is a marked desire among many Latin Americans to make the Pan-American Union more thoroughly international. As organized for many years, the Governing Board of the Union has been composed of the diplomatic envoys at Washington from the Latin-American countries and of the Secretary of State of the United States, who has been Chairman *ex officio*. Each month these representatives of the twenty-one American republics meet in the Pan-American Building and discuss together matters of common interest relating to business, commerce, sanitation, education, and similar topics, although they deal little or not at all with political problems. It is now proposed to expand the present Pan-American Union, especially on the political side, or even to transform it into an American league of nations, a modification which would result in strengthening the position of the Latin-American states. Such a

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change is widely favored both by those Latin Americans who aim to limit the influence of the United States and by those who are such genuine supporters of the Pan-American ideal that they desire to see the Pan-American organization developed and extended to new fields of common interest.

Some of our own statesmen have made proposals which would lead in the direction of an American league. President Taft, in 1910, at the dedication of the Pan-American Building, making reference to Mr. Carnegie, through whose generosity the edifice was erected, said: "We twenty-one republics cannot afford to have any two or three of us quarrel. We must stop. And Mr. Carnegie and I will not be satisfied until all nineteen of us can intervene by proper measures to suppress a quarrel between any other two." President Wilson, in January, 1916, as has been pointed out, proposed that the twenty-one republics should join in giving to each other a mutual guarantee of territory—a suggestion which was not followed in this hemisphere, but which was the basis of the famous Article X in the Covenant of the League of Nations. This plan of President Wilson was indorsed by Mr. Taft: "A League of Nations in the western hemisphere would be a definite and, I think, a

long step toward a League of Nations in both hemispheres.”

A plan for an American league, which was drawn up by President Brum, of Uruguay, following the outline of the organization of the League of Nations, was presented at the recent Santiago Conference, and was favored by many of the members. Since the proposal was understood to be opposed by the United States delegation, it was not seriously discussed, but was postponed for consideration at the next Pan-American conference, when it will doubtless again be advocated by some of the Latin Americans.

Closely allied to the idea of an American league of nations is the movement to make the Pan-American Union more genuinely international and less dependent upon the United States. As now organized, Latin Americans have sometimes called it an annex of the Department of State. It was proposed at Santiago that the Governing Board of the Union should be composed of special envoys appointed by the various republics, instead of the regular diplomatic representatives at Washington; and this change was favored by fourteen of the seventeen Latin-American republics represented at the Conference. One of the reasons advanced for this step was that

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the United States, under the present organization, exercises an undue influence over the members of the Governing Board. It is true that no member may be objectionable to the United States Government, since every Ambassador and Minister at Washington, before being received must be *persona grata* to the Administration. Further, it is psychologically impossible for a Latin-American diplomat at Washington to go from the office of the Secretary of State—with whom it is important for him to be on friendly and even cordial terms, and of whom he has perhaps just asked an important favor—to the council room of the Pan-American Union and there criticize the policy of our Government in the Caribbean. This proposed change, which such a large majority of the Latin-American countries favored, seemed unwise to the United States delegates, who believed that two different sets of diplomatic representatives at Washington from the various American republics might weaken the Pan-American Union and create diplomatic friction—a very likely development. Nevertheless, the United States, very generously and in a spirit of conciliation, agreed to two provisions which were adopted. One makes the chairmanship of the Governing Board elective, rather than belong

to the Secretary of State by right of his office. The Latin-American members, shortly thereafter, elected the Secretary of State to be the presiding officer of the Board for the next term, but they have been given the legal authority, at any subsequent election, to choose some other presiding officer. It is probable that they will continue to elect the Secretary of State, but should they not do so, it would be an affront to the Washington Government, since the Secretary, by diplomatic custom, has the right to preside over any official international conference held in this country. A second change agreed to by the United States, and adopted, provides that a country which shall have no diplomatic agent at Washington may select a special delegate to represent it in the Pan-American Union. This special delegate may be appointed either when the regular ambassador or minister is temporarily absent from his post, or when the republic has no diplomatic representative accredited to Washington—as was the case with Mexico, while the question of the recognition of its new government was pending, from the summer of 1920 until the fall of 1923.

The suggestion that delegates shall be especially elected as members of the Governing Board of the Pan-American Union was re-

ferred to the various Governments for study and for subsequent consideration at the next Pan-American Conference.

The changes thus far made in the Pan-American Union and the proposals for a more extended reorganization, unwise as they may appear for other reasons, are not likely to weaken Pan-American sentiment throughout Latin America. On the contrary, they promise to strengthen it, since our sister republics would have a greater degree of responsibility in the Pan-American organization. Although the motive for these measures has been in part to limit the preeminent position of the United States, it is not likely that, so long as the Pan-American Union exists, the leadership of our country will be seriously impaired, for it rests upon the essential fact that the great republic of the north is stronger in practically every way, and more influential in the world than the other twenty American countries together. Pan-Americanism would be endangered, however, if the Latin-American states should insist upon a league of nations for this hemisphere with such stringent commitments that the United States would be unwilling to be a member, or if they should insist upon dominating the Union through the procedure of settling matters by majority

vote. Neither of these contingencies appears at present to be probable.

LATIN AMERICA AND EUROPE

The real danger to Pan-Americanism lies in the possible strengthening of the relations of the Latin-American countries with Europe, and the consequent weakening of their connection with the United States. Spain, Portugal, and France have for some years been conducting an organized propaganda to bind the Latin-American republics to them. As long ago as 1900 a Congress of Hispanic peoples was called to meet in Madrid. A movement for close commercial and cultural relations between these European countries and Latin America is being actively carried on by methods similar to those of the Pan-American Union. France bases its claim upon the contention that all American republics south of the Rio Grande are Latin in race and culture and therefore naturally bound to France, the cultural leader of the Latin peoples. Spain and Portugal regard themselves as the mother lands of most of the Latin-American countries, and urge the ties of common language, race, and traditions.

Somewhat closer political relations with Europe are already being formed through the

League of Nations. Eighteen of the twenty Latin-American republics are members—all of them except Mexico and Ecuador.¹ They take an active part in it, and most of them give it enthusiastic support. The Presidents of two recent Assemblies of the League were Latin Americans: Augustin Edwards, of Chile, in 1922; and Cosme de la Torriente y Peraza, of Cuba, in 1923. On the Council of the League Latin America has had two of the six elected member states for 1923 and 1924—Brazil and Uruguay; and the Brazilian representative, Dominicio da Gama, was President in 1922, and the Uruguayan, Alberto Guani, in 1924. Of the eleven judges of the Permanent Court of International Justice, two are from Latin America—Antonio Sanchez de Bustamante, of Cuba, and Epitacio da Silva Pessoa, of Brazil. There is also a Bureau in the League to deal with Latin-American affairs. The prominent positions to which the Latin-American republics and their citizens have been elected is evidence of the desire of the other members to attach them strongly to the League. And some of the Latin Americans are saying that they have already been given more genuine recognition and accorded more actual power as fully coequal states in the

¹Costa Rica has given notice of withdrawal in 1927.

League of Nations than they have received in their own Pan-American Union.

A number of incidents have arisen raising the question whether the League would take jurisdiction of disputes between American states. In the Tacna-Arica issue between Peru and Chile, in which Bolivia considers itself interested because deprived of its former seacoast, the latter asked the League, in 1920, to take jurisdiction of its complaint; but the League refused on the ground that Bolivia was technically asking for a reconsideration of its treaty with Chile, which was admittedly legal. Peru, at the same time, requested the League to consider its dispute with Chile, which was based in part upon a difference of interpretation regarding the treaty of Ancon, of 1883; but Chile objected on the ground that such action would be a violation of the Monroe Doctrine. Due to technical reasons, Peru withdrew its request, reserving its right to present it at a subsequent session. When the European press announced that Panama and Costa Rica had started to fight over a disputed boundary, the Secretary-General of the League wired for information, as he was under obligations to do, since both republics were members of the League. But the League took no action when it learned that the United

States had taken the matter in hand. In regard to the claim by Panama that the United States was improperly taking control of the island of Taboga, off the Pacific entrance to the Panama Canal, one of the members of the British House of Commons, doubtless in order to embarrass the Government, asked whether this complaint would be referred to the League, since it appeared to involve the rights of small nations.

A genuine issue of considerable importance is involved in connection with settlement of American controversies by the League of Nations. If the Latin-American states should have their disputes dealt with regularly at Geneva, and should have their common interests in other lines considered and passed upon there, it would naturally overthrow the very bases of present Pan-Americanism and largely destroy the leadership of the United States in this hemisphere. There are those who are apprehensive that the connection of the Latin Americans with the League of Nations will eventually bring about this very result, notwithstanding the fact that thus far the Council of the League has shown a desire to avoid taking jurisdiction of controversies which are strictly American in character.

At the present time, or in the near future,

there is no likelihood that the League will voluntarily take any definite action which will antagonize the American Government, for it is anxious to have the United States enter the League. But as the League grows in strength, this attitude may not continue indefinitely. It is quite possible, too, that the Latin-American republics may themselves turn to the League and demand the fulfillment of the obligations defined in the Covenant. A certain proportion of the Latin Americans have already welcomed their connection with the League as a protection against the overwhelming power of their northern neighbor. An ill-considered policy by the Department of State or a careless step in Caribbean diplomacy would still further incline Latin America toward Europe. Intervention in a revolutionary Mexico, as was urged by many during the years 1917 to 1920, would go far to kill Pan-Americanism as a vital force and unite Latin America closely with Europe through the ties of the League of Nations. There is no political tradition which stands in the way of intimate cooperation between Latin America and Europe; the doctrine of political isolation, as to Europe, was never accepted south of the Rio Grande. With the appeal which Latin Americanism and Europe

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are already making, and with the League increasing in prestige and strength, there is a genuine danger that Latin America as a whole, within the next few decades, may gradually turn from Pan-Americanism, leaving it largely a meaningless form, and unite in sympathy and in action with Europe and the League. The United States would then be practically isolated on the American hemisphere.

There is also danger that acute international difficulties may arise some time in the future should practically all the American republics except the United States continue active members of the League. If two Latin-American states should be unable to come to agreement over a dispute of a nonjusticiable nature, they would be under treaty obligations by the Covenant of the League to submit it to the League Council. Should they do so, public opinion in the United States would probably view with considerable apprehension any attempt of the Council, which is regarded as a political rather than a judicial body, to settle an American issue, especially should it concern the region of the Caribbean. The situation would be more serious should the League attempt to fulfill its obligations under Articles 10, 11, and 16 of the Covenant, in the

case of a war between two American republics. To imagine a concrete case: should Mexico invade Guatemala, and the latter appeal to the League, it would be the legal duty of the members of the League to institute an economic and financial boycott of Mexico, and to prevent all financial, commercial, or personal intercourse between the nationals of Mexico and those of any other country, even of the United States. Upon the recommendation of the Council, military, naval, and air forces from Europe and Asia might appear in the Caribbean for the protection of Guatemala. Such action by the League would not constitute, in the strict sense, a violation of the Monroe Doctrine, for it would not endanger the territory or the political independence of either Mexico or Guatemala, but it would doubtless be vigorously opposed by the Government and the people of the United States. A further issue of considerable friction might arise should the United States believe it necessary to reoccupy the Dominican Republic. One of the first acts of this unstable near neighbor, since the withdrawal of American marines, has been to join the League. An intimation of the unpleasant possibilities may be seen from the comment of the *Paris Journal de Debats*, which regards

the step as one taken by that republic "to protect it against future occupation by the marines, if not by the financiers of the United States."

Notwithstanding dangers which threaten in the next few decades, there is no fundamental reason why the Pan-American agencies and the League should not work together—especially if a broad, elastic interpretation be given by the Council to the Monroe Doctrine—the Pan-American Union and the Conferences dealing with strictly American matters and the League with those of world-wide concern. Their relations are not yet definitely settled, but are now being worked out. A certain degree of cooperation between them is already recognized by some of the Latin-American members of the League. It is an encouraging fact that Señor Edwards, in speaking to the Assembly of the League, emphasized the success of the recent Pan-American Conference at Santiago in dealing with several problems which were under discussion by the League; he added, "I have tried, above all, to point out how closely the moral unity of the twenty-one republics which form the American continent corresponds to the noble ideal and aims of the League of Nations."

STRENGTHENING PAN-AMERICANISM

Since Pan-Americanism is one of the foremost policies of the United States, and is under challenge, the question naturally arises, What may be done to support and strengthen it? There are obviously two steps to be taken: first, to remove or avoid the obstacles to a good understanding between Latin America and the United States; and, second, to develop a community of sentiment between them and to further their common interests.

The greatest obstacle to genuine Pan-Americanism has been the fear of the alleged imperialism of the United States and of its intervention in the affairs of the Latin republics. Secretary Hughes has gone a long way toward removing this fear. He has instituted the policy of withdrawal in the Caribbean; he has announced as a general principle, in the case of the recent Nicaraguan elections, that the United States would express no preference between candidates for office in Latin-American countries, even when requested to do so; and by an explicit definition of the Monroe Doctrine he has attempted to eliminate from it any idea of tutelage or guardianship. In the future it will be necessary, if the Pan-American spirit is to be conserved, to refrain

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from intervention or military occupation in any part of Latin America, except in a case of urgent necessity.

Another possible obstacle the United States has fortunately thus far avoided in Latin America, is the attempt to create artificial barriers in favor of its trade, commerce, and finance. Yet there seems to be an idea among some in this country that Pan-Americanism means especial privileges for the United States and a denial of the completely Open Door for the rest of the world. To attempt to secure preferential treatment for our business men and financiers and to induce or force Latin-American countries to discriminate against others would antagonize the states both of Latin America and of Europe. Sir Harry Johnson, in his volume *Common Sense in Foreign Policy*, published in 1913, said that there was one cause for which Great Britain would probably go to war even against the United States—an interference by our country with the freedom of trade and commerce in Latin America. Such a statement shows, if not a danger of war, at least the intensity of feeling which such action would arouse. On this subject President Roosevelt was very definite; he said, referring to Pan-Americanism, "This doctrine has nothing to

do with the commercial relations of any American power, save that it in truth allows each of them to form such as it desires." Secretary Hughes has gone much further; he has adopted the policy of negotiating commercial treaties giving unrestricted most-favored-nation treatment, thus really extending the Open Door in principle to all Latin America. Recently the United States has even given up the preferential commercial privileges which it held in Brazil, in order to be consistent in this matter; although it still maintains its trade agreement with Cuba, due to the especial relations existing with that country.

In addition to eliminating definite obstacles to Pan-Americanism, it is essential to build up a community of sentiment between Latin America and the United States. The most direct method of accomplishing this is to induce all of the American republics to unite in furthering the interests and the ideals which they have in common. Much has already been done: since the close of the Santiago Conference a remarkable number of special Pan-American gatherings have been held, or scheduled, to deal with particular issues in which each American state is concerned. Among these are the following: Pan-

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American Conference of Red Cross Societies, Buenos Aires, November, 1923; Inter-American Conference on Electrical Communications, Mexico City, May, 1924; Pan-American Highway Commission, Washington, June, 1924; Pan-American Congress on Child Welfare, Santiago, Chile, October, 1924; Pan-American Sanitary Conference, Havana, November, 1924; Pan-American Scientific Conference, and the Pan-American Standardization Conference, Lima, December, 1924; International Commission of Jurists, Rio de Janeiro, 1925; Pan-American Motor Highway Conference, Buenos Aires, March, 1925; Pan-American Pedagogical Conference, Santiago, Chile, September, 1925; and the Pan-American Conference of Journalists, Washington, April, 1926. It should be noted that these conferences are meeting more frequently in Latin-American capitals than in Washington. It is significant, too, that several of them—those of the scientists, jurists, teachers, and journalists—deal with other than business matters, and thus aid in the development of the cultural side of Pan-Americanism. There has been a feeling in Latin America that the Pan-American movement was too largely an effort to improve trade especially in the interest of the United States. *El Mundo*, of Havana,

writing of the recent Santiago Conference, reflected this view: "This meeting was entirely under the control of the United States. The same old patents, trade-marks, and sanitation." The Pan-American Union, however, the past few years, has fortunately been doing considerable along the line of educational cooperation, and is planning to develop this work in the future.

If this increasing cooperation with Latin America could be extended to the field of international politics, it would be still more helpful. Since the Latin-American republics are in some fear of American dominance, they are particularly appreciative of every effort of our country to act jointly with them as equals. This has been shown by the Niagara Conference in 1914; the similar conference on the Mexican situation in 1915; the joint action of the United States with Argentina and Brazil, in 1910, in taking diplomatic steps to prevent a threatened war between Peru and Ecuador; and the cooperation of the United States and Mexico in maintaining peace in Central America in 1906, and in calling the first Central American Conference in 1907. There might well be similar political cooperation, as has already been suggested, in making the Monroe Doctrine a common American policy,

so far as the declaration of the policy is concerned, and in taking the Latin-American republics into the confidence of the United States Government when such a step is necessary as the occupation of Haiti.³

In addition to cooperation, all wise, unselfish action by our Government helps the Pan-American movement. It was the declaration of war against Germany which raised Pan-American sentiment to a greater height than ever before or since. More recently, when the United States, in 1921, insisted that the Republic of Panama should carry out the arbitral award in its boundary dispute with Costa Rica, this action won general approval in Latin America, for it was evident that it was to the selfish interest of the United States to strengthen Panama, over which it could exercise considerable control, rather than its neighbors. As a result, when Panama sent a mission of protest to the other Latin-American republics, the delegates were given a cold

³An elaborate project has recently been formed for creating a distinctive American system of international law, and thereby strengthening Pan-Americanism. Thirty draft conventions for this purpose, drawn up by American jurists, were presented by Secretary Hughes, March 2, 1925, to the Governing Board of the Pan-American Union, and were published March 31. They will probably form the basis for discussion at the coming meeting at Rio de Janeiro of the International Commission of Jurists.

reception. The endeavor of Mr. Hughes to bring to an end the old dispute between Peru and Chile over Tacna-Arica has been very favorably regarded. It is clear to the professional diplomats that this effort is politically somewhat dangerous for the United States, for the feeling between Peruvians and Chileans over this territory—not to mention the insistent claims of Bolivia—is so much like the feeling of Frenchmen and Germans over Alsace-Lorraine, that any attempt to mediate is liable to incur the deep resentment of one side or the other. The friendly effort of the Secretary of State to aid in reaching a settlement is all the more appreciated. As to the future, the moral influence of the United States might well be exerted strongly to bring about the federation of the five Central American republics. Such a union would mean economy in public expenditures, the elimination of international rivalries, and would give the federation a position of influence in the American concert which the five republics singly cannot possess.

Pan-Americanism would be further strengthened by building up in Latin America an asset of good will toward the United States. European nations, especially France and Germany, have been more successful in this re-

spect than has our own country. The methods which they have used have been largely cultural and educational. France has established in South America what is known as the "Institutes of the University of Paris," under the terms of which the French Government sends each year two or three of the distinguished French scientists and teachers, without expense, to lecture at South American universities. The German Government, when it learned that Argentina wished to establish a bacteriological laboratory, loaned, without charge, one of the leading German scientists for this purpose. Along this same line a former Secretary of Education in the Argentine Cabinet has made the radical suggestion that the United States, instead of sending to the Latin-American capitals military and naval attachés, should send educational attachés, who should interpret to Latin America the best in our culture, and interpret to us the best in Latin-American civilization. Our Government has already frequently granted the requests of the Latin-American states, when they have asked for assistance in obtaining financial specialists or commissions to revise electoral laws, although the motive in sending financial experts has been misinterpreted by some. It might do more; it

might—to take an outstanding instance—aid in developing the work of the International Health Board of the Rockefeller Foundation, which has been notably successful throughout Latin America in fighting disease, and has probably done more to create a measure of genuine friendliness toward the United States than any other factor. This work might be expanded, possibly with Government assistance or in part through Government agencies. A program of cooperation might be carried out with some of the neighboring republics by the Department of Agriculture, which is probably the greatest research organization in agricultural matters in the world. Much may also be done by private associations, especially along educational lines, by establishing a larger number of scholarships and fellowships and arranging exchanges of professors and students. It is especially necessary that the American people should interpret their relation to Mexico in a broad spirit and with a sympathetic appreciation of the dangerous social process through which our nearest Latin-American neighbor is now passing, from an essentially feudal to a modern status.

In carrying out an American policy of good will the Pan-American Union is of great service. It has ceased to be merely a business

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organization and in its Director-General, Dr. Leo S. Rowe, has a leader who sees clearly the need of closer cooperation between the Americas along cultural and educational lines and in the field of international law and policy, and who has a sympathetic understanding of the psychology of the people both of Latin America and of the United States.

In closing a survey of the relations of the United States with the other republics of the hemisphere, we should compare Europe, made up of many states which are burdened with armaments and separated in many cases by bitter nationalistic differences and deep-seated racial animosities, with the Americas, relatively unarmed and free from these political and racial feuds. Certainly one of the factors responsible for this comparatively happy situation in this hemisphere is the Monroe Doctrine, fortified in recent decades by Pan-Americanism. In general, these policies have been successful. The prospect is that they will continue to be successful, provided care is taken to make necessary changes and to meet the reasonable desires of the Latin-American states.

IV

COOPERATION IN THE FAR EAST: THE
OPEN DOOR AND THE WASH-
INGTON CONFERENCE

IN the Far East the distinctive policies of the United States are the Open Door and the Integrity of China. The American people accept these with almost as little question as they do the Monroe Doctrine and Pan-Americanism for this hemisphere, although they do not give them the same ardent support. It has been an issue, however, for nearly a century whether these policies should be pursued by independent national action or by cooperation with the other states in the Far East. After decades of uncertainty and of fluctuation between these two methods, international cooperation achieved a complete triumph at the Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armament.

These two related policies, the Open Door and the Integrity of China, have developed their present meaning by a process of evolution from the first days of American contact with the Far East. Shortly after the inde-

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pendence of the United States, when ships from the Atlantic states were sailing to the Orient, American traders were left largely to themselves, although an occasional naval vessel was sent into the Pacific for the protection of American interests. After some decades, the Government began to insist upon the right of the most favored nation, which in principle is the same as that of the Open Door. Still later, about the middle of the past century, when it came to be realized that equal opportunity in trade and commerce demanded a strong united China, the preservation of the integrity of that country came to be recognized as a secondary aim of the United States. These two distinctive policies, which had been maintained in principle for half a century and more, were first definitely formulated by Secretary John Hay in 1899 and 1900.

Throughout most of the nineteenth century, as Dr. Tyler Dennett has pointed out in his recent volume, *Americans in Eastern Asia*, it was largely by independent action that the United States worked to realize these policies—although in our relations with the Far East there has always been a greater measure of international cooperation than in our relations with Europe. The United States took no part in the Opium War and in the Treaty of

Nanking, 1842, which terminated it, and which gave Great Britain its first extensive rights in China. But two years later, in 1844, our Government, by independent negotiation of the Cushing Treaty, gained substantially the same privileges as those which Great Britain had obtained by war. In the following decade, when treaty revision was necessary, there was a measure of timid cooperation. In 1855 the United States Commissioner to China proceeded to his post by the way of Europe and there conferred with the officials of the Foreign Offices in London and Paris, in order to agree upon a common policy in China. But the cooperation did not go far. In 1857 the Governments of Great Britain and France expressed the wish that our country should unite with them in an alliance for the purpose of bringing about adequate treaty revision in China, but the United States, in accord with its usual policy, independent action, stated definitely that it would not be a party to any treaty which might be negotiated with China jointly by these other powers. In the following year, 1858, in the tangled negotiations leading to the Treaty of Tientsin, the United States acted as an independent associate with these two countries. In this matter and in the serious troubles

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which developed with China during the following couple of years, the American representatives were in much the same situation as they were at the recent Lausanne Conference in Europe.

In the sixties, while Seward was Secretary of State and Burlingame was Minister to China, there was a period of genuine international cooperation. This course was possible both because of the attitude of Secretary Seward and his representatives in the Far East, and because the other nations were willing to support the policy of most-favored-nation treatment and of the integrity of China. In Japan this cooperation was carried to the unusual length of joint military operations. In 1864 an armed American vessel united with British, French, and Dutch ships in a naval expedition against Shimonoseki, a precedent for two further joint military demonstrations in 1865 and 1872. In 1866 the United States, with Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands, signed a joint tariff treaty with Japan. Secretary Seward even proposed joint hostilities against Japan, should that appear necessary, and suggested that the French should unite with the Americans in a joint expedition against Korea.

After Seward's time this policy of interna-

tional cooperation was abandoned, and for over thirty years our Government pursued an independent course of action. Many incidents in this period remind one of recent American diplomacy in connection with European issues. In 1882, for instance, the United States appointed an official observer at an international conference called to consider the revision of the Japanese Treaties.

But independent action failed to gain the chief aims of our Government in the Far East. By 1898 the Empire of China appeared to be about to be divided between the military powers of the world and American policies to be overthrown. Secretary Hay, in this critical situation, in 1899, initiated a new policy, which has since been strengthened and developed, of cooperation with the other nations of the Far East, carried out generally under the leadership of the United States. In that year he induced the other great powers to give at least lip service to a somewhat general enunciation of the Open Door. The following years, 1900 and 1901, the United States took a leading part in the military movements for the relief of the legations in Peking and in the subsequent negotiation of the agreements which defined and settled the responsibility of China for the Boxer outbreaks. In 1904

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Secretary Hay secured promises from Russia and Japan to respect, within prescribed limits, the territory and neutrality of China, and in the next year induced the neutral powers to agree not to claim any Chinese territory at the close of the Russo-Japanese War. This same policy of international cooperation was carried out through the Administration of President Taft. When the scramble for financial and commercial concessions became acute in 1908 and 1909, President Taft insisted upon the right of the United States to its full share in these concessions, and took a leading part in the formation of the first Consortium, or international agreement for co-operation in financial matters. In 1911, to be consistent in its advocacy of joint action, our Government invited the other powers to share in the loan for currency reform and the development of Manchuria, which had previously been awarded exclusively to an American banking group. President Taft, in referring to the Chinese situation, in his message to Congress in December, 1912, praised "the principle of international cooperation in matters of common interest"; and the same year the Department of State announced, also referring to China: "The Department attaches the highest importance to the broad principle

of international cooperation and concerted action." With the incoming of the new Administration in 1913, however, President Wilson reverted to the policy of independent action, since he felt that the terms of the Six-Power agreement, or Consortium, were too onerous upon China. This withdrawal of the United States, together with the effect of the World War, proved to be so disastrous to China that the same Administration found it desirable to return again to the policy of financial cooperation and in 1920 took the lead in forming the second Consortium.

THE BACKGROUND OF THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

It was the Washington Conference which carried to its greatest development this policy of cooperation in the Far East. But the Washington Conference cannot be properly appreciated unless it is viewed against the background of the international situation which existed before the Conference was convened. For some fifteen years before 1921 the relations between the United States and Japan had been unsatisfactory. Previously, however, from the opening of Japan by Perry in 1854 until about 1905, the United States had regarded Japan almost as a national

protégé. During the Russo-Japanese War both the American Government and the American people were partial to Japan and wished for its success; President Roosevelt—as Doctor Dennett has recently ascertained from his research in the Roosevelt private letters—sent word to both Germany and France, at the opening of the war, that should they take sides with Russia, he would at once take sides with Japan and proceed to whatever lengths should be necessary on her behalf. But after the Russo-Japanese War, friction developed, due to racial issues relating to the immigration of the Japanese into this country and their treatment in California; to the Japanese foreign policy which Americans regarded as aggressive and militaristic; and to an apparent clash of interests, especially in Manchuria. This friction existed more or less continuously during these fifteen years, sometimes merely latent, at other times, as in 1907-8 and 1913, reaching an almost acute stage. After the World War there was an apparent increase in mutual suspicion.

(The Japanese, from their point of view, resented the anti-Japanese legislation of California, which irritated them and appeared to mark them as racial inferiors. But their great complaint was that the United States,

as it appeared to them, was blocking every attempt of theirs to develop closer commercial and financial relations with China, which they regarded as essential for the economic existence of their nation. They were also disturbed over the naval activity of the United States since the war, and the coming into the Pacific of the American fleet.

From the point of view of the United States it seemed that for years Japan had been riding roughshod over the foremost American policies in the Far East—the Open Door and the Integrity of China. When the Washington Conference met, Japanese troops were still in occupation of the leased territory and of the railroad in Shantung, and thus had the control of that great province; and there was little prospect of their withdrawing. Their forces were garrisoned in some of the cities of China in which they had no legal right, particularly Hankow, the Chicago of the central part of the country. The twenty-one demands, drawn up in 1915, which in their entirety would have made China almost a vassal state of Japan, were still in force or impending. Japan, too, had a much larger number of its own post offices scattered throughout Chinese territory than other powers. The Japanese Government also asserted a theory of general

political dominance over China which was sometimes called the Japanese Monroe Doctrine. It was not a policy of defense, stipulating that no foreign power should extend its control over the territory or the government of any Asiatic country, but, rather, a formulation of Japan's claim that the Far East lay within its especial sphere of interest. The interpretation somewhat popularly given to this policy may be judged from the fact that when the United States, in June, 1917, sent word to the Chinese Government, then on the verge of civil war, that it was important for it to compose its own internal disputes, in view of its possible entrance into the World War, some of the Japanese newspapers resented this official action of the United States, on the ground that any communication of this kind should be sent to China either through the Japanese Foreign Office or after consultation with Japan. The Tokyo Yamato said, "While Japan has abstained from taking any steps whatever in Mexico, in deference to America's special position there, America has interfered in China's domestic politics by ignoring Japan's position in that country." This claim of political predominance or special interests in China was strengthened by the unfortunate Lansing-Ishii Agreement, Novem-

ber 2, 1917, which contained the following stipulation: "The Governments of the United States and Japan recognize that territorial propinquity creates special relations between countries, and consequently, the Government of the United States recognizes that Japan has special interests in China, particularly in that part to which her possessions are contiguous."

In Siberia, as well as in China, Japan appeared to be violating American principles and policies. Before the Washington Conference, Japanese troops were still in military control of eastern Siberia. During the war, in order to rescue the retreating Czecho-Slovak forces, Japan and the United States had agreed that each would send about seven thousand troops to garrison strategic points in that region. While the United States sent the prescribed number and withdrew them all in 1920, Japan sent some seventy thousand and continued to maintain a large proportion of them there. The violation of the agreement with the United States, the efforts to monopolize the trade of the country, the extreme harshness toward the local population, the frequent refusal to carry out a policy of genuine cooperation, and the intrigues with various factions for political influence with the ap-

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parent aim of retaining the country permanently—all characteristic of the military elements at their worst—helped to increase the widespread resentment in the United States against the methods of Japan and to heighten the distrust of its purposes. This natural but unfortunate attitude toward Japan was intensified by the existence of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the opposition to which was due not to any real danger that Great Britain would join Japan in a possible war against the United States, but to the moral support which it had given to Japan—and might well continue to give in the future—in her violations of the policy of the Open Door and her encroachments upon the administrative and territorial integrity of China and Siberia.

In addition to the fundamental clash of policies between Japan and the United States in Eastern Asia, there also was a particular clash of national interests. Some four years ago, the word "Yap" stood for an irritating dispute over this tiny cable island as well as over the other former German islands in the Pacific north of the equator. Japan claimed that all of these had been legally granted to her as a mandate by the Allied Powers and the League of Nations. The United States denied

the claim, and insisted that Japan had no right to act as administrator of these islands without first receiving the consent of the United States, and that in any case Yap was not included in the mandate.

The international friction created by these clashes of policy and of interest was increased by an intense naval competition. In 1916 the United States undertook the greatest naval building program ever inaugurated by any nation at any one time, and at the close of the war it seemed best to our Government to continue this program. It also seemed best to the Japanese Government to do the utmost they could to equal it. There thus arose a keen competition in naval building. Between maritime states there is hardly anything which will more surely develop friction and ill will than competition in the building of great battleships. Competition, however, was not limited to the building of ships; it extended to the erection and strengthening of naval bases and fortifications in the Pacific. On the American side there was little actually accomplished, but there was considerable discussion of extending the military works in the Philippines, and especially of making Guam a Gibraltar of the Pacific, while Japan was believed to be hurrying to completion new forti-

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fications on the Bonin Islands, slightly north of Guam.

These various factors led to an extremely unfortunate situation. In each country there was a dangerously widespread suspicion and fear of the other. The United States had absolutely no thought of attacking Japan; yet while Americans were no longer frightened by the nightmares conjured up by Homer Lee, in his *Valor of Ignorance*, they were apprehensive of attacks on China and the Philippine Islands. In Japan the people as a whole had no more thought of making war upon the United States than Americans had of making war upon the Japanese. Nevertheless, some of the Japanese militarists indulged in jingoistic talk, which was widely reported in this country, boasting that within another decade or two they would be in military possession of all the islands of the Great Ocean, including the Philippines. Some of them wrote books in which they described the probable course of a war with the United States. In order to maintain their own position in Japan, since militarism of the German type had been seriously discredited by the World War, these militarists definitely tried to arouse fear of the United States, not because they expected a war or wished to bring one about, but in order

to convince the Japanese people of the necessity of strengthening their military and naval forces. The result of all this was extremely unfortunate; and the seriousness of the situation was evident in many ways. Shortly before the Washington Conference Dr. James L. Barton, the Secretary of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, who was visiting Japan, was so impressed by the danger of the increasing friction that he wrote to the American press: "Our American missionaries are peculiarly close to the people of the country and through them I have been brought in intimate relations with outstanding Japanese leaders. Our missionaries report that as they move among the people, they are repeatedly asked, 'Why is the United States planning to make war upon Japan?' There seems to be a widely extended fear that America is planning to attack Japan in the near future. Japanese friendly political leaders report the same general opinion, which they meet all over the country. . . . They say the naval activities of the United States upon the Pacific are a cause of increasing anxiety upon the part of multitudes of Japanese. They cannot explain why this should be done, if America does not contemplate war upon Japan." This statement was

typical of others from missionary observers—and it should be remembered that the missionaries are inclined to emphasize the friendly, rather than the suspicious, elements in a nation in which their religious work is carried on. At this same time, many in our country were reading Walter P. Pitkin's volume, *Must We Fight Japan?* Aside from the extremists and the jingoes, a considerable number of thoughtful people, in touch with the diplomatic situation in the Pacific, felt that Japan and the United States were both traveling along roads which, much as each would regret it, would eventually converge in war.

THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

Then came the Washington Conference, which made a radical change in American-Japanese relations. Although there were two apparently separate topics which the Conference was to consider, the limitation of armament and Pacific and Far Eastern questions, yet these subjects were actually intimately connected. The discussion of the limitation of armament was to be centered upon naval armament; the menace of naval armament lay chiefly in the competition between the United States and Japan; and this competition sprang out of the mutual suspicion and re-

sentment of these two countries due to differences over Pacific and Far Eastern questions.

On the morning of November 12, 1921, representatives of the nine nations whose home territories or possessions lie in the Pacific met at Washington in Memorial Continental Hall. The official delegates were supported by scores of advisers and technical experts. Some three hundred newspaper men and special correspondents were present—to prevent secret diplomacy—while the galleries were filled with Congressmen, Senators, Justices of the Supreme Court, and Ambassadors and Ministers from nations which were not participating in the Conference. All in the hall were still under the influence of the emotions of the previous day at Arlington, where they had taken part in the burial of the Unknown Soldier, a service which typified graphically what war meant and what armaments were for. The address of the President of the United States, who welcomed the delegates of the other nations and explained American ideals and hopes, made a very deep impression. The invitation to the Conference, he said, was not from the United States alone; “it is, rather, the spoken word of a war-wearied world, struggling for restoration, hungering and thirsting for better relation-

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ship, of humanity crying for relief and craving assurances of lasting peace." Toward the end of his address he epitomized America's aims by saying: "I can speak officially only for our United States. Our hundred millions frankly want less of armament and none of war."

After the President had left the hall the Secretary of State arose. It was presumed that he would, as usual in such a gathering, give an address introductory to the actual business of the session, in which he would point out the necessity for the appointment of various committees; and that this great international Conference, as others had done in the past, would then slowly organize and gradually get under way. It was doubtless thought by the distinguished and experienced diplomats present that after the committees had been appointed, and proposals submitted and discussed at length, some tentative agreements might be formulated and after some weeks possibly be adopted. It was therefore somewhat listlessly that members of the Conference listened to the Secretary of State as he began his address quite in the orthodox way, by describing the previous attempts of the Great Powers to bring about a mutual limitation of armament. But after a few mo-

ments, with a transition so gradual that it was scarcely apparent, it was almost suddenly realized that something unusual was taking place, that something was being proposed of a kind never proposed before in a great international gathering. Secretary Hughes began to discuss sea power, and sea power meant the British Empire. So rapt was the attention, so startling the project outlined, that one of the British delegates was seen suddenly to grip the arm of the delegate next him; and Lord Beatty, who had seemed almost asleep, suddenly riveted his gaze on a spot in the ceiling, to avoid showing his emotions. For the United States was throwing down a challenge to the other great naval nations of the world—a challenge not of war, but of peace—a challenge to unite in putting on the scrap heap the greater part of their ships of war. It was not a vague general suggestion; the Secretary of State specified by name the American, British, and Japanese ships which he proposed should be destroyed. When in his address he reached a striking sentence, which seemed to visualize his project—"There should be a naval holiday. It is proposed that for a period of not less than ten years there should be no further construction of capital ships"—all the Americans in the hall, the Congress-

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men, the Senators, the Justices of the Supreme Court, broke out in instant and tremendous applause. To destroy all American dreadnaughts partly built, the world's greatest naval force under construction, in the cause of an equitable mutual reduction of armament, appealed to the idealism of the American people.

By a half hour's speech, it has been said, the Secretary of State sank more battleships than all of the admirals of the world had sunk in a hundred years. "The most dramatic moment in the diplomatic history of the world," it has been called. Of the offer of the United States, Lord Beatty said, "It made idealism a practical proposition." And Lord Balfour, the head of the British Empire delegation, at the second Plenary Session, when these naval proposals were adopted in principle, referred to the opening meeting of the Conference as "a landmark in human civilization." How could such an unemotional intellectual type as Lord Balfour speak of this session as a landmark in human civilization? His view may be better understood if we realize that the trained diplomats, in coming to Washington, had in mind the history of a century of effort to bring about mutual limitation of armament and of a century of failure.

The success of the Conference is even clearer to-day than when the delegates were still in Washington, for the essential treaties and resolutions are now being carried out in letter and in spirit. Important as were the limitations upon naval competition, of even greater importance were the agreements regarding the Pacific and the Far East. In fact, the chief value of the naval treaty lay in its favorable effect upon American-Japanese relations. Of the engagements regarding the Far East made either by the Conference or by China and Japan under Conference influence, all are now in force with the exception of the two treaties relating to China, which await the single ratification of France; and even these two are regarded much as if they were legally binding. Japanese troops have entirely withdrawn from Shantung, and this old populous province of China for the first time in a quarter of a century has been fully restored to Chinese administration. The Japanese garrison has been withdrawn from Hankow. The Japanese post offices have all been closed, except in the leased territory of Manchuria and within the zone of the South Manchuria railroad. The twenty-one demands have in large part been superseded or withdrawn: Group I, relating to the former

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Japanese occupation of Shantung, is no longer in force; and Group V, which threatened China's sovereign rights and which Japan had postponed for future negotiations, and several sections of Group II, which stipulated for many special privileges in Southern Manchuria, were renounced by the Japanese delegation during the Conference. Continental Siberia the Japanese troops have entirely evacuated, and although they are still in occupation of the northern half of the island of Sakhalin, they are now withdrawing in accordance with the terms of the Russo-Japanese Treaty, signed January 21, 1925. One remembers the cynics at the Washington Conference who scoffed at Japan's promise to withdraw from Siberia, asking what a mere promise amounted to between great nations; yet the promise has been absolutely fulfilled. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance has been terminated. The claim of militaristic Japan to political dominance in the Far East has been scrapped. The mere fact that Japan attended a conference to consider Pacific and Far Eastern questions which met at Washington rather than at Tokyo, and was called by the American rather than the Japanese Government, was a visible repudiation of the earlier assertion of a measure of control over these

regions; while the agreements made at the Conference were based upon the theory of complete international equality in this whole area. The Lansing-Ishii Agreement, which had recognized Japan's "special interests in China," was abrogated by an exchange of notes between the United States and Japan, April 14, 1923, which stated that, "In the light of the understandings arrived at by the Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armament, the American and Japanese Governments are agreed to consider the Lansing-Ishii correspondence of November 2, 1917, as canceled and of no further force or effect."

The clash of interests over Yap and the mandates was settled by a treaty which was signed during the Washington Conference, but was not strictly a part of its proceedings. By this agreement—a rather remarkable one since it apparently satisfied both nations—the United States obtained in the island of Yap a recognition of exactly the same rights as Japan possesses in everything relating to electrical communication. In the mandate as a whole, the United States gave its consent that Japan should act as administrator, and in return received from Japan all of the privileges which members of the League of Nations enjoy, and certain others in addition, such as

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the right of American missionaries to own property and to carry on schools. As a recognition of the part-ownership of the United States in these former German islands at the close of the World War and of its continuing right as a trustee, Japan agreed to send each year to the United States a copy of the official report of its administration of the mandate, which it prepares annually for the Council of the League of Nations.

No issue exists to-day between the United States and Japan over the Open Door and the Integrity of China. The great significance of the Washington Conference lies in the fact that Japan officially accepted these fundamental policies of the United States for the Far East, and thus did away with the chief long-standing cause of antagonism between the two countries. The Open Door, to be sure, had been recognized in several bilateral treaties or agreements during the preceding couple of decades, but this recognition had been largely lip service, as was shown by the action of more than one great Power in the Far East. The Washington Conference nailed open the Open Door. For the first time the nations concerned in China agreed upon a carefully considered and detailed definition of the Open Door, and pledged each other to

observe and help maintain this policy. Further, they devised machinery for carrying out the pledges agreed upon, including an international commission to pass upon issues which might arise in the future over doubtful cases of alleged infringement of the Open-Door principle. Although the two Nine-Power Treaties embodying these agreements still lack the ratification of France, this fact does not affect the genuineness of Japan's acceptance of the policies of the Open Door and the Integrity of China.

Competition in naval armament, which exerted such an unfortunate influence before 1921, has been rigorously restricted, and in certain classes of ships practically eliminated. In regard to capital ships and aircraft carriers there is now no competition as to their number, their size, or their armament. The naval treaty specified by name the capital ships which each naval power might retain, and those which should be destroyed, and established the well-known ratio of 5:5:3 for the future tonnage of capital and airplane carrier ships of the United States, the British Empire, and Japan. It limited the size of capital ships to thirty-five thousand tons and the caliber of their guns to sixteen inches. Similar restrictions were placed upon aircraft

carriers. Although it was impossible at the Washington Conference to agree upon a ratio for auxiliary ships, such as cruisers, destroyers, and submarines, and each power is therefore at liberty to build as many of such vessels as it wishes, there is, nevertheless, an important limitation upon competition in these classes since the treaty restricts the size of auxiliary ships to ten thousand tons and the caliber of their guns to eight inches. There is a further and very important restriction upon naval competition in the Pacific, for the treaty forbids, throughout most of the islands of this ocean, the building of new naval bases or fortifications, or the strengthening of those already in existence.

All of these changes brought, for a time at least, into the area of the Pacific, to quote the notable expression of Premier Briand at the Washington Conference, "the spirit of moral disarmament." In the words of Secretary Hughes, "At the Washington Conference we managed to scrap distrust as well as the vessels of war"; "Quite apart from specific engagements, it was worth all the efforts of the Conference to produce a new state of mind with respect to our relations with the Far East." Lord Lee of Fareham, one of the British delegates, speaking before the Royal Colonial In-

stitute in London, May 9, 1922, said: "Looking back at it all now, and comparing what has happened with what one hoped in one's wildest dreams might happen, I can only say that the reality has surpassed one's highest expectations. . . . The Conference produced a complete change in the attitude of mind of the nations there assembled, and, if I may so describe it, made them think in terms of peace rather than in terms of war. . . . Perhaps the most important result of the Conference was with regard to that troubled region, the Pacific, in that it changed the prospect of naval war there into a practical certainty of naval peace."

All of the definite issues causing friction between Japan and the United States before the Washington Conference—irrespective of the vague racial issue which was merely latent at that time—were settled by what was done at the Conference or in consequence of it. During 1922 and 1923 it could properly be said that never before for years had the relations between Japan and the United States been so friendly. Never before for years was it possible to look into the future of the Pacific with apparent confidence that it held decades of peaceful international cooperation rather than a menace of a great war. The result was



well expressed by a typical quotation from the Japan Weekly Chronicle, June 14, 1923: "Probably in the near future the American-Japanese war scare will be completely forgotten; it seems almost incredible already that people apparently with a reasonable amount of intelligence could have been seriously concerned two or three years ago with the fear that there was to be a war between Japan and America."

EXTENT OF AMERICAN COOPERATION

Considering the Washington Conference from the standpoint of international cooperation, certain agreements are of particular interest; most of all, the Four-Power Pact relating to the islands of the Pacific, which was signed and ratified by the United States, Great Britain, Japan, and France. The fundamental reason for making this treaty was the desire to abrogate the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. This fact was frankly admitted by the American delegation in its official report on the Conference: "It may be stated without reservation that one of the most important factors in the Far Eastern situation was the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. This Alliance has been viewed by the people of the United States with deep concern. Originally designed as a

measure of protection in view of the policies of Russia and Germany in Far Eastern affairs, the continuance of the Alliance after all peril from those sources had ceased could not fail to be regarded as seriously prejudicial to our interests." The British Empire was in great perplexity regarding the renewal of the Alliance, since some of the Dominions, particularly Canada, were opposed to it, and the subject had been earnestly debated at the British Imperial Conference a few weeks previous to the Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armament. It was well known that Great Britain would be genuinely pleased to terminate the Alliance, provided this could be done without offending Japan; and that Japan, under the circumstances, would be willing to abrogate it, provided some method could be found which would not appear to cast a slight upon its conduct or standing as a great power. It was popularly suggested that the situation might be met should the United States join the Alliance, but such a procedure was impossible on account of the strong opposition of the American people to participation in alliances. The outlines of the problem were perfectly clear: what sort of an agreement for peace in the Pacific could be made which would satisfy Great Britain and



Japan and to which the United States could subscribe? The solution of the problem was the Four-Power Pact—four-power instead of three, since France was included in the agreement before it was put into treaty form.

The provisions of the treaty relate exclusively to the islands of the Pacific, and do not in any way deal with the mainland of Asia, nor even with the home islands of Japan. There are three pledges: (1) The Contracting Parties agree to respect each other's "rights in relation to their insular possessions and insular dominions in the region of the Pacific Ocean"; (2) "If there should develop between any of the High Contracting Parties a controversy arising out of any Pacific question and involving their said rights which is not satisfactorily settled by diplomacy and is likely to affect the harmonious accord now happily subsisting between them, they shall invite the other High Contracting Parties to a joint conference to which the whole subject will be referred for consideration and adjustment." (3) "If the said rights are threatened by the aggressive action of any other power, the High Contracting Parties shall communicate with one another fully and frankly in order to arrive at an understanding as to the most efficient

measures to be taken, jointly or separately, to meet the exigencies of the particular situation." In the concluding article, it is stipulated that when the ratifications of the Treaty shall be deposited, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance shall terminate."

The precise meaning of some of these pledges came to be a subject of dispute in the press, but there was no uncertainty as to them among the contracting powers. As the American delegation stated in its official report: "When controversies arise of the character stated in the article, the powers merely agree to confer together concerning them. No power binds itself to anything further." In the debate in the Senate preceding the ratification of this treaty, so much apprehension was expressed by some of the Senators that a reservation, accepted in advance by the President and the Secretary of State, put the meaning of the agreement beyond the possibility of misunderstanding. The reservation reads: "The United States understands that under the statement in the preamble, or under the terms of this treaty, there is no commitment to armed force, no alliance, no obligation to join in any defense."

By some this treaty has been regarded as of little consequence aside from the fact that

it terminated the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. One of our authorities on the Far East has described it as "towing the Alliance away from the mainland of Asia and beaching it, a derelict, upon a coral reef in mid-Pacific." By a minority in the Senate, however, it was regarded as of dangerous importance. While its chief significance doubtless lies in its canceling the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, it may properly be contended that its provisions are of themselves entirely reasonable. To respect the rights of other nations is good American doctrine; and to agree to confer with them, in cases of dispute which cannot otherwise be settled, or in apprehension of war, would also appear to be in accord with American principles. Nevertheless, this treaty contains definite commitments for closer international co-operation than any other agreement the United States has signed and ratified for over a hundred years. The treaty, excellent as it is, goes further in pledging the United States to take concerted action with other nations in regard to the Pacific than we have ever gone in regard to either Europe or the Americas.

Another way in which our Government has committed itself to the principle of international cooperation in the Far East is by agreeing to take part in the various commissions

which have been provided for in order to carry out the stipulations of the treaties relating to China. These commissions are much like those created by the Treaty of Versailles, and are to be composed of delegates of many of the very powers with whom the United States has declined to cooperate in European political matters. This fact is not of itself an argument for participating in similar commissions in Europe, but it does make it clear that the United States is willing to do in the Far East what it is not willing to do in Europe. The treaties relating to China, although they have not yet been ratified by France, have been both signed and ratified by the United States, and so present an official expression of our national policy. There are five of these commissions, conferences or committees in which the United States has promised to participate officially. The new Board of Reference for Far Eastern Questions is to decide whether doubtful cases are in agreement with the provisions laid down in the treaty for the maintenance of the Open Door. An international Tariff Revision Commission was provided for to place the Chinese customs tariff on a full five-per cent basis, and a special conference, to meet later, to prepare for further tariff changes and the aboli-

tion of likin, that is, the Chinese internal transit charges. A Commission on Exterritoriality is to visit China and study the development and existing status of the Chinese judicial system. Finally, under certain conditions, an international committee is to be called to investigate issues which may be raised as to the presence of foreign troops in China.

J Altogether, the Washington Conference marks the greatest measure of close cooperation with other powers of the world which this nation has ever undertaken. It is also without doubt one of the most striking diplomatic achievements of the United States since the negotiations at Paris in 1782-83, which led to the treaty formally recognizing American independence.

JAPAN'S CHANGE IN POLICY

Success in maintaining the friendly spirit created by the Washington Conference and in carrying out its agreements was apparently made more certain by an essential and fundamental change in Japanese foreign policy. It is now clear that during the past three or four years, in part as a result of the Washington Conference, Japan has discarded its former militaristic policy in favor of one of coopera-

tion with other states and of conciliation of China. This change is of vital importance for the peace of the Pacific and especially for the continuance of satisfactory Japanese-American relations. A moment's consideration of the international situation of Japan during the World War will make clear the reasons for the earlier policy of military force. Japan has a relatively dense population, which is rapidly increasing. The natural means, and almost the only means under actual world conditions of to-day, by which Japan may care for this population is to become a great manufacturing nation. It is therefore the belief of practically all thoughtful Japanese, of every political party, that it is absolutely essential, "a life-and-death matter," to gain markets for their surplus manufactured products and to obtain secure sources of raw materials. China, with its four hundred million potential purchasers and its reservoirs of raw materials, particularly of iron and steel, is the country with which economic and commercial connections are especially desired. As Baron Uchida recently said, "With a large population in a small territory, Japan could insure her existence only by cooperating with China." The only question in the minds of the Japanese

has been as to the best means of bringing about the much desired economic connection with China. Even before the World War German militaristic ideals were firmly held by many in Japan. The Japanese army was German trained, and German influence was strong throughout the Japanese governmental class. When the World War broke out it was only natural, however much it may be reprobated, that Japan should adopt German methods and should seek to gain its political and economic aims by its military power, while the rest of the world was so completely occupied that it could not interfere. It was often said, "This is an opportunity of a thousand years."

In these circumstances the Japanese Government, under the practical dominance of the military class, decided, although against the opposition of an influential minority, to proceed with a strong hand on the continent of Asia. The measures taken have already been described: the seizure of Shantung, the twenty-one demands, the virtual occupation of Manchuria, the garrisoning of such Chinese cities as Hankow, and the occupation and rigorous administration of eastern Siberia.

But this militaristic policy did not bring the desired results. By disregarding the prin-

ciple of the Open Door and violating the Integrity of China Japan still further alienated the United States and eventually found itself isolated internationally. Furthermore, the normal trade of Japan was greatly injured by the Chinese boycott of Japanese goods, at the same time that the costs of the military expeditions, especially in Siberia, came to be excessive. Under the leadership of the commercial and financial classes sufficient pressure was finally brought to bear upon the Government to reverse the former policy and to bring the majority of thinking Japanese to the conviction that it was for their best interests to cooperate with rather than antagonize the other great powers, and to conciliate rather than exasperate China.

This new policy has been frankly announced by the Government and recognized by the leading political parties. As the Japanese Secretary of Foreign Affairs said in an address to the Council of Prefectural Governors of Japan on May 29, 1922: "Better agreement and better understanding between Chinese and Japanese is now our policy." The change, which is recognized by most competent observers of conditions in the Far East, has made it easier for the Japanese Government to carry out in letter and spirit, as it has done,

the agreements of the Washington Conference, and to reverse most of the military actions taken in China and Siberia since 1914. The effects of the new policy are shown in many other ways. The Japanese Government has been noticeably sympathetic with China in the several controversies of the past couple of years between Peking and the foreign powers. In Geneva, the past summer, it was commented upon that the Japanese supported the Chinese delegation in its efforts to have China elected to membership in the council of the League. Particularly significant has been the decision of the Japanese Government to use the greater part of its remaining share of the Chinese Boxer indemnity, as well as the money received for the transfer of Japanese interests in Shantung, to help advance the civilization and progress of China. By an act promulgated March 30, 1923, a special fund was created for this purpose, consisting of \$22,000,000 from the Boxer indemnity and \$10,900,000 from the Shantung payments. An initial appropriation of \$2,675,000 was made by the Diet in July, 1924, to be expended for the creation of two institutions of higher learning in Peking and Shanghai; the former to be devoted to research in philosophy, literature, and social

science, and the latter to research in natural science. The same year the Diet voted \$270,000 to subsidize schools and hospitals in Tsingtao, Shantung. Obviously, the purpose of these gifts is to win the good will of China. ✓ A small and financially poor country, such as Japan, does not give away nearly thirty-three million dollars except to carry out a carefully considered and firmly held policy.

While the chief element in effecting the change of policy has been the conviction that the military régime did not pay, there have doubtless been other contributory factors. Since the war there has been a marked opposition to militarism in Japan, which has shown itself particularly strong in the Japanese universities. In Waseda University, for example, an attempt was made to organize a society for the study of military affairs, and an initial mass meeting was held for this purpose on May 10, 1923, with a number of distinguished Japanese generals on the platform. An audience of some thousand were present; but so bitterly was the organization of such a society resented, even though it was merely for the study of military subjects, that the anti-military element in the student body broke up the meeting in disorder and the attempt to form such a society had to be abandoned.

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Further, there has been a marked democratic movement in Japan, as shown by the successful agitation for manhood suffrage. While democracy is not as peaceful as it is sometimes believed to be, democracies are not apt to plan cold-bloodedly a foreign policy of aggression. Finally, the Washington Conference convinced the majority of the Japanese people of the sincerity and earnestness of the United States in its effort for peace and international cooperation in the Pacific.

This change of policy is of very great importance in its bearing upon Japanese-American relations, for the militaristic methods of the Japanese during the World War violated the Open Door and the Integrity of China, while their more recent course of action is in full accord with American principles for international conduct in the Far East. The Washington Conference and Japan's new foreign policy have removed the one fundamental issue which for several years has seriously divided the United States and Japan.

FACTORS IN THE SUCCESS OF THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

In studying the reasons for the success of the Washington Conference it is evident that there were certain factors which were largely

responsible for it—factors which are generally essential for the success of any great international gathering.

First of all was the Conference method. There was so much misunderstanding, especially between Japan and the United States; so many complicated details to be settled, as in the naval treaty and the agreements regarding China; so many interests of different nations to be considered, that it was practically necessary for the delegates to meet together and face to face talk over the common problems. It was noticeable that the Japanese accepted the invitation to the Conference with some regret, and came to Washington with a measure of reluctance; they felt at first that they were defendants on trial; and only gradually, after days of frank, intimate exchange of view with the other nations, did they develop an attitude of full confidence and accept completely the policy of the Open Door.

Some degree of unity of purpose and of mutual good will was essential. If Japan had come to the Conference insistent upon carrying out in the Far East its former military aims, it would have brought about a diplomatic head-on collision between its policy of military aggression and America's policy of

the Open Door. But when the Japanese reached Washington there had already developed a measure at least of willingness to cooperate for peace and mutual advantage in the Pacific. Mr. Sadao Saburi, Chargé d'Affaires of the Japanese Embassy at Washington, and now in the Foreign Office in Tokyo, said, in December, 1922: "I was a member of the Japanese Delegation to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. We left Japan with a definite impression that what public opinion demanded of us was that we should concentrate our efforts primarily on protecting Japanese interests. I was also connected with our Delegation at the Washington Disarmament Conference. Our delegates were unanimous in the view that what Japanese public opinion expected of them was to envisage the problems not so much in terms of the special interest of Japan, but, rather, in terms of a just and expedient world settlement. This striking change from a national to an international point of view, from a competitive idea to a cooperative ideal, from apprehension to confidence, had occurred in the short space of three years."

A willingness was manifested on the part of each nation to sacrifice minor considerations in order to achieve the greater objects of the

Conference. At Washington each of the nations made its sacrifice. The United States gave up potential control of the sea. Its capital ships building in 1921 would have given it, within two or three years, the most powerful navy afloat. The United States sacrificed this naval leadership, and, further, it sacrificed its right to increase or strengthen its naval bases and fortifications throughout most of the Pacific islands. Japan in turn gave up its military hold upon China and Eastern Siberia, as well as its claim to special interests in these regions as a whole. It had incurred a heavy cost in money and in lives to gain the position which it held. The Japanese Government knew well that no power would fight on behalf of China, and that only by a long war of great magnitude would it be possible by force to compel the observance of the Open Door. Yet what could not have been gained by military means Japan sacrificed voluntarily in order to help establish a régime of peaceful cooperation in the Pacific and the Far East. The British Empire, in renouncing its centuries-long position as the foremost sea power of the world, with memories going back to Nelson, Trafalgar, and the Armada, laid upon the altar of mutual limitation of armament the most firmly held policy of the British

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Government and the most cherished tradition of the British people.

In such a Conference it is well to remember that each nation is inclined to magnify its own sacrifices and minimize those of its colleague nations. The Washington Conference is no exception to this rule. Many Americans, especially our naval experts, feel that it is the United States which made the greatest sacrifice of all. A somewhat typical expression of this view is from an article by Mr. Schornstheimer, an associate of the United States Naval Institute: "In all the Diplomatic History of Japan there has been no victory quite so complete, so important, or one gained at so little cost, as her victory at the Washington Arms Conference. She has gained the position for which she has been struggling for fifty years, and accomplished it without bloodshed, and even without creating hard feelings."¹ But Lord Wester-Wemyss, Admiral of the British Fleet, said: "The Conference has proved an unqualified success for the United States, who, through the statesmanship of President Harding and Mr. Hughes, have achieved all the objects they had in view. The check to Japan's rising naval power is, after the surrender of Britain's naval su-

¹ Current History, August, 1922, p. 744.

premacv, the most striking feature of the Conference." And the Tokyo Hochi, reflecting the disappointment of the Japanese military circles at the withdrawal from parts of China and from Siberia, insisted that by the Washington Conference Japan had "sustained such a loss as she would have suffered had she been defeated in her desperate war with Russia." A comparison of the complaints from each nation inclines one more strongly to the conclusion that the general settlement at Washington was an equitable one.

The topics on the program or agenda were definite and restricted. This fact enabled the delegations from the several states represented to give adequate study to the issues involved before the Conference convened, and during the sessions to concentrate their efforts upon a few definite objectives. Even the League of Nations, which is organized to settle the various international difficulties as they arise, and which has been strikingly successful in many instances in doing so, has come to realize that the best method of solving the important, complicated international problems of the world is to refer them to conferences called for their special consideration, such as the two opium conferences, which met in November, 1924, and the projected confer-

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ence on the international traffic in arms, scheduled for May, 1925.

A reasonable degree of secrecy was maintained in preparation of material and in negotiation. To have begun the Conference by an international newspaper discussion as to the proper basis for the limitation of armament would have been almost disastrous. In carrying on negotiations over topics regarding which strong national feeling exists, there must be confidential exchanges of view. The Secretary of State has recently stressed this fact: "It is suggested that all would be easy if negotiators would simply tell the public everything that they are doing. But the trouble is that in every negotiation, as all business men know, there are preliminary positions to be taken, tentative plans to be discussed, arguments to be presented and demolished, and nothing can be accomplished if every suggestion, every advance, and every retreat must be publicly made. . . . Open diplomacy is openness of results."

The crowning factor was strong, audacious, idealistic leadership. The Washington Conference had such leadership from Secretary Hughes. The success of the Conference was due in no small measure to the dramatic moment at the first plenary session when the

Secretary of State challenged the other great naval powers to follow the lead of the United States in scrapping a large part of their ships of war. Through the following weeks a powerful locomotive pulling a great express train gives a slight idea of the force and the speed of the Chairman of the Conference. But his energy was combined with geniality, and his quickness in decision with an unerring judgment. Above all was his idealism, the vision of what the Conference should accomplish. In the hot Washington weather of the latter part of the summer of 1921 the Secretary of State, instead of taking the usual vacation, was spending each day busy in the Department, and each evening took home a portfolio filled with memoranda and reports. On one of those afternoons, in a meeting with some of his technical advisers, to discuss the proposed agenda, one of the group remarked, regarding a suggested topic, "That proposal, Mr. Secretary, will not gain contemporary approval." With a quick response, Mr. Hughes replied: "I don't care for contemporary approval. I want the approval of history. We must make our program so that thirty years from now men will look back to this Conference and say that we did the very best that could possibly have been done."

V

JAPANESE IMMIGRATION: STATU-
TORY EXCLUSION AND AMERI-
CAN POLICY

It was international cooperation which made the Washington Conference a success. It was the absence of international cooperation which made the settlement of the Japanese immigration issue almost a disaster. In fact, the real question, so far as the exclusion of the Japanese was concerned, was whether the United States would consult with and obtain the support of Japan, or would take measures by itself alone. It was a new form of a fundamental issue in American foreign relations—cooperation or independent action. The immigration problem did not present a clash of national policies between the United States and Japan, such as existed on so many points before 1921. Japan was not resolved to do something which the United States was equally resolved to prevent. The Japanese Government was not attempting to colonize its nationals in American territory, nor was it even insisting that all Japanese should have

the right freely to enter the United States; but it did ask that the rigid restriction of immigration should be accomplished without discrimination against Japanese and without action which they regarded as an affront to their national self-respect. The question, to be sure, was a delicate one, and its discussion by the press of the two countries liable to be irritating, but inherently it was probably not as difficult of solution as were the problems before the Washington Conference.

The issue was perfectly clear to the Department of State, and had been clear to every Administration of the United States for nearly twenty years: general Japanese immigration had to be prevented, but this should be accomplished in such a manner as to avoid antagonizing Japan and jeopardizing the success of other American aims in the Far East. For the key to the whole American policy in the Orient is cooperation with Japan. It was well known that the Japanese Government, under the circumstances, would be willing to enter into a further understanding which would provide for even more rigid restriction of Japanese immigration than was provided for by the existing Gentlemen's Agreement. But Congress, by refusing to place the Japanese upon the same quota basis

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as the peoples of Europe and by insisting upon excluding them by statute instead of by negotiation, unnecessarily injured the feelings of a nation which was anxious to remain on cordial terms with us, threw away much of the advantage gained by the Washington Conference, and endangered the entire American Far Eastern policy.

TWO-DECADE STRUGGLE BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND CALIFORNIA

The immigration issue, which became so acute in the first part of 1924, had back of it nearly two decades of controversy, during which the National Administration endeavored to prevent the State of California and Congress from enacting discriminatory legislation against the Japanese. The attitude of California regarding Japan was influenced by its earlier experience with the Chinese. Welcomed originally to do the work of railroad building and other hard labor, the Chinese came in such numbers that by 1877 they nearly equaled the voting population of the State. Agitation developed against them throughout the Pacific Coast, accompanied frequently by violence. The result was that Congress, in 1882 and in 1892, passed rigid exclusion acts against Chinese, with the ex-

ception of the usual exempted classes—such as tourists, merchants, and students. As a consequence of these laws the Chinese population has steadily decreased; the few thousands now here are not regarded as a menace, and agitation against them has ceased. From the point of view of efficiency, a strict national exclusion act appeared to the Californians to be successful and the accompanying discrimination against China to have had no evil results.

After many of the Chinese had left California the Japanese began to come in. According to the Federal census, the Japanese population in continental United States has increased as follows: 1890, 2,039; 1900, 24,326; 1910, 72,157; 1920, 111,010. As their numbers grew larger, antagonism developed against them much like the former antagonism against the Chinese. Although the opposition started as early as 1900, it was not until after the Russo-Japanese War, in 1905, that it became serious. At that time the California Congressmen agreed to introduce bills in the House of Representatives for the exclusion of the Japanese, but when President Roosevelt heard of this proposed move he vigorously opposed it, and in his Message to Congress, December, 1905, he urged that the American

immigration policy should be nondiscriminatory. He was successful in preventing any anti-Japanese legislation in Washington, but in California the feeling against the Japanese increased.

The first anti-Japanese incident to attract attention throughout the United States was the action of the San Francisco School Board, October, 1906, requiring all Japanese pupils to attend a separate Oriental school. This order produced an outburst of indignation in Japan and brought a protest from the Japanese Government. Secretary of State Elihu Root October 23, 1906, cabled Ambassador Wright in Tokyo, "The United States will not for a moment entertain the idea of any treatment of the Japanese people other than that accorded to the people of the most friendly European nations." President Roosevelt sent his Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Metcalf, to California to look into the situation. It was found that instead of a thousand Japanese pupils being in the San Francisco public schools, as one of the California papers had stated, there were only ninety-three, and that these were divided between twenty-three different buildings. President Roosevelt, in his Message to Congress, December, 1906, said, "To shut them out from the public schools is

a wicked absurdity." His view of the problem was shown in his telegram to Governor Gillett, of California: "The national Government . . . can in all human probability secure the results that California desires, while preserving unbroken and friendly relations between the United States and Japan." But elements in California made it as difficult as possible for the national Administration. The Exclusion League opposed a negotiated settlement and demanded a stringent exclusion act.

Notwithstanding the contentiousness of California and the strong desire of Japan to be treated exactly as European nations, President Roosevelt worked out a settlement by means of the Gentlemen's Agreement. The terms of this notable contract were not set forth in a single document but were embodied in a rather extended exchange of communications between the American and Japanese Governments in 1907 and 1908. The Agreement provided that the Japanese Government would itself refuse passports to laborers, skilled or unskilled, who wished to go to continental United States, with the exception of those who had already acquired a residence here, or the parents, minor children and wives of Japanese living within the United States.

While technically it did not apply to Hawaii, the Japanese Government agreed that it would maintain the same regulations regarding these Islands, so long as there should be no need of importing labor there. The aim of this negotiated understanding was to put a stop to the increase of the Japanese population in this country without the need of statutory exclusion and thus to respect the national standing and the feelings of Japan.

But the Gentlemen's Agreement, while moderating the agitation in California, did not satisfy the extreme elements there. The Exclusion League and the California Legislature wished further action taken. In the California Legislature, in 1909, there were introduced some nineteen anti-Japanese bills. At the request of President Roosevelt, however, these were finally dropped; but the Legislature did pass a resolution advocating the extension of the Chinese exclusion laws to the Japanese. In 1911, after Mr. Roosevelt had left the Presidency, the drive against the Japanese continued in the California Legislature, and several anti-Japanese bills were introduced. But the Taft Administration took the same view of the Japanese problem as President Roosevelt had done, and accordingly requested that no action should be taken on

these bills, in view of the fact that a new Treaty with Japan was being negotiated. Again the California Legislature acceded to the request of the national Administration.

The treaty of 1911 was made to replace the one of 1894, which naturally expired in 1912 and which in Article II had recognized the rights of either country to enact laws in regard to the immigration of laborers. Japan objected to this provision as a mark of national inferiority, a reminder of the earlier years when it had to submit to extraterritorial jurisdiction by foreign states; and was unwilling to admit in a treaty a statement of a right which was not inserted in similar treaties with European states. As a result, the new treaty omitted all reference to general immigration; but when the treaty was signed the Japanese Ambassador gave a note to the Secretary of State which pledged the Japanese Government to continue to enforce the Gentlemen's Agreement. To meet any possible difficulty, the treaty was made terminable upon six months' notice at any time by either Government.

A difference of opinion regarding this treaty developed between the Taft Administration and Mr. Roosevelt, which the latter has explained in his *Autobiography*. On fun-

damentals both agreed: the exclusion of Japanese laborers should be maintained if possible by methods which would not antagonize Japan. Neither Mr. Roosevelt nor President Taft wished to resort to exclusion by act of Congress, unless negotiations with Japan should fail. But Roosevelt believed it advisable to retain the provisions of the old treaty by which Japan recognized the right of statutory exclusion, since this would make statutory exclusion easier, should it ever be unavoidable; while President Taft and Secretary Knox believed such a provision unnecessary, since every state has an inherent natural right to decide what aliens may enter its territory. Roosevelt, Taft, and Knox, however, were all opposed to Congressional action except as a last resort.

The Wilson Administration took the same view of the Japanese question as had the two previous Republican Administrations. But opposition in California was rising, especially since the number of Japanese was constantly increasing, and in 1913, as several times before, anti-Japanese bills were introduced into the Legislature. One of these measures permitted only aliens "eligible to citizenship" to own certain classes of land, which would bar the Japanese. President Wilson

thereupon telegraphed: "Invidious discrimination will inevitably draw in question the treaty obligations of the Government of the United States. I register my very earnest and respectful protest against discrimination in this case." In addition, following the precedent set by President Roosevelt, he sent to California a member of his Cabinet, Secretary of State William J. Bryan. Nevertheless, the Legislature passed the famous Webb-Heney Act, which took away from aliens ineligible to citizenship all right to own agricultural land, although they might lease such land for three-year periods. The Japanese Government formally protested against "the discriminatory phase of the legislation" and war talk began on both sides.

At the close of the World War, in 1919, the California Senate was considering the introduction of additional anti-Japanese legislation, but since the Paris Peace Conference was in session, at which the United States and Japan were both represented, the California leaders took the precaution of cabling to the Secretary of State at Paris regarding the matter. Mr. Lansing wired back that it would be particularly unfortunate to have this legislation introduced or pressed at the time. So the matter was dropped; but the California

Senate urged the federal Government to take action itself in regard to Japanese immigration.

In 1920 California made a renewed attack. There was now no restraining influence due to the war or the Peace Conference. Strong State organizations and the Hearst newspapers took up the movement; and anti-Japanese initiative bills were placed upon the ballot for the November election, the most important proposal being one which would deprive aliens not eligible to citizenship of the right to lease agricultural land. During the campaign a vigorous propaganda was carried on, including moving picture plays calculated to arouse bitter racial feeling against all Japanese.

The Governments both of Japan and of the United States tried unsuccessfully to stem the tide of feeling in California and to arrange a more equitable settlement of the immigration issue. The Japanese Government agreed that from March 1, 1920, it would issue no more passports to the so-called "picture brides," against whom the Californians were strongly protesting. These picture brides were young Japanese women who were legally married in Japan by proxy to Japanese men residing in the United States, and who then came over to

this country as married women. These marriages were recognized by the United States Government as legal according to Japanese law; therefore the picture brides were technically admissible by the Gentlemen's Agreement. Shortly before the election the acting Secretary of State at Washington issued the statement "that no outcome of the California movement will be acceptable to the country at large that does not accord with existing and applicable provisions of the law, and, what is equally important, with the national instinct of justice." But neither the concession of Japan in refusing to give further passports to picture brides nor the strong expression of opinion by the Washington Government availed with the people of California, for the anti-Japanese initiative bills were passed by a large majority.

During this same year, 1920, earnest efforts were made to arrange a new agreement between the United States and Japan. There were extended negotiations carried on in Washington between Roland S. Morris, American Ambassador to Japan, and Baron Shidehara, Japanese Ambassador to the United States. They finally reached a proposed settlement, and submitted it in January, 1921, to Secretary of State Colby. None

of the documents have been made public, but the main points have been made known through the press. On the one hand, the Japanese agreed that by an exchange of diplomatic notes they would make more severe the stipulations of the existing Gentlemen's Agreement, and would provide in effect that no Japanese laborers should thereafter be permitted to leave for the United States even though they might be members of families of Japanese residents in America. On the other hand, the proposed treaty provided that Japanese in the United States should have the rights of the subjects of the most favored nation in all civil matters except naturalization, which would in effect abrogate the California anti-Japanese legislation. Shortly after the draft of this Morris-Shidehara treaty had been submitted to the Secretary of State, Senator Hiram Johnson, of California, issued a public statement attacking the proposed settlement, and stating in conclusion, "I think I voice the sentiments of California when I say that in every legitimate and legal fashion the consummation of such a plan will be resisted." After this the treaty was not submitted to the Senate.

At the beginning of 1924 the situation in California and other parts of the Pacific

Coast was far different from what Secretary Root had anticipated in 1906 when he cabled, "The United States will not for a moment entertain the idea of any treatment of the Japanese problem other than that accorded to the people of the most friendly European nations." The statute book of California, and to a less degree those of other Western States, bristled with laws depriving Japanese of rights and privileges accorded to the people of European nations. The acts were, in general, directed against "aliens ineligible to citizenship," although the State of Washington used the equally effective formula—aliens "who do not in good faith declare their intention to become citizens." In California it is now lawful for communities to establish separate school buildings or rooms for Japanese pupils, and, as a result, half a dozen school districts have segregated Japanese children—the very course which President Theodore Roosevelt in 1906 and 1907 worked so hard to prevent. Not only were legal discriminations suffered by Japanese, but they were subjected to a measure of violence and terrorism, as when fifty-eight Japanese laborers in 1921 were forcibly deported from Turlock, California, because they had underbid white fruit pickers; and when anti-Japanese signs were

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posted in some of the towns of California, such as, "Japanese: Don't let the Sun Set on You Here. Keep Moving." Efforts of American religious workers to help Japanese build churches and community centers were frequently prevented.

For nearly twenty years successive Administrations at Washington had tried to avert discriminatory legislation, aimed at Japanese, by the Pacific Coast States, but they had failed. For twenty years they had vigorously opposed a national discriminatory exclusion act, and up to 1924 they had succeeded. Each Administration for twenty years has believed it important to deal with Japanese immigration by agreement with Japan rather than by statutory exclusion. But the pressure for a national exclusion act was becoming constantly stronger.

THE JAPANESE SITUATION IN CALIFORNIA

The presence of the Japanese in California, however, and their continuing increase in numbers made a genuine problem. The existing situation, it was evident, could not be allowed to continue indefinitely. The discriminatory State legislation and the occasional acts of violence against the Japanese were arousing strong feeling in Japan, while

the Pacific States believed they were fighting against a growing racial menace, and the danger that their section of the United States would become increasingly Oriental in population.

The Japanese in California by the Federal Census of 1920 numbered 71,952 out of a total population of 3,426,861, or about two per cent. In continental United States, that is, not including the Hawaiian Islands, they totaled 111,010. Constituting only two per cent of the population of California, the Japanese would hardly seem to be a menace; and they would not be so regarded were they in fact only two per cent and were they scattered in this ratio equally throughout the State. But the Californians generally believed that the Federal Census was an underenumeration. Their exact number is one of the disputed topics in the Japanese controversy. Californians claim that, in 1920, 100,000 would not be too large a figure. These Japanese were for the most part concentrated in a relatively small part of the State and were engaged in intensive farming. Of the 11,000,000 acres of improved farm land in California, the Japanese controlled, in 1920, about 458,000, or, roughly, four per cent. But of the rich irrigated lands they controlled, through-

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out the State, between twelve and thirteen per cent, and in certain districts a very much greater per cent. From long training in their home country the Japanese are adept at intensive farming, or market gardening. By their skill, an initial lower standard of living, and their willingness to work long hours and employ all the members of their families in the fields, they have largely driven away the small white farmers. They have gained control of the vegetable market in the State, raising—according to figures compiled March, 1921, by the Japanese Agricultural Association—91 per cent of all the berries, 81 per cent of the onions, 65 per cent of the asparagus, and 59 per cent of the green vegetables. With command of the market, they have followed American business practice in raising prices. They have more recently gone into the small trades in competition with the whites. In Los Angeles the City License Department recently reported that there were over 4,000 separate businesses owned and operated by Japanese.

Not only were the Japanese, in the view of the Californians, an economic danger; they were also, it was claimed, a social and political danger, since they formed a distinct unassimilable racial group, largely under the

political control of Japanese officials. There is some truth in this charge. There has been very little intermarriage between Japanese and Americans; neither group has seemed to desire it. The Japanese as a whole associate largely with their own people, although this is due in considerable measure to the attitude of the whites. The immigrant Japanese must retain political allegiance to the Japanese Government, since it is impossible for them to be naturalized as American citizens. Their children born in this country, and therefore American citizens by virtue of the Constitution, have been regarded, with some special exceptions, as Japanese subjects by Japanese law, which, until its modification in the summer of 1924, stated, "A child is a Japanese if his or her father is a Japanese at the time of his or her birth." This provision has made most American-born Japanese owe dual allegiance, a situation common enough in the case of children born in this country of subjects of certain other states, France and Italy for example. The Japanese, however, have been more highly organized than any other racial or national group in the United States. It has been almost essential for them to be registered with the Japanese Consul and to join Japanese associations which keep rather strict

control over their members and which are under the supervision of the Consuls.

It is not true, however, that Japanese are incapable of assimilating our ideas and ideals and cannot become loyal Americans in feeling and point of view. In many cases, usually among the better educated, the genuine Americanization of Japanese has clearly taken place so completely that in some instances when American-trained Japanese have gone to Japan to live they have found conditions so uncongenial that they have returned to their accustomed American life. This loyalty of a considerable percentage of the American-born Japanese is vouched for by many of the whites, especially in Hawaii, and their devotion was evidenced by their military service in the World War. The Japanese, as a class, as has been shown by scholarly surveys, are more law-abiding and have more innate intelligence and capacity to learn than most of the European national groups now in the United States. There has also been a greater measure of assimilation than is generally realized. The Japanese children have gone to the public schools, and a recent test of two thousand of these school children in California showed that two thirds of them were attending Protestant Sunday schools. Never-

theless, since the Japanese do not intermarry with other nationalities, and remain a marked physical type, it is probable that, as a class, they will continue to form a somewhat distinct racial group in the United States.

It is particularly the continuing increase in the numbers of the Japanese which has disturbed the Californians. In 1880 there were practically no Japanese in the State; in 1924 there were some 100,000 of them, and they were increasing from the excess of births over deaths by about 4,000 a year. Their birth-rate is high, at present about three times that among the whites. But it is probable that after a few years it will not be excessive, since, as Professor Adams, of the University of Hawaii, has recently pointed out, in Hawaii, where the Japanese men are now married in higher ratio than are the men of any other race, the Japanese birth-rate, based on the number of births to every hundred married women under forty-five, is lower than that of any other group except the American and the northern European. In any case, the total Japanese population in California has not increased noticeably in its ratio to the whites; in the decade from 1910 to 1920, according to the Federal Census, while the Japanese element increased by 30,596, the total

population increased by 1,049,312. The Californians, however, noting the marked increase of Japanese in certain localities, and their high birth-rate, became insistent that a stop should be put at least to all immigration of Japanese entering the country as permanent settlers.

The Pacific Coast attacked the Gentlemen's Agreement on the ground that it had not accomplished its original purpose—to prevent the increase of the Japanese population. The first two or three years after it went into effect it did give every promise not only of checking the immigration of Japanese but of reducing their numbers in the United States; during 1909, 1910, and 1911, over 6,000 more Japanese left continental United States than entered it. But later there was a considerable increase in the number of Japanese wives who came over; and their coming, while clearly within the terms of the Gentlemen's Agreement, accomplished what the Agreement aimed to prevent—the establishment on the Pacific Coast of permanent and growing communities of Japanese, for the most part Japanese agricultural laborers or small farmers. During the continuance of the Gentlemen's Agreement, from 1909 to 1923 inclusive, the total number of Japanese admitted to conti-

mental United States has been 120,317, the total number departed, 111,636, leaving a total net increase by immigration of only 8,681 for fifteen years. These figures are an indication of the known fact that the Japanese Government has earnestly endeavored, often in the face of considerable pressure from its own nationals, to enforce scrupulously the letter of the Gentlemen's Agreement. But it is significant that over 22,737 more Japanese males left the United States than entered, while 38,853 more females entered than departed. That is, the increase by legal immigration has been due almost entirely to women, who in most cases have become both agricultural workers and the mothers of a large number of Japanese children. Had these Japanese women not been admitted, the Agreement would have been successful. As it was operating, it was generally admitted that the Agreement needed to be modified and its restrictions made more severe.

THE JAPANESE ATTITUDE

As to the attitude of Japan, it naturally would be pleased could its nationals emigrate freely to other lands, since its own territory is densely populated. On islands with an area less than that of the State of California

there are some 60,000,000 people, who are increasing annually by 500,000 to 700,000. How to provide for this great and growing population, already living on a low economic level, is a serious problem. Occasionally Japanese press editorials and public addresses make the demand that Japanese should have the same right of immigration as the most favored European nation. But the Japanese Government has not been making such a demand. It understands that unlimited Japanese immigration into the United States would be economically disastrous for our Pacific Coast. It is willing to cooperate to keep its laborers out of America, as was demonstrated when it made the Gentlemen's Agreement. It has been willing for some time to modify and make more stringent this Agreement, as was shown during the Morris-Shidehara negotiations in 1921, and as has frequently been stated officially since that time. Foreign Minister Matsui said, in February, 1924, for publication in the Associated Press, that if the Gentlemen's Agreement was not working satisfactorily, Japan was ready to discuss anew the problem of restriction and exclusion. Ambassador Hanihara, in his note of May 31, 1924, referring to Japanese who entered the United States in accordance with the Gentle-

men's Agreement, stated, "If even so limited a number should in any way be found embarrassing to the United States, the Japanese Government have already manifested their readiness to revise the existing arrangement with a view to further limitation of emigration."

It was racial discrimination which the Japanese Government and people alike resented—a stigma, as they regarded it, marking them apparently as an undesirable or inferior people. They had good reason to be proud of their rapid rise to a position of complete political equality with the great powers of the world. It was particularly galling to have this equality recognized politically, yet denied socially in the family of nations. It was only natural, therefore, that the Japanese Government for years had been making every possible effort to insist upon racial equality for its nationals. In 1919 at the Peace Conference at Paris, the Japanese delegation endeavored to have inserted in the Covenant of the League of Nations a clause granting "to all alien nationals of States Members of the League, equal and just treatment in every respect, making no distinctions, either in law or fact, on account of their race or nationality." Before this proposal was acted upon, the Jap-

anese Ambassador at Washington gave President Wilson, then in the United States for a short period, a note which stated: "The Japanese Government regards as of first importance the establishment of the principle that the difference of race should in no case constitute a basis of discriminatory treatment under the law of any country." Later the Japanese Delegation at Paris modified its request, asking only for a mere phrase in the preamble endorsing "the principle of the equality of nations and the just treatment of their nationals."² Although the motion to insert this clause received a majority in the League of Nations Commission, it did not receive the necessary unanimous vote. This same attitude has been shown throughout the controversy with the United States. The Japanese Government protested strongly when the San Francisco School Board attempted to segregate Japanese pupils. It made the Gentlemen's Agreement, in order to obviate the necessity of discriminatory legislation, and in 1913, when the California Legislature passed an Act depriving aliens ineligible to citizenship of the right to own land for agricultural purposes, it protested that "the measure is un-

²Baker, Ray Stannard, *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement*, Vol. ii, pp. 234-7.

fair and intentionally racially discriminatory." In the same note the Japanese Government stated its attitude toward the interpretation of our Naturalization Act, which makes it impossible for Japanese to become American citizens: "The provisions of law, under which it is held that Japanese people are not eligible to American citizenship, are mortifying to the Government and people of Japan, since the racial distinction inferable from those provisions is hurtful to their just national susceptibility."

In regard to immigration, while Japan had, of course, no objection to an immigration measure, however restrictive, provided it applied equally to all nations, it did object to any discrimination, especially if based on racial grounds. Japan therefore protested several times against the proposed insertion into American immigration acts of provisions excluding those ineligible to citizenship. In his New York address of May 18, 1923, Ambassador Hanihara said, in regard to Japanese immigration: "The question is simply one of elementary principle in international intercourse—that is to say, of discrimination or no discrimination based on color or nationality."

With this Japanese viewpoint Americans

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should have much sympathy, for the American Government for many years has taken a strong stand against national discrimination, especially upon racial grounds. It has protested to foreign states against the difference in treatment which they meted out to Jews because of their race. It was Theodore Roosevelt who said, "The people of the United States assert as a fundamental principle that the rights of its citizens shall not be impaired at home or abroad because of race or religion."

ATTITUDE OF BRITISH DOMINIONS

The other important countries on the Pacific peopled by whites, which have the same problems as the United States in regard to Japanese immigration, particularly Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, have thus far dealt with the Japanese issue as effectively as has the United States, but much more wisely. They have brought about substantial exclusion of Oriental labor without obvious racial discrimination, and have avoided an open breach with Japan.

The British Pacific Dominions were disturbed by the immigration of Japanese earlier than was the United States. In 1896 the Premiers of the Australian colonies decided to

extend their existing anti-Chinese measures to Japanese, but the British Government would not allow this to be done, on the ground that Japanese immigration should be prevented by legislation "which makes no distinction in favor of, or against, race or color." Since Natal had adopted a dictation test for immigrants, which the Japanese Minister in London regarded as satisfactory, the British Government recommended this means of excluding undesired immigration. A dictation test was therefore included in the Australian Commonwealth Immigration Act of 1901, and is now in force. Apparently nondiscriminatory in character, it provides that any person who, when asked to do so by the proper officer, fails to write out from dictation fifty words in any European language, shall be prohibited from landing in Australia. Although this test has been used to debar some few whites, it is intended in general to apply only to Asiatics. Since the official in charge may select any European language he chooses, probably no one could pass the test if it were cleverly given. In fact, no one has passed it since 1909. In 1904, however, an agreement was made by Australia with Japan and certain other Asiatic countries, that the test should not be given to students, merchants,

and tourists, if properly provided with passports; and that such persons should be admitted into Australia for twelve months, a period which might be extended. Japanese of these exempted classes, as a matter of fact, have not been at all restricted in the length of their stay in Australia, with the exception of a few undesirables whose requests to remain longer than twelve months have been refused with the concurrence of the Japanese Consul. New Zealand also had a dictation test from 1908 to 1920, and now has a law which operates similarly. In both of these countries the exempted classes of Japanese are admitted freely, but laborers are kept out by laws which are in appearance nondiscriminatory.

Canada has a Gentlemen's Agreement with Japan much like the one recently in force between Japan and the United States. In fact, the history of Canada in regard to Japanese immigration has been strikingly similar to that of the United States, with British Columbia playing the rôle of California. In 1907, when considerable opposition to the Japanese had developed on the Pacific Coast, the Canadian Minister of Labor was sent to Tokyo to arrange some settlement. By the end of the year he made the Canadian Gentlemen's Agreement, which was more favorable in some

respects to Japanese immigrants than was the one negotiated with the United States at much the same time, although the former contained a definite limitation upon the total number of laborers admissible. The Canadian Agreement, like the American, has been honorably carried out by the Japanese Government, as the Canadian Ministers testify. But it is increasingly unpopular in British Columbia, and has occasioned a number of debates in the Legislature of that Province as well as in the Dominion Parliament—which Dr. R. L. Buell, of Harvard, has summarized in a recent pamphlet, *Japanese Immigration*, published by the World Peace Foundation. In 1921 the British Columbia Legislature requested the Canadian Government to amend the general immigration Act so “as near as possible to wholly restrict immigration of Asiatics into this Province”—just as with California, a demand for statutory exclusion. In 1922 the Canadian House of Commons, by a large majority, declared “that, in the opinion of this House, the immigration of Oriental aliens and their rapid multiplication is becoming a serious menace to living conditions, particularly on the Pacific Coast, and to the future of the country in general, and the Government should take immediate action with a view to

securing the effective restriction of future immigration of this type." Doubtless as a result of this vote, Premier King negotiated, early in 1924, a revision of the Gentlemen's Agreement by which the possible number of Japanese immigrants as household servants and agricultural laborers is limited to merely 150 a year. The Canadian Government still insists upon dealing with the Japanese immigration issue by negotiation and agreement—not by statutory exclusion.

In the treatment of resident Japanese, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada—but not South Africa—are all more liberal than are our Pacific Coast States. In Canada and New Zealand the Japanese are under no racial disabilities on score of race; many of them are naturalized and own land. In Canada they enjoy most-favored nation treatment by treaty. In Australia there are some restrictions against those who cannot pass the dictation test, but, in general, Japanese are permitted to purchase land—except crown land—and to farm it.

JAPANESE LEGISLATION REGARDING FOREIGNERS

The Japanese themselves, who have limitations upon immigration and landowning, have

no restrictions based upon race or directed specifically against any particular people. In 1899 Americans and most Europeans obtained for the first time the unrestricted right to enter and reside in all parts of Japan; this right being granted by the treaties made by Japan with those states which previously had exercised extraterritorial jurisdiction. But a number of countries, especially in the Orient, had no such treaties; therefore the Japanese Government issued an Ordinance providing that foreigners who did not enjoy freedom of residence throughout Japan were granted such freedom with the exception "that in the case of laborers they cannot reside or carry on their business outside the former settlements or mixed residential districts unless under the special permission of the administrative authorities." As a result of this general regulation laborers from China and a number of other countries do not have the right to reside in parts of Japan, unless they receive special permission from the authorities of the particular province they wish to enter. Frequently Chinese laborers have been admitted; occasionally they have been denied admission or deported. But Japan has no Chinese exclusion act. In the Japanese laws regarding land, there is also no discrimina-

tion. While no foreign individual may own land in fee simple,¹ foreigners may form corporations under Japanese law and exercise the same right of land ownership as Japanese corporations. Further, by long-term leases, and by a legal formula, much like the old English doctrine of "uses," foreigners may acquire the legal right of using real estate although the title is held by a Japanese. By these methods many foreigners, including Americans, have legal rights in Japanese land, much as if they owned it. But the main fact is that these laws apply equally to all foreigners.

THE IMMIGRATION BILL OF 1924

It was the old fundamental issue of racial discrimination against the Japanese which was foremost in the discussion of the general immigration bill before Congress early in 1924. The national Administration, taking the same attitude as that of the previous Administrations for two decades, disapproved this discrimination and opposed statutory exclusion. President Coolidge and Secretary Hughes took the position previously taken by every President and Secretary of State who had faced the problem—Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson; Root, Knox, Bryan and Lansing.

¹An act of March, 1925, permits alien ownership.

When the bill had been introduced, Secretary Hughes requested that the exclusion provision aimed at the Japanese be omitted, and that the quota plan be applied to their immigrants as well as to those from European countries. "The Japanese," he said, "are a sensitive people and unquestionably would regard such a legislative enactment as fixing a stigma upon them." It would, he believed, largely undo the work of the Washington Conference, which had so greatly improved the relations with Japan. The quota rule, that is, two per cent of the number of Japanese in the United States in 1890, plus the uniform basic unit of one hundred for every country, would have admitted merely one hundred and forty-six Japanese a year, in addition to the usual exempted classes concerning whose coming there was no dispute. The Secretary stated further that he did not favor admitting any Japanese laborers, and proposed continuing the Gentlemen's Agreement in addition to the quota, thus gaining a double control over Japanese immigration, and further obtaining the important and effective cooperation of the Japanese Government in enforcing restriction. But Secretary Hughes' request was refused by both House and Senate. When the bill was in Conference Committee the President sug-

gested that the exclusion section should not go into force until March 1, 1926, in order to permit the Administration to offer Japan the option of agreeing by treaty to a rigid limitation of immigration. But the Conference Committee refused. As a slight concession the President then persuaded the Committee to recommend that the date of exclusion should be postponed until March 1, 1925, "before which time the President is requested to negotiate with the Japanese Government in relation to the abrogation of the present arrangement on this subject." All the President asked was that Japan be given an opportunity to terminate the Gentlemen's Agreement by formal negotiation with the United States, rather than have it terminated by legislative action. The House of Representatives rejected even this request. President Coolidge signed the bill because a comprehensive immigration act was needed, but he said: "If the exclusion provision stood alone, I should disapprove it without hesitation, if sought in this way at this time. . . . There is scarcely any ground for disagreement as to the result we want, but this method of securing it is unnecessary and deplorable at this time."

The Act as passed, by means of the designation, "aliens not eligible to citizenship," ex-

cludes from admission to the United States all Japanese not in the exempted classes. Although this clause bars all Orientals, it restricts the previous privilege of immigration only for the Japanese, since the Chinese and peoples living in the zone of the East Indies were already excluded by previously existing legislation. The exempted classes include, as summarized by the President: "Government officials, those coming to this country as tourists, or temporarily for business or pleasure, those in transit, seamen, those already resident here and returning from temporary absences, professors, ministers of religion, students, and those who enter solely to carry on trade in pursuance of existing treaty provisions." The terms of this statute, in so far as they affect the Japanese, are similar, in general outline, to those of the former Gentlemen's Agreement, except that the parents, wives and children of Japanese now within the United States may not hereafter be admitted. But the Immigration Act together with the later regulations issued by the Department of Labor have instituted harassing restrictions upon entrance and residence in this country which will operate harshly in the cases of certain of the Japanese educated classes.

REASONS FOR CONGRESSIONAL EXCLUSION

Why was it that Congress insisted upon restricting Japanese immigration by statutory exclusion when every President and Secretary of State who ever dealt with the matter has believed that this particular method would be both unnecessary and unfortunate? From the Congressional hearings, committee reports, and debates, it is evident that there was a combination of reasons, as is usually the case; but fundamental was the unwillingness or inability of the majority of Congress to view this issue in its broader relationships, in its bearing upon our entire foreign policy, and upon the whole international situation in the Pacific and Far East. The action of Congress was certainly not caused by any feeling of unfriendliness toward Japan; nor was there any intention or desire of insulting or humiliating her. It was simply a manifestation of the spirit of national self-assertion rather than of international cooperation. It expressed itself in the attitude: why bother to consider the feelings of Japan, when clearly the easiest, simplest, most direct method of keeping Japanese settlers out of the country is by a rigid exclusion statute?

Political considerations affected Congress

in a measure. Politicians of both parties were anxious to win the vote of California and other Pacific Coast States, and California had officially asked for statutory exclusion of all aliens ineligible to citizenship. The same request had been made by the national conventions of three strongly organized and powerful associations—the American Federation of Labor, the American Legion, and the National Grange. But the widespread support of the President and the Secretary of State in their opposition to exclusion by act of Congress was not organized, and therefore was of relatively slight political influence.

The claim that immigration is a domestic question, and as a consequence of no concern to Japan, was important. To be sure, international law recognizes that the admission of aliens into a country is strictly a domestic question, and the United States has taken pains to insist upon this view. But it does not follow that a discriminatory immigration law is of no concern to another nation affected by it. The tariff is admittedly as much a domestic question as is immigration, yet a discriminatory tariff has been a cause of war. The size of a nation's army and where within its own borders its troops may be placed is a domestic question, yet mobilization against

the frontier of a neighbor would naturally bring an ultimatum or declaration of hostilities. The enforcement of our prohibition laws within our territorial waters is also a domestic question, yet at the present time the United States is making treaties with most of the leading nations of the world to secure their cooperation in this matter; by international agreement it is modifying the operation of an American statute within the three-mile limit.

Insistence upon the prerogatives of Congress probably played the largest part of all. It was argued again and again that it is Congress which has rightful authority to deal with the question of immigration, and that this issue should not be settled by treaty or other international agreement. The majority of the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization said, referring to the treaty with Japan of 1911, "If there be a provision therein regulating immigration, it is improperly there, since regulation of immigration is a prerogative of Congress." Senator Shortridge expressed the same view: "Inasmuch as it is a domestic question, inasmuch as that domestic question is under the jurisdiction of the legislative branch of our Government, it follows that control of such a ques-

tion is not within the treaty-making power of this Government under the Constitution." But although Congress has clearly a right to legislate on immigration, this question may also be properly dealt with by international agreement. The United States has made at least three important treaties which contained provisions on immigration—those of 1868, 1880 and 1894 with China; and the United States Supreme Court has ruled: "In the United States this power [to control immigration] . . . belongs to the Political Department of the Government, and may be exercised either through treaties made by the President and Senate, or through statutes enacted by Congress." The Supreme Court has also decided that an immigration treaty would supersede an earlier act of Congress upon the same subject, if in conflict with it; that "the last expression of the sovereign will must control."

In addition to insistence upon its legal rights in matters of immigration, Congress showed a desire to take from the Administration its control of foreign affairs. Senator Swanson expressed this idea strikingly when he exclaimed, "I am tired of the Executive determining American foreign policy." It was in part because the Gentlemen's Agree-

ment was made by the Department of State alone that it was so vigorously attacked. As Congressman Lea, of California, said, "Congress cannot perform its duty, it cannot preserve its self-respect if it ratifies that void agreement, made without authority, and the terms of which are still unknown to the American people." The charge most frequently made, that the Gentlemen's Agreement surrendered a sovereign right to a foreign nation, was without foundation; when the Agreement was made Japan merely promised to refuse passports for the United States to certain classes of her subjects who by the then existing laws of the United States and the treaty of 1894 had a legal right of entrance. Japanese immigrants have never been exempt from the regular requirements of American immigration laws, such as have excluded the insane and those afflicted with contagious disease; and the United States has always maintained, and Japan has always recognized, that this country retains the legal right to legislate upon this issue. The complaint that the Gentlemen's Agreement was secret was true only to the extent that the correspondence between the two Governments in which the Agreement was worked out was confidential. The provisions of the Agreement

were well known; they had been made public in general terms by the United States Commissioner of Immigration in 1908 and were stated more specifically in the note of Ambassador Hanihara, April 10, 1924, and vouched for by the Secretary of State.

The narrow nationalism of Congress was also an important factor. In the proceedings of the Senate and the House there was a marked absence of a broad-visioned statesmanship, which keeps in view the outstanding aims of a nation, is not swerved from its purpose by trifles or petty irritations, is able to subordinate minor considerations for great objects, and is willing to consider the standpoint of other peoples in order to achieve results which can be gained only by a cordial cooperation with them. The standards of a part at least of the Senate, in this respect, may be judged by the statement of one of its ablest members, who said in debate that, contrary to his previous intention, he was about to vote in favor of the exclusion provision because the Japanese Ambassador in his note telling of the probable effect of such legislation upon the sentiments of the Japanese people, stated that it would inevitably bring "grave consequences . . . upon the otherwise happy and mutually advantageous rela-

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tions between our two countries." The Senator stated that the result of his vote, and that of the majority of the Senate who took the same course, meant the waste of twenty years of excellent diplomacy.

ATTITUDE OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

The attitude of the American people on this recent action of Congress it is of course impossible to state with positiveness. The Pacific Coast in general has been much pleased. It is reasonably clear, however, that the intelligent opinion of the country as a whole has condemned Congress. The majority of the leading newspapers, as reported by at least three independent surveys, disapproved of the method taken by the Senate and the House regarding the Japanese; one of these surveys found that forty of the forty-four prominent dailies east of Chicago held this position. But so many of these papers censured the manner in which Congress proceeded rather than exclusion of Asiatics by legislative action, should it be carried out as tactfully as possible, that it is not certain that the American press as a whole condemned statutory exclusion in principle, although probably the greater number of the foremost dailies did so. It would appear, however,

that the majority of the particularly thoughtful element in the country regarded this procedure as an unnecessary affront to Japan. The leaders of American colleges and universities, of our religious denominations and of our important business interests in general took this position. Some thirty university Presidents joined in a cablegram to Japan stating that "the inconsiderate action of the American Congress . . . does not represent the sentiments of the American people toward Japan." A few weeks after the Immigration Bill became law, Brown University gave Ambassador Hanihara an honorary Doctor of Laws, and when the degree was conferred the Japanese Ambassador received a great ovation from the large university audience present. The Institute of Politics at Williamstown invited a Japanese lecturer for its summer session, although its program was already full, in order to mark both its friendliness toward Japan and its distinct disapproval of the action of Congress. The religious organizations, so far as they have taken action, seem to be agreed in their opposition to this method of dealing with Japanese immigration. Resolutions to this effect have been passed by at least fourteen different religious bodies, including the Federal Council of

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Churches, representing over twenty-five Protestant denominations, at its quadrennial meeting, in December, 1924; the Foreign Missions Conference, with a membership of seventy-five different foreign missionary boards; the General Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church—the largest Protestant denomination in the United States; the Northern Baptist Convention, and the National Council of the Protestant Episcopal Church. As for the leading business interests of the country, the United States Chamber of Commerce, by an almost unanimous vote, declared against “this affront to Japan.”

Much of this sentiment has condemned Congress not only because it insisted upon statutory exclusion, but also because it has attempted to control our foreign relations. Such important dailies as the New York Times, the Herald-Tribune, and the World, representing widely different views, agreed on this point. The New York Times said, “Its passage despite the protest of the Department of State, without apparently paying due attention to the diplomatic questions involved, is but another example of that legislative intemperance which has been so manifest in Washington in recent months.” The Herald-Tribune took the same position: “There is no

need for Congress to ride roughshod over an amicable agreement of years' standing, flouting reasonable objections of the State Department." And the World indignantly exclaimed: "This incident is merely the climax to five years of truculent aggression by the Senate which has done immeasurable harm to the people of the United States. . . . If we permit the Senate to continue baiting the rest of the world, we shall end by having no friends among the great peoples of the earth."

EFFECT OF EXCLUSION IN JAPAN

The effect of the exclusion provision upon the feelings of the Japanese was at first very great, as Secretary Hughes warned Congress it would be. In general, all classes at once regarded it as a national insult and racial stigma. On the day when exclusion became effective, July 1, 1924, there was a nation-wide demonstration throughout Japan against it. Thousands of people in all parts of the country met at the various national Shinto shrines, while in Tokyo alone scores of anti-American meetings were held. On nearly every telegraph and telephone pole in the capital was placarded a notice which said: "Japanese must never forget July 1st, when America inflicted an intolerable insult on Japan." A

typically Japanese protest was the suicide of an unknown man, who killed himself near the American Embassy grounds, leaving behind him a letter for the American people, which read in part: "I request by my death the withdrawal of the Japanese exclusion clause. . . . I am a Japanese. We are now humiliated by your country in the eyes of the world without any justification." A few days later national homage was paid at the grave of this man, who was looked upon as a hero who had died for his country.

The national feeling at the time was manifested by the universal attitude of the Japanese press. Nineteen Tokyo and Osaka dailies published a joint declaration against the "outrageous enactment which not only offends against justice and humanity, but disregards the traditional friendship which has subsisted between Japan and America." Vigorous comments from individual papers were: "deliberate insult," "the honor of Japan has been mercilessly destroyed," "the friendship between Japan and America has been swept away," "a disgrace to our national honor and a blow to our prestige," "an insult and disgrace of which the history of Japan knows no precedent," "not only a challenge to Japan, but also an insult to all the colored

ances," "no profit will accrue to the United States from such indiscreet action, though it injures the honor and pride of Japan," "a shock to the whole Japanese race such as has never before been felt," "to-day is the day of humiliation."

Some of the leaders of Japan expressed their feeling in public statements and resolutions. Count Yamamoto, former Premier, said: "It will take years for the Japanese to forget this insult and rally again to the support of cooperative peace efforts." Representatives of the three leading political parties met together before the opening of the Diet on July 1, and deplored the passage of the exclusion act. When the Diet itself opened, at its first meeting—almost its first business—both Houses passed resolutions strongly opposing the exclusion provision.

In addition, there was for a time, as would be likely in any country under the circumstances, considerable activity by the jingo and even hoodlum elements. A number of patriotic societies were organized to stir up opposition to the United States and all things American, and a boycott of American goods and American missionary activities was widely discussed and even inaugurated. But the serious-minded Japanese frowned upon

all of these extreme manifestations and succeeded in largely suppressing them.

Bitter resentment, although widespread in Japan, was probably not as general among the educated classes as a feeling of grievous disappointment, a sense of injury without cause. The Japanese were deeply hurt, from the highest officials to the masses of the people; and the wound was made more painful because it was inflicted by America, which had so shortly before generously helped them at the time of the earthquake disaster and which the older generation especially had regarded as a national friend and the leader in the ideals of democracy and international fair-play. This attitude was described by the editor of the Japan Advertiser, the American daily of Japan: "No blow can stagger like the blow of a friend—no country but the United States could have hurt Japan as has the United States." The same point of view was expressed by distinguished Japanese. Viscount Kaneko, member of the Privy Council, a Harvard alumnus, said, "We can bear an attack by an enemy, but it is hard to endure when betrayed by one whom we have always thought of as our sincere friend"; and Baron Sakatani, former Minister of Finance, stated, "This blow comes from America, the land of

idealism, the land of justice, a nation great and good, our long-time friend, and it cuts us to the quick."

Although the popular indignation against the action of Congress has now somewhat cooled, the Japanese as a whole still retain a deep sense of injury. It is too early to state with any certainty what the permanent results of this feeling will be. While it is hoped that good judgment, self-restraint, and sympathetic consideration on the part of both Americans and Japanese will be able to maintain essentially undiminished the genuine friendship between the two countries and to prevent any unfortunate effects upon their international relations, there are nevertheless unpleasant possibilities which have forced themselves into consideration, especially if the future of the Pacific and the Far East be envisaged in terms of decades.

POSSIBLE EFFECTS UPON THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST

A measure of racial antagonism has been developed. This fact was stressed, during the early part of 1924, in the speeches, resolutions, and newspaper editorials in Japan. The younger members of the Diet in their resolutions said, "Exclusion sows the seeds for

future racial war." References to race as a new issue precipitated by the exclusion provision were for a time frequent in the press. Somewhat extreme statements were: "The seed of racial hatred has been sown in the bosom of the Japanese"; "The racial struggle is by far the most horrible specter ahead of us"; and—from an article written shortly before the passage of the Immigration Act—"If diplomacy be misguided in handling that problem, mankind is bound to be led to the greatest tragedy the world could know—the conflict of East and West." Most unfortunately the majority of the Japanese apparently still believe that it was race prejudice, and not economic considerations, which led Congress to pass the exclusion act. This view is held by forty out of sixty-three prominent Japanese whose opinions were summarized by the Japan Times and Mail in its issue of October 1, 1924.

Racial discrimination has a tendency to draw together the nations discriminated against; it has certainly given the peoples of Asia a common grievance against the United States. It is even possible, in the judgment of some careful observers of political conditions, that the exclusion act may be a factor in bringing about an eventual entente between the two

leading nations, Japan and China. Although such an alignment would not seem probable, judged by the events of the past few years, yet considerable Pan-Asiatic sentiment has recently developed in certain groups in both of these countries, as well as in other parts of Asia, and this sentiment has been strengthened by a consciousness of what is regarded as a common racial affront. In Japan—repulsed as it feels by America—the press has frequently discussed a closer cooperation with continental Asia, especially with China—a cultural, economic and political understanding. The Tokyo Hochi stated that the Asiatic peoples would eventually become strongly united, and that “it is the English-speaking nations who will be responsible for it. In this sense the anti-Japanese measure adopted by the American Congress is an epoch-making event.” Professor Anesaki, of the Imperial University, Tokyo, one of the distinguished Liberals of Japan, expressed a point of view held by a number of the intellectual leaders: “Seen from the standpoint of a Japanese, the issue raised is a great challenge, or, rather, an ordeal, forced upon Japan as to which of the two possible courses to adopt, either to keep firm her former aspiration to be a mediator between East and West in every respect and

thereby to be a harmonizing factor in the peaceful progress of humanity, or to accept the challenge and to trust her fate to the cause of 'Asia for Asiatics'; that is, to lead a life-or-death struggle of the Orientals against the Occidentals."

So far as Japan's relations with China are concerned, American exclusion has merely intensified a long-standing desire on the part of the Japanese for intimate cooperation with that country. It has been recognized by Japan for years that its economic well-being depended upon the establishment of close commercial, industrial, and financial ties with its great Asiatic neighbor. The important question is whether China will forget its recent bitterness against Japan and accept the proffered *entente cordiale*. Certainly relations between the two countries have improved since Japan's abandonment of its military policy in favor of conciliation; and America's exclusion act, directed against all Asiatics, although it merely reaffirms existing legislation against the Chinese, has tended to bring them closer together. As the Japan Times says: "China seems to have begun to think exactly as Japan is thinking in regard to the unfortunate development in America. Congress is, it may be said, driving China to

reconciliation with Japan." A society has recently been organized in Shanghai to advance the principle of Pan-Asia. Some of the Chinese leaders are favorable to such a racial grouping, notably Sun Yat Sen, who said in an address in Kobe, Japan, November 30, 1924: "We Asiatics must emancipate Asia . . . from European and American oppression. Japan and China must join hands and harmoniously lead the Asiatics to fight for a greater Asiaticism, thus expediting world peace." Mr. Y. Kiang, former Minister of Education in China, said of the recent action of Congress: "It is exclusion directed not only against the Japanese but all other races except the whites. . . . We cannot help being indignant with America's attitude." The same view is held by a number of the Chinese newspapers. Recently Rabindranath Tagore, the Indian leader, poet and philosopher, has spoken and lectured in both China and Japan, upon the spiritual and cultural unity of Asia, and against the aggression of the whites. Although Japan's lease of the Liaotung peninsula and of the South Manchuria Railroad remains an apparent bar to a genuine accord, even this issue may possibly be compromised, and Japan may take further steps in its present program of conciliation. If, as has been

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suggested by some, it should renounce its extraterritorial rights in China without waiting for the other powers, such a move would doubtless produce a very great impression upon Chinese sentiment.

The increased efforts of Japan to develop an accord with China have been furthered by a strong opposition in China to all foreign control and by some measure of resentment against the nations of the West. A nationalistic movement, which has been developing the past few years, demands for China the full rights which legally belong to a sovereign state, especially freedom from extraterritoriality and customs restrictions. Since the privileges of extraterritoriality have been relinquished by Russia and Germany in separate treaties with China, and by Austria in the general treaty of peace signed at Saint Germain in 1919, the Chinese are all the more insistent that the other powers as well shall renounce them. The rising irritation of the Chinese against these forms of foreign control and against what they regard as interference in various ways in their governmental affairs has been intensified by the propaganda of Bolshevik Russia, which is directed especially against the United States. The Bolshevik agents in China have been carrying out the program

announced by Trotsky in his May-Day speech, 1924: "We are going to help the Eastern peoples to shake off the yoke of foreign domination." While Japan shares in the forms of general control exercised by foreign powers in China, the irritation against Japan, on this score, would not now appear to be so great as against certain of the Western states, since the Japanese Government the past two years has been particularly sympathetic with the Chinese in the various disputes which have arisen between them and the Concert of Powers.

The common resentment against racial discrimination by the United States, the developing Pan-Asiatic sentiment, the conciliation policy of Japan, the increasing insistence in China upon the unrestricted right of political and economic self-determination, and the Bolshevik propaganda against the capitalistic states of the West make a combination favoring a better understanding, and possibly a degree of common action, between China and Japan. It is clear that some change in Chinese sentiment has taken place the past two years, which has made for less sympathy toward the West and more sympathy toward Japan. But this movement has not as yet developed much strength throughout

China as a whole, and does not warrant the prophecy that a political entente between the two countries will surely take place. The Manchurian issue still separates them widely; and suspicion of Japan—even fear of Japanese aggression—is still prevalent throughout China.

But whether Japan comes to a political understanding with China or not, it is believed by some that Japan will gradually give up its close association of the past few years with the United States and Great Britain in favor of an entente with Russia or France, or both, countries which do not discriminate against Japanese on grounds of race. A combination of Japan, China, Russia, and France would in many ways be a strong one in the Far East, including most of the territory of Eastern Asia. China and Russia, in 1896, and Japan and Russia, in 1916, were military allies; and the treaties recently signed at Peking, between China and Soviet Russia, May 31, 1924, and between Japan and Soviet Russia, January 21, 1925, may be indicative of further developments. As to France, the visit to Japan of the Governor-General of French Indo-China, in May, 1924, has caused much speculation among the diplomats, who have called attention to the support, regarded

as significant, which Japan and France have recently given each other in the League of Nations. On the other hand, there are factors which militate against such a new international grouping. The United States and the British Empire are the strongest and the wealthiest nations in the world, and the statesmen of Japan will be most reluctant to join any combination which would place their island Empire in opposition to these two powers. In fact, the present Minister of Foreign Affairs, Baron Shidehara, stated, February 2, 1925, that Japan was not contemplating any alliance with either China or Russia. It is more than possible, too, that acute friction may again break out between China, Russia, and Japan over Manchuria and Mongolia. All that can be stated with confidence is that the future alignment of the states in the Far East is uncertain. There is at least no assurance that the conditions of the past two decades will continue—a China especially friendly to the United States and particularly unfriendly to Japan.

EFFECT UPON AMERICAN POLICIES AND AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS

So far as the interests and the policies of the United States in the Far East are con-

cerned, close friendship between Japan and China—as well as between the other nations in this region—will be welcomed so long as it is not exclusive in character, does not violate the Open Door, and is not antagonistic to our own country. A Pan-Asiatic movement is not essentially hostile to America, any more than a Pan-American movement is hostile to Asia. But an Asiatic grouping based upon race, and largely directed against the United States because of alleged racial discrimination, would seriously endanger American policy in the Far East. It would not be necessary for Japan to adopt measures of forceful aggression to close the Open Door. An alliance could accomplish the same purpose, obtain preferential advantages for the nations concerned, exclude the United States from equality of opportunity in China, and bring about resulting international friction. Under the existing conditions in the Far East cooperation between the United States and Japan, as was seen so clearly at the Washington Conference, is almost the sole means of maintaining the Open Door and assuring the peaceful development of the Pacific.

This friendly cooperation appeared to be seriously endangered by the exclusion provision. When the act was passed, Ambassador

Woods exclaimed in his keen disappointment: "We had it all in our hands; the future friendship and good will and the trade and international teamwork of this strongest nation in the East and one of the strongest in the world. And we have willfully thrown it away."³ Much the same view was held by many Japanese; as one of their papers expressed it, "How can America hope to preserve the peace of the Pacific by excluding the cooperative spirit of the Japanese people?" The danger that cooperation would be made difficult by recurring suspicion and friction was foreseen by Baron Matsui, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who said, as to the effect of this exclusion act: "Petty incidents will keep irritating the relationship of the two nations. Small matters will take on large proportions in the thinking and feeling of the people. Harmony and good will will be handicapped. Friction and misunderstanding will be made easy." This prophecy has thus far been correct. Mobilization Day in the United States, last September, and the plans to base the American naval maneuvers, this coming spring, upon the Hawaiian Islands, have increased popular irritation in Japan. On the other hand, a large section of the American press has been

³The Outlook, June 18, 1924.

greatly disturbed by the Japanese amendment to the Geneva Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, which aimed to make it possible for the Council or Assembly of the League to suggest some settlement in case a domestic issue should endanger international peace. Many interpreted this amendment as an effort by Japan to bring the immigration question before the League for discussion and possible decision. In each country a group started an agitation for a larger navy, based in large part upon statements that the other country was making great military preparations. In each, references to war grew more frequent in the editorials of the jingo press and in the speeches of excitable patriots. In the United States the extreme was reached when the Chairman of the Naval Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives introduced a resolution favoring a conference of the white nations of the Pacific in order to promote their solidarity—a conference which, he explained, would include the subject of common military defense.

To dispel this mutual suspicion and to suppress these occasional manifestations of antagonism, the Governments of both the United States and Japan have labored most earnestly during the past few months. The

White House and the Department of State have expressed confidence in Japan and friendship for her people. Secretary Hughes departed from diplomatic precedent in order to state his gratification at the appointment of the new Japanese ambassador, Mr. Matsudaira, and to say, "We can look forward now to the most cordial relations with Japan." The American Secretary of War arranged for an exchange of language officers between the American and the Japanese Armies; the Navy announced its plans for the entertainment to be given to three Japanese naval vessels which were shortly to visit the Pacific Coast, and Congress frowned upon the plan for a conference of white peoples of the Pacific. These efforts of the Government were strongly supported by the press as a whole and by the serious-minded element in the population. The gift of \$1,600,000 to the Library of the Imperial University of Tokyo, by Mr. John D. Rockefeller, Jr., was indicative of the kindly feeling of the American people.

The highest officials of the Japanese Government, notwithstanding the sting of the exclusion provision, have taken pains repeatedly to emphasize the continuing friendship with the United States. The commander of the Jap-

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anese Navy stated that he and his fellow officers were not in the least concerned over the American maneuvers at Hawaii, and the Minister of the Navy announced that Japan was ready to consider a further mutual limitation of armament. A particularly cordial reception was given to the new American ambassador, Mr. Bancroft, upon his arrival in Tokyo. The desire of the governing classes in Japan still to cultivate good relations with the United States has been shown in a most striking way by the passage by the Imperial Diet, in July, of an act, which became effective December 1, 1924, modifying the nationality law so that the American-born children of Japanese parents will not be Japanese subjects, except by special declaration. This effort to do away with dual nationality was motivated, as shown by the debates in the Diet, by the wish to remove a cause of friction between the two countries.

As to cooperation, upon which so much depends in the Pacific, it is clear, nine months after the exclusion act, that the Japanese Government both desires and intends—no matter what its relations with Asiatic nations may be—to carry out a policy of cooperation with the United States. This is evident from the statements of Japanese officials and the acts

of the Japanese Government. The Minister of Foreign Affairs said, in February, 1924, before the immigration issue had aroused such intense feeling in Japan: "Our continued development and security to a large measure depend upon the maintenance of good relations with America as well as other nations. This is not merely a temporary need, but, as far as possible to see, Japan's need far in the future. We live by our overseas trade, in which the United States is our greatest customer and our chief source of supplies. In the wisdom of a policy of closer understanding and cooperation all Japan concurs." Since the immigration act was passed, similar assurances have been given, especially by Premier Kato and Foreign Minister Shidehara. The principles of the Open Door Japan has loyally supported, and the provisions of the Washington Conference it has scrupulously carried out. It is to be sincerely hoped, both in our own interest and in that of the Pacific as a whole, that after the pain of the recent hurt has lessened, Japan will not merely continue its cooperation, but will resume the cordial relations with the United States which existed during the two years following the Washington Conference.

Much depends upon the tact and wisdom of

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our two peoples in the near future. The Japanese as a whole have thus far shown admirable self-restraint, considering their deep indignation, but their present attitude is one of insistence that the exclusion provision of the immigration act be repealed. The same demand is being made by influential groups in the United States. Yet an agitation for repeal, if unsuccessful, would merely increase the resentment; and there is little likelihood that this act of Congress can be reversed within the near future. The Japanese Government is showing excellent judgment in opposing any popular movement in Japan to bring about repeal. The willingness of the Japanese people to renew their former friendship will naturally depend in large measure upon the future action toward the Japanese here in the United States. Now that the Pacific Coast has won its immediate demands from the Federal Government, it should give up the policy of continual pin-pricking against the Japanese, and accept the present situation. Most fortunately, California appears at present to be satisfied. Even the groups formerly regarded as anti-Japanese in sentiment have recently taken pains to show their good will toward Japan, as was strikingly illustrated in January when apparently the entire city

of San Francisco joined in giving an elaborate reception to the officers and crews of three visiting Japanese naval vessels. The Exclusion League of California, however, has had a program which has demanded not only statutory exclusion of Japanese, which it has now secured, but an amendment of the Federal Constitution which would deny citizenship to those born in this country of Japanese parents, and also State legislation which would in effect deprive American citizens of Japanese parentage of the right to own land. All such proposals, it is perfectly apparent, must be dropped, if there is to be any hope of genuinely satisfactory relations between the United States and Japan. If this anti-Japanese agitation on the Pacific Coast should be ended permanently, and the Japanese now within the United States be treated justly and courteously, and there be evidence on the part of the American people of continued appreciation, sympathy, and respect for Japan and the Japanese, there is hope that the unfortunate results which seemed to impend from the recent immigration act may eventually be largely avoided.

VI

COOPERATION IN THE FUTURE:
REGIONAL AND WORLD POLICIES

THE foreign policy of the United States is like a road which, from some hilltop, we may watch as it comes winding up from the horizon to our immediate foreground. Looking ahead, we cannot see exactly where it goes, but we can see the hills which inclose the broad valley, and we know that the road must proceed somewhere within this valley and in a certain general direction. American foreign policy, with many local turnings, has developed for over a hundred years toward the present degree of participation with other nations of the world in matters of common interest. We cannot be positive of the exact path which American policy will take in the future, but there are certain outstanding factors which so control the situation that we can see clearly the general direction in which it must proceed.

Because of these factors the United States will be compelled in the future to follow a course of much closer cooperation, economic

and political, with the other nations of the world than it is following to-day; and it will be forced to do this, no matter what our political platforms state, or our political parties desire, or the majority of the American people really wish at the present time. These factors are in part: the United States is coming ever nearer to its neighbors, since the world is becoming constantly smaller; it is developing an increasing number of contacts with them, due to its position as the most powerful and the richest member of this world community; its growing dependence upon foreign trade and overseas investments, together with the efforts of our Government, in competition with other Governments, to maintain equality of opportunity and the Open Door, necessitates an ever greater number of international agreements; and the rising demand throughout America that war as an institution shall be abolished, due to the clearer realization of its increasing destructiveness and its menace to civilization itself, calls for joint action by the United States with the other nations to safeguard the peace of the world.

In Washington's day not only was the United States as a whole largely separated from the rest of the world, but each community within the country was practically

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isolated. From Boston to New York by the regular stagecoach route took a week's travel, proceeding at the rate of about forty miles a day. At that time Boston was farther from New York than is London or Paris to-day. So rarely did an American ever visit a foreign land that anyone who had crossed the Atlantic was apt to be pointed out on the street, even in our largest cities, with the remark, "That man has been to Europe." In Washington's time it took between six and seven weeks, on an average, of intensely disagreeable voyaging, to reach Europe. To-day a New York financier learns that it is desirable to have a conference with London business men; he looks at the steamer sailings, telephones for a stateroom, reaches a luxurious steamship just before it leaves the dock, and in six days is in London. Measured by the time it takes to carry persons, express, and freight across the ocean, the Atlantic is only one seventh as wide as in Washington's day. That is, we are in this respect seven times nearer to Europe than in the days of the Fathers. We are still closer in certain other respects, as was recently illustrated by a typical incident which took place in one of the foreign-exchange banks in New York. A customer called up on the telephone and said: "I

must have ten thousand pounds on the London stock exchange before it closes in half an hour, or lose a large sum of money." The bank officials wrote out the money cablegram, coded it, put it on the wire, and in twenty minutes the amount was in the hands of the proper person in London. In transferring funds, in sending commercial statements, orders to buy and to sell, and general cable news, we are to-day two thousand times nearer to Europe than when the founders of the republic formulated our national foreign policy.

This process of bringing the world closer together is going on at a rapid rate. At the Paris Peace Conference, on a particular occasion, the presence of a technical expert was desired, but he was in London. Word was sent to him; he jumped into an aeroplane—and attended the next meeting of the committee. In a very near future all parts of the world will be most intimately connected by passenger and express aeroplane service. The radio is annihilating distance between countries in all matters requiring direct conversation. The explorer Macmillan, while ice-bound in the Arctic, was able to speak to his friends in New England. New England and Old England are now talking back and forth;

and, recently, speakers in New York city were heard by those listening in Australia.

In all these ways the world, which a hundred years ago seemed separated by such great distances, has become a small, compact community. And what happens in any part is apt to affect the rest of the world. Ten years ago a pistol shot in a Bosnian town sounded the alarm which put four million American young men into khaki. A few months past, in Iowa, a farmer could not pay the interest on the mortgage on his farm and was forced to leave the place which had been his home for many years. The reason why he could not pay this interest was because people four and five thousand miles away could not buy his wheat. Multiply this situation by hundreds of thousands, and we have the explanation of the distress, a year ago, in our great agricultural West. Secretary Hoover's statement, made on October 3, 1919, is equally applicable to-day: "We are an overseas people and we are dependent upon Europe for a market for the surplus products of our farmers and laborers. Without order in Europe we will at best have business depression, unemployment and all their train of trouble. . . . We are forced to interest ourselves in the affairs of the world if we are to

thrive." One half of the working population of our country, it has been estimated, are engaged in occupations where prosperity depends upon the export of surplus goods or materials.

In this small world it is the United States which has the greatest wealth, resources, and ready cash. The total wealth of our country, estimated by the Bureau of the Census to be \$320,803,862,000 at the close of 1922, is more than the combined wealth of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, according to a London authority who used the statistics of 1920; or, according to the estimates of the National City Bank of New York in 1925, fifty per cent greater than the combined wealth of the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italy; it has been estimated to be nearly thirty per cent of the total wealth of the entire world. As to American resources, in agriculture the United States furnished, in 1923, three fourths of the corn crop and, for the four-year period, 1920-1923, over half of the cotton crop of the world. In industry a similar situation exists in the basic elements. The United States produced, in 1923, in both pig iron and steel, double the output of the joint product of Great Britain, France, and Germany; or, between one half and two thirds of

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the pig iron and the steel of the whole world. It also mines from one third to one half of the world's coal, nearly one half of the world's copper, and produces two fifths of its total mineral output. As for the future, the United States has approximately one half of the known coal reserves of the world and one third of the known iron ore reserves. A considerable proportion of these products, especially of agricultural products, Americans need to sell abroad. Of its cotton crop the United States exported, during 1919-1922, more than one half, the average annual value of which was over \$809,000,000. In 1920, a favorable year, of the five principal grains, the United States sold to foreign countries 513,000,000 bushels.

In finance the leadership of the United States is especially marked. Before the war the United States was in debt to the rest of the world between \$2,000,000,000 and \$2,500,000,000; to-day the rest of the world is in debt to the United States about \$18,000,000,000. The significance of this change is clearer from a consideration of somewhat more detailed statistics. In 1914 foreign investments in the United States amounted to about \$4,500,000,000, while American investments abroad totaled \$2,000,000,000 to \$2,500,000,000. In

January, 1925, the United States had loans outstanding to the rest of the world of over \$21,000,000,000; of which sum \$12,041,440,921 in principal and interest (November 15, 1924) was owed by foreign governments to the Government of the United States, and over \$9,000,000,000 was owed to American banks, investment companies, and individuals. Since foreign loans made to American companies or individuals, at the beginning of 1924, have been estimated at about \$3,000,000,000, the rest of the world, as has been stated, owed at the opening of 1925 an approximate net debt to the United States of about \$18,000,000,000. In actual money, this country held, on June 30, 1924, \$4,490,807,000 in gold, nearly one half of all the gold coin and gold bullion in the world. During the year 1924 the rest of the world paid as interest to American investors about \$750,000,000, not including the amounts received by the Government as interest on its war loans. The natural result of this financial situation is that the United States must invest abroad, and our bankers have been doing this on a large scale not only during but since the war. An earthquake took place in Japan, and America, in addition to giving over \$11,000,000 for relief, loaned to Japan \$150,000,000.

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Into the countries of Latin America there has been an almost continuing flow of funds, until American investments are now estimated as approaching \$4,000,000,000. When Austria, a couple of years ago, was put upon a sound financial basis, through the agency of the League of Nations, America contributed \$25,000,000 as its share of the necessary rehabilitation loan. A few months ago, when the franc began to tumble in Paris, New York bankers threw into the balance a hundred million dollars, and more recently sold to American investors a hundred-million-dollar bond issue for the French Government. To carry out the Dawes plan Americans loaned \$110,000,000 to the German Government. These instances are typical. In all there are twenty-one European Governments, not including municipalities and various corporations, which have borrowed from the Government, investment companies, or citizens of the United States. There is every prospect that America will continue to loan largely to foreign countries. During the past year alone, 1924, Americans loaned abroad, according to the Department of Commerce, \$1,208,438,394; and the prospects are that similarly large sums will be advanced in the future. In fact, with the economic situation as it is—

vast sums owed us from abroad, hundreds of millions of dollars coming in annually as interest, and a great amount of gold now in this country—it is practically necessary, according to well-known financial laws, for Americans to continue to loan and invest in foreign lands.

The United States therefore, the wealthiest nation in this compact world of ours, whose civilization is based in an ever-larger measure upon international finance and trade, necessarily has an increasing number of contacts with other nations and a growing interest in their economic well-being, which naturally lead to various forms of international cooperation. Its present active participation with the powers of Europe, both officially and unofficially, in the settlement of the reparations tangle is largely due to the keen realization that American prosperity is affected by conditions in Europe. As the foremost creditor nation for the entire world the United States is concerned over the economic as well as the political stability of countries in which American money has been loaned or invested; and this concern will naturally lead to a greater degree of helpful international action, when necessary, to aid in preserving or restoring stable conditions.

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Another factor which, after a time, will naturally lead the United States into a greater measure of cooperation is the fact that, at present, the United States Government has been practically forced by the action of foreign Governments into an increasing, and sometimes vexatious, competition with them, directly or indirectly, especially for overseas markets for manufactured goods and for raw materials for imports. The United States is coming to be an ever greater producer of manufactured goods for sale abroad. For several years, manufactured articles have formed an increasing proportion of American exports, and this trend will doubtless continue in the future. In the past, the United States has been primarily an agricultural country, depending upon a continuing development of free or cheap land. During the last century, as the population increased, there was a constant stream of settlers, taking up the unoccupied fertile areas of the great West. This cheap land produced quantities of cheap food. In the twenty years between 1880 and 1900 new farm lands were brought under cultivation equal to the combined areas of England, Wales, France, and Germany; but now the good cheap land is practically gone, and population is gaining faster than wheat produc-

tion. There is therefore a near limit to the increase in the export of farm staples. The products which the United States, with its growing population, will sell abroad in ever larger quantities, in order to maintain the present standard of living, must be in greater proportion manufactured goods. In the effort to increase the foreign sales of these commodities, the United States is giving Governmental aid. To enable American exporters to meet the competition of foreign trusts, by the Webb-Pomerene Act it has legalized combinations of American firms for foreign trade. In other words, it has authorized and encouraged the formation of a trust to operate outside the United States, although the same trust would be illegal were it to operate within the United States. By a recent Federal revenue act it has exempted American corporations engaged in foreign trade from the Federal income tax to the amount of this business. That is, the Government, to the extent of its remission of this normal tax, is giving a subsidy to help American firms gain overseas trade. In such ways our Government is competing for foreign markets with other Governments which had previously taken similar action. And this governmental competition is almost certain to increase in the future. With

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Japan it is a "life-and-death" matter to increase its exports. Great Britain has over a million men out of work, due to the failure to sell abroad the necessary amount of manufactured articles. Germany, also, after its hoped-for economic recovery, will need to develop greatly its previous foreign sales. In fact, the manufacturing nations of the world will be competing, in the near future, probably as never before, for export business; and this competition promises to be not merely between the manufacturers and exporters of different countries, but indirectly between the governments of the great powers themselves.

As to raw materials, there is also to be a growing competition between the industrial nations. Although the United States is particularly fortunate in its possession of essential raw materials, there are some products which must be imported. Petroleum is the outstanding case. The United States produces sixty-four per cent of the world's supply, but consumes seventy-two per cent of the world's supply. Further, the reserves in the United States are being exhausted more rapidly than in other countries. Therefore the United States is interested in an equal opportunity to compete for the remaining petroleum resources throughout the world. In Mex-

ico alone American capital up to \$500,000,000 has been invested in the petroleum industry; and this situation forces the United States Government to be concerned in the conditions of investment in Mexico and in the equitable treatment of American oil companies operating there. In Persia there has been a vigorous controversy between British and American groups for petroleum concessions in the northern part of the country, and the Department of State has been keenly interested in maintaining the Open Door for the American companies. In Mesopotamia, according to the San Remo agreement of 1920, Great Britain and France attempted to divide the petroleum output of that region between them; but the United States officially and strongly objected to any such monopolistic settlement. In the Dutch East Indies, our Government has carried on a long controversy with the Dutch Government, asking for equality of opportunity in regard to petroleum. At the recent conference at Lausanne, among other matters, the United States stressed the Open Door, especially in regard to oil concessions. In relation to petroleum alone it is evident there is increasing rivalry and strain, as a result of this international competition, between the industrial nations of the world.

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In regard to other essential raw materials, Secretary Hoover has recently called public attention to the products, needed in this country, which are controlled, in quantity and price, by outside groups, and the prices of which are in some cases unreasonably high. He named, among other products, sisal, used for binding twine, which is controlled by the State of Yucatan and a combination of producers; nitrates and iodine, controlled by a British selling agency and by the Chilean Government through a high export tax; potash, controlled by German producers; tin, largely controlled by British producers; rubber, controlled by combinations of producers in the British and Dutch colonies; and coffee, controlled by the Government of the State of Sao Paulo in Brazil. The value of the total products mentioned by Secretary Hoover amounted, in 1923, to \$525,000,000. For some of these essential raw materials American consumers were compelled to pay an excessive amount. On sisal binding twine, a few years ago, the price was advanced at once three hundred per cent; and a hundred million dollars in excess profits taken from American purchasers. To meet this situation Mr. Hoover has advocated that a law be passed permitting the formation in this country of common pur-

chasing agencies. Should this be done, the United States would be using its legislative power, in rivalry with foreign states or groups of producers, to obtain an adequate supply, at a reasonable price, of important raw materials. Already the Government has begun action to lower the price of rubber and coffee. Due to the restrictions on crude rubber adopted November, 1922, by the British colonies in the East Indies, Congress authorized the Department of Commerce and the Department of Agriculture to make a thorough study of rubber and other raw materials with a view to making the United States less dependent on these East Indian areas. As a result, three Government commissions were sent out to investigate the possibilities of developing rubber production in the Philippines, the Amazon Valley, and the Caribbean region, so that these lands might compete with the East Indies. More recently, in December, 1924, Secretary Hoover instructed the American commercial attaché in Brazil to study the possible methods of reducing the price of coffee, which is unduly high on account of restrictions imposed by the State of Sao Paulo. In these ways the United States Government is coming into competition with other governments over economic issues.

If the United States is so much disturbed over the control of raw materials by outside agencies, it is easy to appreciate the keen national apprehension of such governments as Japan and Italy, which lack an adequate supply of the most essential materials needed in industry.

In finance the United States Government has begun to exercise a degree of supervision over foreign loans. It announced, in 1922, its desire that American bankers should not thereafter lend money abroad without consultation with the Department of State, which might wish to raise objections "in view of the possible national interests involved." The aim of our Government, as with other Governments which have long exercised similar or more rigorous supervision, is at present largely to prevent undesirable foreign loans; but every foreign loan in this situation tends to become a semi-governmental transaction. Before the war, Governments have at times supported their respective nationals in their competition for the privilege of making loans which were regarded as financially or politically profitable. This has happened a number of times in China. President Taft, in 1909, even sent a direct personal cable to the Regent of the Chinese Empire insisting upon "equal

participation by American capital in the present railway loan."

In the past it has been the industrial-commercial-capitalistic states which have most frequently quarreled and made war. In the future the competition between states of this type, of which the United States is one, will become more severe, and the natural and logical result will be that the competing Governments will practically be forced to come to some business agreement providing a greater measure of international cooperation in trade and finance. According to Dr. Isaiah Bowman, "there must necessarily come either war or a pooling and rationing system with respect to those waning resources that are most nearly vital."¹ Professor Frederick J. Turner, in his recent Founder's Day address at Clark University, declared: "Truly a shrinking earth! An earth compelled by irresistible forces to exercise restraint, to associate, agree, and adjust or to commit suicide." General Tasker H. Bliss, before the Council on Foreign Relations, in 1923, said: "It is the business men of a few great nations that will decide most future questions of peace or war. Can they not decide them in a business way? Can they

¹ From Bowman's Supplement to *The New World*, p. 63. Copyright 1923, 1924, World Book Company, Yonkers-on-Hudson, New York.

not establish a working rule that will guarantee a fair distribution of the natural products of the world—that will assure their supply of coal, iron, copper, oil, or what not in the markets of the world without the constant apprehension of political interference? If they can, they will do more than anything else to check war for the indefinite future.”² Mr. Hughes, in his Montreal address, September 4, 1923, stated, “I believe that we shall be able at no distant day to keep within reasonable limits some of our pressing economic rivalries by fair international agreements in which the self-interests of rivals will submit to mutual restrictions in the furtherance of friendly accord.”

The importance of this statement by Mr. Hughes can hardly be overestimated. The American Secretary of State commits himself to the principle of cooperation with other nations in dealing with those issues which in the past have probably been the greatest cause of war, and which for the most part have hitherto been reserved for the exclusive action of each of the several nations concerned. Should this principle be generally accepted, the natural methods of carrying it out would lead to a notable development of joint interna-

²*Foreign Affairs, Supplement*, Vol. i, No. 3, p. ix.

tional action in the economic field. International Commissions are suggested by Secretary Hughes as appropriate agencies for the investigation of the facts in disputes of an economic nature, particularly those which arise from the effect upon one state of the domestic legislation of another. An International Joint Commission for the United States and Canada is already in existence, empowered to investigate and report upon issues arising under the treaty of 1909 in connection with the American-Canadian boundary. It would be advisable, Secretary Hughes believes, to create a permanent joint commission for these two countries, to which would be referred automatically, for examination and report as to the facts, all questions concerning the bearing of the governmental action of the one upon the interests of the other. Were such commissions of investigation generally established between commercial countries, there would naturally be referred to them such complaints as those against the British in the East Indies for their alleged undue increase in the price of rubber, against Brazil for its limitation of the supply of coffee, and against the state of Yucatan for its restrictions on the export of sisal. Suspicion and fear are among the greatest dangers in economic as well as in

political rivalry. Impartial investigation of the facts in an economic dispute might well show that there were few, if any, grounds for complaint, or, by justifying the complaint, might lead more readily to some settlement.

Special international conferences might be held to deal with important economic issues or groups of related issues, much as the Washington Conference dealt with the limitation of naval armament and the problems of the Pacific and the Far East. A conference to consider the question of petroleum would appear to be needed at the present time. The recent opium conferences, called to deal with a raw material important because of its injurious effect upon health, show the possibility of international conferences called to deal with a raw material important because of its effect upon international friendship and peace. After such a conference had drawn up an international agreement as to any commodity, it might well set up a commission to settle disputes which would arise under the terms of the agreement, similar to the commissions provided for by the Nine-Power Treaty in regard to China, or even to the Interstate Commerce Commission in our own country.

A more radical method of dealing with the most fundamental of the economic issues be-

tween states would be international agreements providing that each country should have an opportunity to purchase a just proportion of the essential raw materials needed. Such an arrangement was actually made under the pressure of the World War. Representatives of the Entente, comprising the Allied Maritime Transport Council, sat about a table, presented statements of the amounts their countries needed of such essential commodities as wheat or coal, checked up the information presented by others, and made agreements as to the division of the available supplies, which were then ratified by the various governments, and loyally carried out.

Such methods as these for dealing with international disputes of an economic nature, which are constantly pressing for some friendly adjustment, show the possibilities of greatly increased cooperation between nations within this new field in the relatively near future. At the Institute of Politics at Williamstown, in 1923, Dr. William S. Culbertson, Vice-Chairman of the Tariff Commission, in closing a series of Round Table discussions upon international relations from the economic standpoint, stated that the choice which faces the nations is—force or cooperation.

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With a world growing smaller, its resources limited, intense competition for these resources and for markets in which to sell manufactured goods, with industry and finance so organized that unfortunate economic conditions or political instability in any region will affect the prosperity of other countries, with the United States closely bound to other lands through constantly increasing financial ties, and with joint action by the nations already well under way, it is clear that the future policy of the United States, as well as that of the world as a whole, must include closer international cooperation, economic and political.

The only question is, What kind of cooperation shall there be? There are already many different types now in existence. In addition to the League of Nations, with its multitudinous agencies for joint international action, there are regional organizations of states. The most notable is the one for this hemisphere, with its Pan-American Union and frequent Pan-American conferences. For the Pacific and Far East agreements for regional international cooperation were made by the Four-Power Treaty regarding the Pacific Islands, and by the Nine-Power Treaty regarding China. Permanent organizations

of states have been created for particular objects. At present there are in all thirty international associations of this kind, of which the most important probably are the Universal Postal Union, with its membership of sixty states, and the Universal Telegraph Union, with thirty states. The former is practically an international government, since it has an international congress, which makes regulations, and bureaus, which carry them out. International conferences frequently meet to draw up agreements on definite subjects. Some of these conferences are world-wide in scope, dealing with such general humanitarian topics as the restriction of opium; others are regional, such as the Pan-American Financial and Pan-American Scientific Conferences, and the Washington Conference insofar as it considered the problems of the Pacific and the Far East. Between two or more states many hundreds of treaties exist which regulate their conduct, or provide for common action, in particular fields; while commissions, in increasing number, act as international administrators in limited areas or for definite subjects, such as the European Danube Commission and the Commission for the Saar Basin. Unofficial international organizations are various in form and pur-

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pose. In the decade between 1901-1910 there were seven hundred and ninety unofficial international conferences. Of such gatherings some are educational or religious in character, and tend in a measure to develop a better understanding between the various national groups represented; others relate to international business and attempt, though in a very small way as yet, to lessen, in particular fields, the economic rivalry which is such a potent cause of friction between modern states.

There is no reason why the states of the world should limit themselves to any one particular form of international cooperation. Surely the United States does not do so, while many nations are now participating with others through agencies of each of these types. It is probable that in the coming age Governments and peoples will resort, in an increasing degree, to every one of these various agencies for dealing with matters of international concern.

FUTURE OF THE REGIONAL POLICIES OF THE UNITED STATES

The query of especial interest to a student of American foreign relations is what effect the increase in international cooperation,

which is certain to take place, will have upon the three great regional policies of the United States. As to relations with Europe, not only is it probable, from the general factors considered and from the trend in the world as a whole, that America is to participate in an increasing measure in European affairs, but this likelihood is strengthened by the history of our own governmental relations with Europe during the last quarter century. It has been impossible to maintain the old policy of taking no part in the political issues of Europe. Before the World War political isolation was breaking down under Roosevelt; during the war the attempt to keep out of the European struggle was a failure, and since the war the effort of the Senate to renew the political isolation of the Fathers has collapsed under the pressure of American interest in the restoration of Europe. There can be no question as to our increased cooperation with Europe; the only question is as to its form and extent. America will doubtless take part more frequently and more intimately with Europe in the field of economics and finance, as it has recently begun to do; and this cooperation will probably be followed by participation in conferences dealing with such topics as limitation of armament. But the vital

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problems of European economics and finance are largely political, as is evident from the recent effort to settle the reparations tangle, while any attempt to take part in discussing the world-wide restriction of land forces will touch the nerve center of European political life. Drawn on by joint action of this character, our Government will doubtless gradually come to take an open, official part in helping, as a mediator, to solve the great political issues of Europe which affect the peace or essential well-being of the continent, and therefore concern the American people. This rôle has already been played incognito at the London Conference.

The policy of political isolation, as expounded by the Fathers and the present Senate, will thus gradually become obsolete. Some parts of this policy, however, will probably remain, for there is no reason to believe that the United States will ever regard itself as a real European Power, or be willing to concern itself with the minor disputes of the Continent. It will probably always wish to leave the Balkan squabbles—in the first instance and unless they threaten world peace—exclusively to Europe.

In the Americas a marked increase in co-operation between the United States and the

Latin-American republics has recently been taking place through the numerous Pan-American Conferences which are being held to deal with special subjects of common interest. But at the same time the Latin-American countries are showing greater interest and activity in the League. It is a question whether Washington or Geneva will be the more potent center. The outcome will depend largely upon the action of the United States, its freedom from foreign aggression, and the sympathy and understanding shown in dealing with the other countries of the hemisphere. The United States, with its distinct culture and civilization and its overwhelming power and wealth, needs to exercise the utmost tact to retain the spirit of cordial fraternity within the Pan-American group, and avoid a natural tendency on the part of the more numerous, culturally somewhat homogeneous, but weaker Latin-American states to unite in an association by themselves. The prospect is that Latin America will continue to cooperate with the United States in matters of general American interest, and with the League in matters of world concern. What is at stake, then, in this hemisphere is not an increase of international cooperation, but the form which this cooperation will take, and the

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leadership of the United States in the movement.

In the Pacific and Far East the present American policy of full cooperation with the other states of that region in settling its economic and political issues will probably continue for some years to come. In the Pacific Ocean the United States will permanently remain one of the most interested powers, due to its many island possessions—the Aleutians, Hawaii, the Philippines, Guam, and Tutuila. But it is possible that a considerable change will take place in American foreign policy for Continental Asia, at least in the part the Government will play in its affairs. To one who wishes to see the international world ordered logically there is a noticeable contrast between American policy toward Europe and that toward the Far East. The United States, since it is not a European power, has insisted upon avoiding participation in the political affairs of Europe; yet although it is not genuinely an Asiatic power, it is taking a leading part in settling political affairs of Eastern Asia. The American possession of the Philippines, which Secretary John Hay and others advanced as our claim to political partnership in the Orient, gives merely a technical basis for our action; the United States

had nearly, if not quite, as much real interest in the Far East before the acquisition of these islands as at present, as was shown by a half century of activity in the Far East before 1898, especially by the naval demonstration which brought about the opening of Japan. Should the Philippines become independent, American concern over developments in Asia would scarcely be lessened. Our full cooperation in Far Eastern affairs has been due particularly to the fact that China, in which the United States has had important interests, economic, religious and educational, has been unable, on account of its different standard of civilization and its political and military weakness, to protect the lives, property, or legitimate rights of foreigners, or to defend itself against aggressions of other states. This situation led to extraterritoriality and customs supervision, in which the United States shared, and to territorial encroachments by Japan and certain European powers, and the grave danger of the partition of the country. But should China develop a strong, capable government, as has Japan, and free herself from foreign supervision, and should Asia then gradually form such a state system as has Europe, the Far Eastern nations would naturally settle

their ordinary disputes by themselves. In fact, Japan already feels that she is entitled to lead Eastern Asia to function as a regional international group. This view has been expressed through the Japanese Monroe Doctrine and the Lansing-Ishii Agreement, both of which have been opposed by American opinion for fear that they would sanction the violation of the Open Door. But some of the leading American statesmen have believed that the states of Asia, while maintaining the Open Door, should themselves deal with local Asiatic problems. Mr. Roosevelt, in his last editorial, expressed this idea: "Let civilized Europe and Asia introduce some kind of police system in the weak and disorderly countries at their thresholds." This statement has strongly appealed to the Japanese, and was quoted with approval by the liberal-minded Japanese professor, Doctor Fujisawa, in his Williamstown addresses, in 1922. The same point of view has been revealed in the recently published confidential report of Viscount Kaneko's mission to the United States during the Russo-Japanese War.

There is already some sentiment in favor of Asiatic solidarity, which is frequently expressed through the watchword, "Asia for the Asiatics." This sentiment has been strength-

ened, as has been pointed out, by the recent American exclusion legislation directed against Asiatics as a race. It is possible that after some years Japan, a strong China, and other Asiatic states may come to such an understanding that they will by themselves deal with the ordinary difficulties of the Far East. In that case the United States would cooperate with them only in the more important issues and those in which American interests would be directly involved. The United States would still remain a Pacific power, but toward Continental Asia its attitude would come to be more comparable to its attitude towards Europe. While we shall certainly have less "political isolation" in regard to Europe, we may possibly have more "political isolation" in regard to Eastern Asia; while we shall take an increasing part in European affairs, we may take a decreasing part in Oriental matters. But due to its island possessions in the Pacific—stepping-stones across the ocean—the United States will always have a keener political interest in the Far East than in Europe.

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

The world, however, cannot be separated into three water-tight compartments—

Europe, the Americas, and Asia. There must be some international organization to deal with subjects which are necessarily world-wide in character, and the League of Nations promises to remain the only organization of this kind. Striking progress has already been made by the United States in cooperating with the committees of the League and in participating in conferences held under the auspices of the League which deal with humanitarian problems and issues of general international importance. In fact, it appears to some that we are now drifting into the position of an informal associate member of the League.

Of the various objections in the minds of Americans to the next natural step—joining the League with adequate reservations—probably the strongest is the belief that the League is essentially a European organization, membership in which would force the United States to participate in the settlement of issues which primarily concern only the countries in the state system of Europe. For this belief there is some measure of justification, notwithstanding the fact that the League includes eighteen of the twenty-one American republics and most of the states and self-governing dominions of Asia, Africa, and Oceania. The important political issues con-

sidered by the League have all related to Europe, or the European zone which embraces northern Africa and the Near East. Practically every strictly local question passed upon, with the possible exception of those relating to the administration of Mandates, has been European. A list of the important problems which have come before the Council of the League makes this fact clear: the ownership of the Aaland Islands, the boundary in Upper Silesia, the possession of Vilna, the occupation of Albania, armed bands on the Bulgarian frontiers, the seizure of Corfu, Hungarian property in Rumania, the territory of Memel, the financial reconstruction of Austria and Hungary, the administration of the Saar Basin and of the Free City of Dantzig, the protection of minorities in various countries of Europe, the exchange of racial minority groups between Greece and Turkey, and boundary problems between Austria and Hungary, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and Hungary and Jugo-Slavia. American problems, since the formation of the League, have been considered not by the League but by the Fifth International Conference of American States at Santiago, and by the Central American Conference at Washington, and continue to be considered by the

numerous Pan-American Conferences, by the Pan-American Union, and by direct negotiations between the Governments of American republics. Pacific and Far Eastern problems have been dealt with by the Washington Conference upon the Limitation of Armament and its commissions, and continue to be dealt with by informal conferences at Peking of the ministers of powers interested in China, and by direct negotiations between the Governments of these powers.

It would be a logical development should the European states form a league of their own, or a group within the League of Nations, to deal with the local political issues of Europe. A European group would doubtless, with their experience in the League, create a more effective regional organization than that possessed by the states of the Americas or of the Far East. But such an arrangement would provide at least some kind of international agency for the settlement of the local issues of each of the three great regions of the world, and would leave the League of Nations to deal with general matters which are essentially of universal concern, or disputes which threaten the peace of the world. Should the United States, in this way, be relieved of the need of taking part in European politics,

American opinion would at once become much more favorable to the League, and the possibility of the United States joining the League with reservations, would be greatly increased. Although the creation of such a new European group is possible, since many in Europe recognize its desirability, it is not probable, for the large majority in Europe apparently favor the League as it is, and feel the need of the advice and moral support of strong non-European powers, especially of the United States, in helping to settle Europe's many perplexing difficulties.

As the League now functions, and as it will probably continue to function, it really fulfills at least three somewhat different purposes. It deals with local affairs of the European zone, but not with those of the Americas or of the Pacific and Far East; it considers matters of a general international character; and it is working out a plan for world security and the outlawry of war. These fields overlap, and frequently it is not easy to decide in which field a particular issue really belongs; but this difficulty is commonly experienced in every political organization of a federal character, and is well understood by Americans who are so often perplexed in drawing a sharp line between the affairs of their state and

their national Government. But the principle of making a distinction in practice between the local affairs of the three regional areas and those of general world concern is clear enough and is supported by American experience and opinion. Into the first field—the disputes over the Saar Basin, Upper Silesia, Corfu, the protection of minority nationalities in Central and Eastern Europe—the majority of the American people, in their present state of mind, are apparently disinclined to enter; but in the subjects of the second field, which include world-wide humanitarian movements, such as the suppression of the traffic in opium and in women and children, and such topics of general interest as the trade in arms, standardization of customs requirements, and uniform regulations against contagious disease, they are genuinely concerned and in these matters they are clearly willing to cooperate with the League. In the third field there is at least one measure evidently favored by the overwhelming majority of Americans: membership by the United States in the Permanent Court of International Justice in accordance with the Hughes-Harding-Coolidge conditions. It is widely believed, with an almost pathetic hopefulness, that America's entrance into this Court will be a long step toward the

establishment of world security and the outlawry of war.

Under these conditions the United States will, for some few years, probably advance rapidly along its present path, the middle course adopted by the Harding-Coolidge Administration, cooperating with the League in affairs which concern this country, but avoiding, so far as possible, participation in European political problems. As the United States increases its cooperation in these general nonpolitical issues, the American people will recognize, ever more clearly, the value of a world organization with its permanent Secretariat and its frequent international conferences. After joint action with the League, within definite limits, has come to seem natural and normal, it will be but a step for the United States to regularize this procedure by becoming a member of the League with such reservations as would be necessary to preserve its freedom of action in dealing with political issues.

The movement in favor of joining the League will have the constant support of a considerable proportion of the American people, who are deeply in earnest in this matter, and who regard the issue as a moral, not a political one—and moral ideals are not easily

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surrendered. The movement now has the official indorsement of some of the strongest Protestant churches, and probably the individual support of a large majority of all members of the Protestant clergy. It is also backed by organized labor, with its growing power. Should the League itself continue to develop in strength and prestige, should practically all the states of the world become members, and should the United States cooperate in its nonpolitical activities with growing frequency and cordiality—all of which now seems probable—the League idea will make an increasingly strong appeal to the judgment and the conscience of the American people.

POLICY OF WORLD PEACE

In addition to its regional foreign policies, the United States has certain world policies, the most important of which is the advancement of world peace. "The leading principle of all our foreign relations," President Coolidge termed it in his annual message to Congress of December 3, 1924. Probably no people are more opposed to war as an institution than the American people; probably no government has done more in the effort to limit or suppress it than the American Government. Never militaristic in the European sense, nor

inclined to regard war cold-bloodedly as a proper means of achieving their national aims, the American people—however obstinate and even belligerent they may have been in specific controversies—have been one of the leaders in the general movement to settle international disputes by arbitration rather than by war. The Jay Treaty of 1794 with Great Britain, negotiated shortly after the national Government was established, by providing for three arbitral commissions, is said to have given birth to modern international arbitration. In 1832 the Massachusetts Senate passed a resolution that “some mode should be established for the amicable and final adjustment of all international disputes instead of resorting to war.” Shortly before 1840 a popular movement developed in favor of calling a congress of nations for the establishment of some international tribunal. The following decade, in 1851, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate reported favorably a resolution calling for treaty agreements with other nations “for referring to the decision of umpires all future misunderstandings that cannot be satisfactorily adjusted by amicable negotiations in the first instance, before a resort to hostilities shall be had.” In 1872 the war-threatening Alabama claims were

settled at Geneva, the first of a series of notable arbitrations with Great Britain. The very same year Charles Sumner urged in the United States Senate the establishment of a tribunal which should be a "complete substitute for war." It was an American President who brought the first case, the Pious Fund Issue with Mexico, to the Permanent Court of Arbitration established by the Hague Conference of 1899. It was the United States Government which gave the strongest support to the proposal for a Court of Arbitral Justice, which was adopted in principle by the second Hague Conference of 1907. The United States has bound itself by many treaties of peace, some of them providing for the arbitration of all justiciable issues which do not affect vital interests, independence, or national honor, or concern the interests of third parties, and others stipulating for the submission to an impartial investigation of all disputes which cannot be settled by diplomacy. And an Act of Congress, passed August 29, 1916, announced arbitration as a national principle: "It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to adjust and settle its international disputes through mediation or arbitration, to the end that war may be honorably avoided."

The policy of mutual limitation of armament was also officially set forth in this same Act. In this field the United States has been the world leader. In 1817 it joined Great Britain in restricting the number of naval ships on the Great Lakes, the most significant limitation of armament in the nineteenth century. By initiating the Washington Conference in 1921, it led in effecting the only important agreement ever made by the great powers as a whole for the mutual reduction of any of their military forces. The American attitude has been shown, more recently, by the proposals for further similar conferences, which have been made frequently in Congress—notably in the recent Congress—included in the platforms of the leading political parties, and voiced by the President.

After the World War had proved that the existing system of arbitration and the few agreements regarding armament were unable to preserve peace, the United States officially took the lead in the formation of a League of Nations to prevent war. But since the United States has now declined to enter the League, it has no other specific proposal to take its place. It still maintains the principle of arbitration and mutual limitation of armament, but it has no definite, comprehensive plan for

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realizing its leading general policy—the achievement of world peace.

War is the world's greatest problem. Although the World War was often called "a war to end war," there are in Europe to-day nearly as many soldiers under arms as before 1914. The frightful cost of the last gigantic struggle is still fresh in mind. The loss of life which it caused, directly and indirectly, according to the figures of Professor E. L. Bogart, totaled approximately 26,000,000—a number greater than the entire population at that time of New York, Ohio, and the six New England States. The last war caused indescribable destruction in large areas, as in Northern France; and a breakdown of civilization, as in Russia. Yet the next war, it is generally believed, will bring results very much worse.

Fleets of aeroplanes dropping poison gas upon great cities make the center of the picture, as it is generally painted, of the next great international conflict. Poison gas is now bringing about a more profound change in warfare than has been made by any other invention since that of gunpowder, according to General Amos A. Fries, Chief of the Chemical Warfare Service of the United States Army. In his official report for the

year ending June 30, 1924, he writes, "Perhaps the most interesting event of the last two years, and particularly of the last year, is the growth of chemical warfare development throughout the nations of the world." The poison gas will be carried by pilotless aeroplanes—such is the prophecy of General M. M. Patrick, Chief of the United States Army Air Service. A radio-controlled plane has already been developed. Squadrons of these, he states, can be maneuvered from a distance, and be forced to drop their bombs at a fixed height over a predetermined object or city. Enemy submarines may rise to the surface at night, off some unexpected part of the coast—so writes Lieutenant-Commander Fitzhugh Green, of the United States Navy—release the planes which they will be carrying, and guide them by radio into the heart of the hostile country. Against such an invasion, he says, there is no defense. The results of a gas attack upon a great city by aeroplanes have recently been described by Dr. Norris F. Hall, of the Chemistry Department, of Harvard University: "Even two hundred tons a day of many of the gases now available would paralyze completely all industrial life in a large city." By selecting the right gas the city might be made uninhabitable, al-

though with small loss of life, or "the streets could be piled high with dead." Such prophecies are substantiated by similar statements recently made by Thomas A. Edison, Dr. L. H. Baekland, a former president of the American Chemical Society, and Sir Max Muspratt, one of the eminent British chemists.

Such a vision of the next war led the present Chancellor of the British Exchequer, Winston Churchill, to write his widely read pamphlet, "Shall We Commit Suicide?" The same thought Secretary Herbert Hoover expressed in a recent address, when he declared that another great war would be "the cemetery of civilization."

The horrors of such a conflict, visualized against the background of the misery of the recent international struggle, have doubtless been the chief cause of the increasing demand by Christian denominations for the abolition of the war system. Nearly every prominent religious organization in the country has passed insistent resolutions within the past two or three years against war as an institution. The following are typical: "War is not inevitable. It is the supreme enemy of mankind. . . . We are determined to outlaw the whole war system" (Methodist Episcopal

General Conference, May, 1924); "It is the most colossal and ruinous social sin that afflicts humanity to-day" (Baptist Convention, June, 1924); "It threatens the existence of civilization" (Universalist General Convention, October, 1923); "War is a colossal sin to be relentlessly condemned and eradicated from our common life" (The World Alliance for International Friendship through the Churches, Convention, November, 1924); "The church cannot permit war to remain the only method for the ultimate settlement of disputes between nations" (Protestant Episcopal House of Bishops, November, 1923); "The Presbyterian Church in the United States of America pledges all its energies to the outlawing of war" (General Assembly, May, 1924). The Federal Council of the Churches of Christ, representing nearly all of the leading Protestant denominations, issued a declaration at its recent convention, in December, 1924, calling for a crusade for a warless world. The religious and moral opposition to war was never stronger in this country than at the present time. The general policy of the United States to advance world peace has more insistent and more widespread support than ever before.

To realize this policy an essential means is

increased cooperation with other nations. The vigorous resolutions of the religious organizations calling for the destruction of the war system, although vague as to the exact method to be employed, are in general agreement as to the necessity of concerted action by the United States with other powers. The need of international cooperation has recently been stressed by the President and by the Secretary of State. President Coolidge said, in Chicago, December 3, 1924: "We can no more assure permanent and stable peace without cooperation among the nations, than we could assure victory in war without allies among them. We know that the way to assured and permanent peace is slow and difficult. We know that no nation can travel that way alone." Secretary Hughes said in London, July 21, 1924: "Our people have a passion for peace; you may count, as I have said, upon America's devotion to this cause, and upon our purpose to cooperate with you and with others in every way that is congenial to our institutions in the interest of peace."

There is no question as to the necessity of increased cooperation; the only issue is as to the type of cooperation which should be adopted and the degree to which the United States should participate with other powers.

Some of the next steps which this country will almost certainly take may be foreseen with reasonable clearness, for they are in line with its past and present policies. These will be: participation in a world court—almost certainly the existing Permanent Court of International Justice—and in conferences for developing and codifying international law; international agreements for further limitation of armament; more frequent special and regional conferences, such as those dealing with opium and the traffic in arms, the Washington Conference in its relation to the problems of the Pacific and the Far East, and the many Pan-American and Central American gatherings; and closer cooperation with the nonpolitical agencies and activities of the League. These increased measures of cooperation will all work for the maintenance of peace, but each has its limitations. A World Court to interpret a reasonably definite code of international law will settle an increasing number of specific disputes between states, some of which might otherwise fester until they would break out into war; but it is doubtful whether states will submit to the Court issues which they regard as vital unless forced to do so by treaty or the pressure of the organized nations of the

world. It is also significant that the large majority of the wars of the past two hundred years arose from other than strictly justifiable issues; an excellent example of such wars are those fought in the nineteenth century for Italian liberation, when efforts were made to drive the Austrian government out from Northern Italy, where it was established strictly in accordance with existing international law. Further limitation of armament will prevent a competition which frequently arouses such suspicion and fear between rival states that public opinion is prepared to go to war over issues which otherwise might have been settled amicably; but limitation of armament does not deal with the disputes themselves arising between the states. Frequent special conferences will doubtless remove many international misunderstandings and even settle complicated tangles of conflicting issues, as did the Washington Conference; but they would be unable to deal with such a sudden emergency as arose in Europe in July, 1914. Cooperation with the League in its nonpolitical agencies will develop the spirit of team-work between the nations in working for the common good of the world; but it will give the United States no direct part in achieving the purpose

for which the League was formed—the prevention of war.

These steps, which would certainly tend to lessen friction between states, facilitate a settlement of issues which become acute, and develop in some measure a feeling of international confidence and good will, may possibly be adequate to maintain general peace. The present relations between the United States and Canada might lead to such a conclusion. Aided by an almost total elimination of frontier armament, by a tradition of arbitral settlement of disputes which arise, and by an essentially common culture and civilization, there has developed a mutual attitude of good will which places war between the two countries beyond the bounds of practical international politics.

But the leaders of a majority of the nations apparently are convinced that further measures of international cooperation are essential in order to maintain the peace of the world: a forum should be organized for the mobilization of world opinion upon disputes endangering peace, a guarantee of protection be given to states against attack, and aggressive war be outlawed by the family of nations. Following the idea of a mutual pledge of assistance against attack, advanced

progressively by three American Presidents, Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson, the League of Nations was organized, with the chief purpose of meeting these first two needs. But although the League has functioned successfully as a forum for the effective expression of general international opinion, the pledge of assistance in case of attack has become a dead letter. During the past two or three years, however, a study by the League of the problem of limitation of armament showed clearly that large armies could not be reduced unless some other assurance of protection could be given to nations, particularly in Europe, which are in acute fear of attack. The craving for security leads not only to excessive armament but to exclusive military alliances, both of which endanger peace. At the same time that the leaders of the League were coming to the conviction that a mutual pledge of protection must be given, there developed in the United States a strong movement in favor of outlawing aggressive war by making it an act criminal by international law. The result was the Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, drawn up by the delegates of forty-eight states at Geneva, in October, 1924. This draft treaty attempts to restore force to the League, gives

the pledge of protection to League members, provides in detail for the consideration by Court or board of conciliation of every dispute which cannot be settled by diplomacy, and agrees to outlaw as an aggressor any state which shall go to war without submitting the dispute at issue to some prescribed method of settlement. Although the Protocol will not be adopted as it stands, the principles upon which it was based were accepted at Geneva by the greater number of the states of the world.

If this majority judgment of the world is correct, the United States will be forced to take some part in similar measures, together with other nations, in order to make successful its policy of gaining world peace. To avert another war, world-wide in character, should it seem immediately impending, public opinion in this country would probably support the Government in any action which should seem necessary. The difficulty with any plan for peace, however, is not so much with the principle that the nations must co-operate to prevent a world war as it is in working out the principle in its detailed applications. The movement for the outlawry of war, for example, has recently gained great strength within the United States. It is

backed by some of the strongest religious denominations, indorsed by the Democratic National platform, and supported sympathetically by President Coolidge. In its simple form, it calls for general international action declaring aggressive war to be a crime, and thus taking from it the status of legality which it enjoys by present international law. But the more general opinion is that to make outlawry effective some international machinery must be developed for determining which is the aggressor state and for penalizing it, as was done in the Geneva Protocol. But the Protocol raised many perplexing issues, even for the members of the League, due to the difficulty of determining in advance just when a state shall be deemed an aggressor, and under what conditions, if any, a domestic matter may be treated as an international issue.

A particular perplexity exists for the United States in reconciling its policy of world peace with its policy of nonparticipation in European politics. Should a war between two Balkan states appear probable, American opinion would doubtless regard it as solely a European affair, which the United States should take no action to prevent, so long as the conflict promised to remain local.

But should a war between France and Germany appear impending, with the probability of involving the other great powers of Europe, American opinion would doubtless insist that the Government should make earnest efforts to maintain peace. The real difficulty lies in the regional attitude which the United States takes toward its international relations. It feels a particular responsibility for peace in the Americas; it regards itself as a Pacific, if not a Far Eastern power; but it wishes to leave entirely to Europe the settlement of European political issues, unless these should threaten a great war, which would be world-wide in character. But it is impossible to draw a sharp line in advance between wars which the United States would regard as local to Europe and those which it would regard as of general concern. Nor would it be safe to wait for an international crisis before developing the means through which the United States could instantly consult together with the statesmen of other powers and cooperate with them adequately and effectively to maintain peace. A logical and possible step would be the creation of some sort of associate relationship with the Council of the League of Nations by which the United States would take a full part in its

deliberations whenever, in its judgment, an issue involving general world peace should be involved. A somewhat similar relationship has recently been created in the Reparation Commission, where an American is an official member only when there is a consideration of matters which are covered by the Dawes plan.

The problem of getting the world from a war basis to a permanent peace basis is so difficult, so many conflicting or partial solutions are urged by different groups or schools of thought, and the detailed application of any plan—should one be generally agreed upon—is so full of perplexities that it is not surprising Secretary Hughes has said, "The pathway of peace is the longest and most beset with obstacles the human race has to tread." But if even a reasonably rapid progress is to be made toward the abolition of the war system, it will require an increasingly close and effective cooperation by the nations of the world, including the United States. The American policy of general international peace, as well as the growing unity of the world in so many material respects, will draw the United States almost irresistibly into an ever greater measure of organized, helpful association with the other

nations of the world. The details of such co-operation cannot be foreseen, but the general direction of future American foreign relations is clear.

In the task of cooperation for international peace a peculiar obligation rests upon the United States. It is the most powerful and richest of the nations of the world; it is the most free from danger and fear of attack from an enemy state; it is untrammelled by the long-time enmities which so hamper the action of many of the great powers; it is the leader in a hemisphere of republics largely exempt from the conditions which have produced the wars of the Old World; it stands, guarded by two oceans, midway between the two populous danger zones of the world—Europe and Asia. By its tradition it supports a policy of world peace; by its form of government it presents an example of a federation of sovereign states. From its strength, its geographical situation, its century-long policy, and its governmental structure, the United States is the best fitted of all the nations to take the leadership in bringing about a peaceful world. The especial responsibility resting upon our country was recognized some years ago by Theodore Roosevelt, who said, "We, here in America, hold in our hands

the fate of the world, the hope of coming years."

To replace the war system by a system of international peace would be the greatest blessing which could be conferred upon mankind. Here, then, is the world's greatest opportunity for service. Does this not make an appeal to our America, to the power of the nation, to the organizing genius of which we boast, and to the idealism which has dominated our national life when we have been at our best? It was our ablest critic, Viscount Bryce, who said, "No one who has known America for half a century or, indeed, for a far shorter time will ever doubt American idealism."

The existence of war as an institution is an especial challenge to the educated men and women of America, for the abolition of war is a problem of such perplexing difficulty that it demands the highest qualities of the intellectual class, keenness of thought, breadth of mental vision, and strength of moral purpose. The college trains men to serve best society and civilization; here is a field in which society has probably made least advance from the Stone Age to the present, a field in which civilization periodically almost completely breaks down. The true college

man jumps at a challenge to take part in a hard struggle for a great cause. Here, then, is a challenge, to the college men of America, to do their part as leaders in this long-continuing struggle to solve the problem of war.

The American Government, in its efforts to carry out wisely and effectively the increasingly close cooperation which will take place with other nations for the advancement of world peace, will need the support of a public, not intent upon selfish national gain, timorous for fear of making a false step, willing to follow at a distance the advance of other nations less qualified for leadership; but, rather, a public insistent that war as an institution shall be destroyed, afraid not so much of making a false move as of making inadequate effort, conscious of the difficulty of the task but with faith that it can be done, seeking less national advantage than the accomplishment of a great service to the world as a whole—a people guided by the truth expressed in the words of that keen-minded Secretary of State, Elihu Root: "Not what a nation does for itself, but what a nation does for humanity is its title to honor and glory."

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